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I. TOPIC 
THE JOINT COMPRENHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION ON NUCLEAR 
DEVELOPMENT AS A MECHANISM OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY OVER IRAN  
 
II. ABSTRACT 
 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a legal instrument signed on 
June 2015 that allows international monitoring to all uranium enrichment plants in 
Iranian territory in exchange of lifting the sanctions imposed to the development 
of the Iranian nuclear program. By studying the document itself and the foreign 
policy of Iran and The United States, this dissertation aims to analyze the 
influence of American foreign policy in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan Of Action (JCPOA) to remain a hegemon over Iran in nuclear issues. In 
order to verify that the modification of the American foreign policy in nuclear 
issues towards Iran, would have been caused by the preponderant role of the 
United States in the international community and the Iranian need to end the 
sanctions, which would be evidenced by the signing of Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) that maintains the current hegemonic system, this dissertation 
will use a neorealist also referred as structural neorealism as theoretical 
framework. Additionally, a qualitative methodology through an inductive approach 
will be used to develop this dissertation. After determining the motivations of the 
United States to change the strategy of sanctions and start negotiating with Iran 
and identifying the reasons why Iran decided to negotiate the limits of its nuclear 
program with the United States, this dissertation recognizes the elements within 
the JCPOA that show evidence of a hegemonic dynamic. Finally, this dissertation 
concludes that international law instruments are a reproduction of the underlying 
power distribution of the system and therefore the JCPOA does represent a 
mechanism of American hegemony over Iran.  
 
Key Words: Nuclear security, International Law, Hegemony, United States, 
Iranian nuclear program. 
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III. RESUMEN 
 
El Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto es un instrumento legal firmado en 
junio de 2015 que permite el monitoreo de todas las plantas de enriquecimiento 
de uranio en Irán a cambio de eliminar las sanciones impuestas a este país por 
el desarrollo de su programa nuclear. Por medio del estudio de la política exterior 
de Irán y Estados Unidos, esta investigación pretende analizar la influencia de la 
política exterior estadounidense en la firma del Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto 
para mantener a Estados Unidos como hegemón sobre Irán en asuntos 
nucleares. Con el propósito de verificar que la modificación de la política exterior 
norteamericana hacia Irán en material nuclear haya sido causada por el rol 
preponderante de Estados Unidos en la comunidad internacional y la necesidad 
iraní de terminar con las sanciones impuestas, lo cual se verificaría en la firma 
del Plan de Acción Integral Conjunta que perpetúa el sistema hegemónico, la 
presente investigación utilizará como marco teórico el realismo estructural 
también conocido como neorealismo. Adicionalmente, se utilizará una 
metodología cualitativa complementada con una metodología inductivo para 
desarrollar la presente investigación. Tras determinar las motivaciones 
estadounidenses para cambiar su estrategia de sanciones e iniciar 
negociaciones con Irán e identificar las razones por las cuales Irán decidió 
negociar los límites de su programa nuclear con Estados Unidos, esta 
investigación reconoce los elementos del Tratado evidencian una dinámica 
hegemónica entre ambos países. Finalmente, esta disertación concluye que los 
instrumentos de Derecho Internacional son una reproducción de la distribución 
de poder preexistente en el sistema y por lo tanto el Tratado representa 
efectivamente un mecanismo de hegemonía estadounidense sobre Irán. 
 
Palabras Claves: Seguridad nuclear, Derecho Internacional, hegemonía, 
Estados Unidos, programa nuclear iraní. 
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IV. RESUMÉ 
 
Le Plan d'Action Global Conjoint est un instrument juridique signé en 
Juin 2015, qui permet la surveillance de toutes les usines d'enrichissement 
d'uranium en Iran, en échange de l'élimination des sanctions imposées à ce pays 
pour le développement de son programme nucléaire. Grâce à l'étude de la 
politique étrangère de l'Iran et les Etats-Unis, cette recherche vise à analyser 
l'influence de la politique étrangère des États-Unis à la signature du Plan d'Action 
Global Conjoint pour maintenir les Etats-Unis comme hégémon sur les questions 
nucléaires iraniennes. Afin de vérifier que le changement dans la politique 
étrangère américaine envers l'Iran en matière nucléaire a été causé par le rôle 
dominant des États-Unis dans la communauté internationale et le besoin de l’Iran 
de mettre fin aux sanctions, qui seraient vérifiées à l'entreprise le Plan d'Action 
Global Conjoint qui perpétué le système hégémonique, le cadre théorique de 
recherche sera le réalisme structurel, aussi connu comme néoréalisme. En plus, 
la méthodologie qualitative, complétée par une méthode inductive sera utilisée 
pour développer cette recherche. Après déterminer les motivations des États-
Unis pour changer sa stratégie de sanctions et établir des négociations avec 
l'Iran et d'identifier les raisons pur lesquelles l'Iran a décidé négocier les limites 
de son programme nucléaire avec les États-Unis, cette recherche reconnaît les 
éléments du Traité qui montrent une dynamique hégémonique entre les deux 
pays. Finalement, cette thèse conclut que les instruments du droit international 
sont une reproduction de la répartition actuelle du pouvoir dans le système et par 
conséquence le Traité représente un mécanisme d'hégémonie américaine sur 
l'Iran. 
 
Mots Clés: sécurité nucléaire, droit international, hégémonie, États-Unis, 
programme nucléaire iranienne  
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V. ZUSAMENFASSUNG 
 
Der Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ist ein Vertrag, der im Juni 2015 
unterzeichnet wurde. Dieser Vertrag erlaubt die Überwachung der Aufhebung der 
Sanktionen gegen die Entwicklung des iranischen Atomprogramms. Durch das 
Studium des Dokuments selbst und die Außenpolitik des Irans und den 
Vereinigten Staaten, diese Untersuchung zielt darauf ab, den Einfluss der 
amerikanischen Außenpolitik in der Unterzeichnung des Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) um zu bleiben ein Hegemon über Iran in Nuklearfragen, 
zu analysieren. Diese Forschung versucht zu überprüfen die Änderung der 
amerikanischen Außenpolitik gegenüber Iran, die durch die wichtige Rolle der 
Vereinigten Staaten in der internationalen Gemeinschaft und der iranische 
Notwendigkeit von der Ende den Sanktionen verursacht worden wäre; die durch 
die Unterzeichnung des JCPOA, der den aktuellen hegemoniale System 
unterhält nachgewiesen werden würde. Dafür, die Forschung benutzt 
Neorealismus, genannt strukturelle Realismus auch, als  theoretischen Rahmen. 
Zusätzlich, eine qualitative Methode wird verwendet, um diese Forschung zu 
entwickeln. Nach die Analyse von die Motivationen der Vereinigten Staaten  um 
die Sanktionen Strategie zu ändern und die Identifizierung von die Iranischen 
Gründe zu beginnen Verhandlungen mit dem Vereinigten Staaten, um zu der 
Atomprogramm zu begrenzen; diese Untersuchung erkennt die Elemente 
innerhalb der JCPOA, die Beweise zeigen einer hegemonialen dynamisch. 
Endlich, schließt diese Dissertation, dass die internationalen Rechtsinstrumente 
eine Wiedergabe der zugrundeliegenden Machtverteilung des Systems sind, und 
daher vertrat der JCPOA einen Mechanismus der amerikanischen Hegemonie 
über Iran. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: nukleare Sicherheit, internationales Recht, Hegemonie, die 
Vereinigten Staaten, das iranische Atomprogramm 
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VI. INTRODUCTION 
 
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked a milestone in 
the development of weaponries in the history of the world. Nearly four decades 
later, nuclear energy is still a synonym of power in the international system and 
the United States has recognized the importance of Non-Nuclear States in 
nuclear security dynamics of the system. Thus, the general objective for this 
dissertation is to analyze the influence of American foreign policy in the signing of 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to remain a hegemon over Iran in 
nuclear issues, in the following manner. 
 
First, is important to understand the evolution of nuclear foreign policy of 
the United States towards Iran in order to grant security in the international 
community. Thus, this dissertation makes an emphasis on the two U.S. latest 
governments in order to have a clear view of the vast changes that the current 
administration has implemented: from sanctions to negotiations. The specific 
objective for this first chapter is to determine the motivations of the United States 
to change the strategy of sanctions and start negotiating with Iran. Firstly, the 
construction of Policy Making until Bush’s Administration will be studied through 
the study of the context for the American understanding of Nuclear Security; 
Bush’ policy of zero tolerance towards nuclear proliferation and the American role 
within the United Nations Security Council as the organ in charge of maintaining 
international peace and security. Secondly, the policy making during the Obama 
Administration will be approached through the study of the new pillars for 
international nuclear security presented by the President during his speech in 
Prague in 2009. The divergence between non-proliferation -used before the 
Obama Administration- and counter-proliferation -used during the Obama 
Administration- and how this new concepts of threat are approached. Finally, the 
last section analyzes external actors influencing the American foreign policy-
making by studying JCPOA allies, impact of the JCPOA in American-Israeli 
relations and American-Iranian relations.  
 
A similar analysis of Iranian foreign policy is carried out in the second 
chapter. The specific objective for this chapter is to identify the reasons why Iran 
decided to negotiate the limits of its nuclear program with the United States. In 
order to achieve the objective, the chapter will study the modification of Iranian 
foreign policy to leave its pariah status through the study of three main aspects, 
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similarly to the analysis done in the previous chapter. Firstly, the chapter will 
focus on the construction of foreign policy until the Ahmadinejad Administration 
by studying the political background since the time of the Shah until the Islamic 
Revolution, the structure and internal actors of foreign policy decision-making and 
Ahmadinejad’s severe speech against the Western World. Secondly, foreign 
policy during the Rouhani Administration will be understood through the study of 
the Iranian context leading Hassan Rouhani to the Presidency, Hassan 
Rouhani’s Campaign Promises and the resulting conciliation with the Western 
World. Finally, the last section analyzes the external actors influencing Iranian 
foreign policy by examining Israel, other States in the region and the JCPOA 
signatories.  
 
Once the motivations for both States to negotiate are understood, the 
objective for the third chapter is to verify if a hegemonic dynamic exists between 
the United States and Iran through the clauses established in the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In order to study how the JCPOA 
makes hegemony prevail, the chapter will firstly detail the general legal 
framework for Nuclear Security including the ideals of Nuclear Frameworks in the 
Public International Law, how these ideals are materialized on the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and additional Treaties regarding the 
nuclear matter. Secondly, a documentary analysis of the JCPOA will be 
performed by analyzing the historical background, classifying the document and 
its purposes, analyzing the Treaty in a literal and logical manner, and explaining 
the content of the Treaty. It must be clarified that this is not a legal analysis and it 
will not venture to do a deep analysis of technical enrichment limitations imposed 
to Iran, it will rather conceive all restrictions as equivalent tools for Iranian-
American dispute of power. Finally, the last section seeks to identify the JCPOA 
as means to grant hegemony, for which the origins of the concept will be initially 
explained, followed by the neorealist approach to the term, and finally, how 
hegemony is materialized in International Law. 
 
This dissertation is territorially delimited to Iran and the United States, 
because the Foreign Policies of both countries are the objects of study to explain 
the achievement of the JCPOA. The time period to be considered is between 
2013, when the new administrations took power and 2015, when the JCPOA was 
signed. 
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For the purpose of developing the following dissertation the stated 
hypothesis is that: the modification of the American foreign policy in nuclear 
issues towards Iran would have been caused by the preponderant role of the 
United States in the international community and the Iranian need to end the 
sanctions, which would be evidenced by the signing of Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) that maintains the current hegemonic system.  
 
In order to perform this dissertation structural realism, also known as 
neorealism is used. Structural realism or neorealism seeks to explain the 
dynamics of States -particularly the more powerful ones compared to others in 
the structure of the international community- conceiving their actions as 
motivated by a struggle for power and limited to its survival in the structure 
(Powell, 1994). This theoretical framework is considered the theorization of 
classical realism formulated by Hans Morgenthau and others (Schroeder, 1994). 
The most recognizable attempts to reformulate classical realism (Solomon, 2002) 
are evident in the work of authors such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer 
from 1979 to 2001 (Mearsheimer, 2006). Moreover, neorealism considers that the 
anarchic structure of the system encourages States to safeguard their security 
through the accumulation of power. Nevertheless, two streams of neorealism 
respond differently to the dilemma over how much power is needed 
(Mearsheimer, 2006).  
 
On one side, the defensive neorealism -as Grieco (Kramer 1998) and 
Waltz- argues that despite being ineffective, States seek to maximize their share 
of power and the anarchic system will take care of stopping this ambition 
eventually (Mearsheimer, 2006). Waltz limits the elements of analysis to the 
following three: definition of the political structure in terms of its principle order, 
the distribution of skills between units of analysis, and the differentiated function 
of each unit (Powell, 1994). According to Bieler (2014), for defensive neorealism, 
the balance of power ensures peaceful stability. Therefore, power should be 
distributed. Consistent with this, Waltz (1988) that the only mechanism through 
which the security dilemma is solved is through self-help. However, the author 
stresses that the possibilities to maintain peace increase when States can obtain 
their major objectives without the use of force, thus differentiating this theory from 
classical realism. Additionally, the author determines the potential importance of 
the specific power characteristics of each State to understand their actions. 
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On the other side, offensive neorealism States that it is strategically 
beneficial for States to acquire as much power as possible, and if possible, to 
achieve hegemony. According to Mearsheimer (2006) and Bieler (2014), this 
branch of neorealism has five postulates; but one is particularly important to 
highlight: States may never know with certainty the intentions of other States. 
According to one´s intentions, States can be categorized into revisionists, when 
they attempt to alter the balance of power by force, and traditionalists, who are 
satisfied with the established status quo and have no interest in modifying it 
(Mearsheimer, 2006).  
 
Generally, the problem is that one cannot identify with certainty any 
element evidencing empirically whether or not a State intended to alter the 
balance of power. Yet, in a situation of interdependence, the actions of one actor 
certainly depend on the actions of others around. Hence, the importance of the 
distribution and categorization capabilities of States can’t be taken for granted 
(Powell, 1994). Therefore, the study of system-level interaction and unity builds a 
theory of international politics but also creates a theory relative to foreign policy 
(Waltz, 2010). As the State is the unit of study, neorealism assumes motivations 
are common to all (Powell, 1994), leaving aside cultural specificity in the States 
(Mearsheimer, 2006). Neorealism is a theory that primarily seeks to deduce the 
actions of States in the international arena (Waltz, 1990), assuming its 
generalized preferences. However, the determining factor of the behavior of a 
State is the distribution of economic and military capabilities. This distribution is 
understood as a systemic phenomenon that explains the development of events 
in the international system because of its close relations to power distribution 
within the system (Bieler, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2006). 
 
Having dealt with the basic precepts of the theory, it is important to 
emphasize that neorealism gives the nuclear race considerable importance. For 
theorists of structural realism, the existence of nuclear weapons discourages 
entrepreneurship of war much more than conventional weapons because a 
nuclear war is potentially inviting retaliation and the risk of destruction is too 
costly (Waltz, 1988). With the end of the Cold War, John Mearsheimer warned 
that the new world order would be more dangerous than the recently finalized 
bipolar system, because the new structure creates incentives for proliferation 
(Kramer, 1998). While States do not reach the level in which nuclear deterrence 
is such, where additional nuclear weapons do not provide additional safety, 
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there’s a motivation to acquire them (Waltz, 1988). Therefore, to recover the 
concept of a close relationship between international politics and foreign policy, 
analysis of the latter is essential to understand the dynamics of current nuclear 
proliferation (Kramer, 1998). Kramer (1998) as well as Mearsheimer (2006) agree 
that it is unlikely a conventional conflict between two nuclear weapon States, due 
to the possibility of escalation. Mearsheimer States that a global hegemony can 
only be achieved in the case of a State from obtaining a nuclear monopoly, but 
increasing the existence of conflict for the possible retaliation by other States 
(Tofta, 2005). 
 
Additionally, structural realism explained by Kramer (1998) States that 
cooperation only exists when States form alliances against a common threat or 
when a hegemon is able to induce cooperation practices through positive or 
negative motivations (Kramer, 1998). Some neorealists as Stephen Krasner 
(Steinbeck, 2013) attach importance to international institutions, diplomacy, 
international law and regimes as guidelines of behavior (Kramer, 1998), taking 
these as epiphenomena of anarchic structure (Steinbeck, 2013). Meaning, 
according to Waltz (2000), these are not "a change of the system but a change in 
the system". According to this author, there are system changes that have 
drastically altered the interaction of agents in the system, but Waltz (2000) says 
that the biggest change so far has been nuclear development, again, although 
this has changed the anarchic system of self-help per se. Study of international 
law making, according to Steinbeck (2013), asserts that structural realism is 
useful for understanding the positivism of matter that satisfactorily explains and 
predicts the actions of States in the system. Given that International law cannot 
contradict the international system and the dynamics within it, law is the 
embodiment of the status quo. In this logic, the author concludes that although 
treaties benefit the parties, these create an asymmetric coordination through 
military or economic pressure, which are categories that structural realism 
considers determinant for acquiring power. 
 
The elements of structural realism properly explain the dynamics of public 
international lawmaking. In this manner, the most powerful States impose the 
conditions. Thereby, perpetuating the existing status quo (Steinbeck, 2013). 
Ideas of Krasner and other authors are important to relate hegemony and 
structural realism within International Public Law.  
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Throughout the three chapters, neorealist concepts established by Waltz, 
Mearsheimer and Kramer are used. Along the first chapter Mearsheimer’s 
approach to power is largely appropriate to explain American foreign policy. 
According to neorealism, modification of American foreign policy reflects the fact 
that the distribution of capabilities in the international system has also changed. 
The United States intends to maintain the status quo, thereby maintaining its 
dominant position within it. The sanctions established by the United Nations 
respond to the use of international institutions as places where the most 
influential States in the system can exercise their power. This is evident based on 
the American behavior within the Security Council through the exercise of veto 
power given to the five permanent powers. Maintaining power -as a hegemon- is 
a clear interest of the United States as a mean to keep international security, 
according to American standards. Nuclear security is especially significant, due to 
the high costs in case of direct confrontation with a nuclear State. Even if at first 
sight the JCPOA might look like a sympathetic strategy, it clearly shows the use 
of negative motivations to control the system, which offensive neorealism 
specifies as means to exercise power over weaker States in the system. This 
accumulation of various actions intended to safeguard the survival of the United 
States as a hegemon in the system. Therefore, promoting a partnership to sign 
the Treaty of joint action with the Islamic Republic of Iran is a sign of an offensive 
realist policy. 
 
Along the second chapter the ideas presented by Waltz are of extreme 
importance to approach Iran's nuclear policies. Iran, in the structure of the 
international community, is a State that has many capabilities such as natural 
resources and geostrategic location. Nevertheless, this country has little decision-
making power in the dynamics of the system. After the fall of the Shah, and the 
establishment of the new regime, the Iranian government proposed to enlarge its 
military capabilities, or make it appear so, which would have given it power within 
the structure. Iranian foreign policy generated suspicions and feelings of 
insecurity, as a revisionist State system would. This situation has caused 
retaliations from other States in the system. The first example of retaliation, 
based on the presumption of nuclear warfare, was not a direct confrontation, but 
the limitation of capabilities. That is, economic sanctions and blockades to the 
country's oil exports, its main source of income. However, this action had two 
effects on Iranian foreign policy; on the one hand, it maintained its position as a 
revisionist State, challenging the status quo through the speeches of its 
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representatives, and on the other hand, it functioned as a negative motivation to 
force them to negotiate and sign a Treaty with the P5 countries and Germany. 
Therefore, Iranian attempts to change the system have been fruitless and have 
brought dissatisfaction from inside the country. In sum, the government has seen 
the need of changing the strategy to avoid more economic sanctions and thereby 
reduce the discomfort of the Iranian society. 
 
Finally, Krasner’s ideas regarding hegemony and realism in International 
Law are useful to explain that regardless of how the treaties are handled -
whether bilaterally or multilaterally- they all aim at maintaining power, as it is a 
means to safeguard international security. Therefore, treaties do not change the 
system; they are legal frameworks that have been created to be functional to the 
system; a system that is controlled by one hegemon. The fact that the 
mechanisms of coercion evidenced in binding UN Security Council resolutions 
are decided by the P5, where the United States plays a leading role, exemplifies 
the asymmetric coordination capabilities that treaties preserve. Identifying the 
punitive elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action might be a key 
approach to visualize the asymmetric conditions of the signatories.  
 
In order to develop the following dissertation a qualitative methodology will 
be used as an effort to understand the uniqueness of a situation as part of the 
greater interaction (Patton, 1990) between the United States and Iran. In unison 
with this nature of dissertation methodology, the researcher will be the principal 
collector of data. This dissertation will be carried out through the analysis of 
primary sources, mainly legal documentation, speeches, and an interview to the 
Embassy of Iran in Ecuador and other secondary sources. The precepts, 
assumptions, principles and categories determined by the theory will be used to 
explain and interpret the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action in order to ratify the 
hypothesis. 
 
It is of interest to those who live in other regions of the world –as it is the 
case for us Ecuadorians- to know what happens when certain States develop 
nuclear weapons, because we are not excluded from the consequences in case 
a crisis unleashes. According to neorealism, the possibility of detonating a 
nuclear bomb today is much greater than during the Cold War, and therefore it is 
of global concern to maintain peace by all means. This dissertation provides 
valuable information to academia because the signing of the JCPOA in mid-2015 
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marked a precedent to see the nuclear security matter from the perspective of 
negotiations with Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In addition, this work may shed 
light on students interested in the subject, through a clear deductive analysis that 
will give way to expanding the study of the subject from similar approaches or 
critical ones. The following dissertation is, therefore, closely related to the field of 
study of the Multilingual Bachelor in Business and International Relations, 
specifically with the international relations branch. Herein, foreign policy and 
International Public Law issues are also to be considered. 
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CHAPTER I 
NUCLEAR FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM SANCTIONS 
TO NEGOTIATIONS  
 
“The United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor 
alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.”1 
Barack Obama, 2009 
 
The study of the American Nuclear foreign policy is of extreme 
importance for this dissertation for the understanding of the evolution of 
mechanisms and approaches used by the American government to grant nuclear 
security to the international community. The milestones of the American Nuclear 
Policy throughout history and its characteristics will be identified, making an 
emphasis on the two latest governments in order to have a clear view of the vast 
changes that the current administration has implemented regarding the approach 
to new actors in the matter. 
 
1.1. The Construction of Policy Making Until Bush’s Administration 
 
Throughout the Administration of George W. Bush, the Nuclear Policy of 
the United States was clear: a tailored deterrent strategy (Woolf, 2008: 1). 
Nevertheless in a global context States have considered the use of nuclear 
weapons unthinkable (Perry, Scowcroft, & Ferguson, 2009: 3) based on the 
historical compilation of events such as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings 
and the detonation of Soviet and Chinese test bombs. Therefore it is of interest 
for this section of the present dissertation to understand the internal and external 
factors that helped shape the American nuclear foreign policy during Bush and 
Obama Administrations and the role of the United States on the United Nations 
Security Council regarding nuclear issues. 
                                                        
1 “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” April 5, 2009. 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1.1.1. Context for the American Understanding of Nuclear Security 
 
At this point it is important to highlight that security itself doesn’t have a 
standard definition since it varies according to different theories of international 
relations (Baldwin, 2011). As Baldwin (2011) explains, neorealism understands 
security as the main goal a State has, and each State competes one another to 
obtain it. In this manner, according to neorealism, States would be better at 
managing international relations than others when acquiring security. Therefore 
making it an achievement-related concept, which might not be shared by the 
constructivist or the liberal approach. Here, the definition for security given by 
Arnold Wolfers will be used, presented as follows: “absence of threats to acquired 
values” (Baldwin, 2011). This definition, as highlighted by Balwin (2011) leaves a 
wide spectrum of ambiguity, but ratifies the neorealist approach to the meaning of 
security in the matters related to: Security for whom? Security for which values? 
How much security? From what threat? By what means? At what cost? And in 
what time period? All of these factors have a subjective dimension that in the 
case of American foreign policy will always look out for America, the values 
Americans embrace, the amount of security American leaders consider 
appropriate against threats identified by American leaders, through the means 
available in the United States, sacrificing other goals that aren’t a priority for the 
United States government, as short-term or long-term objectives according to 
U.S. governmental priorities. It is of substantial importance to understand 
American non-proliferation initiatives before Bush’s Administration in order to 
recognize patterns in the American foreign policy regarding the elements 
mentioned above. 
 
For approximately forty years, since the first Soviet detonation of their 
own nuclear bomb in 1949 until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the American 
nuclear security policy was based on the use of deterrence2 to avoid an outburst 
of nuclear conflict (Woolf, 2008: 1). During the first decade of the Cold War the 
American doctrine was known as “massive retaliation”, which turned out to be 
strongly questioned since the Soviet Union proved to be capable of responding 
(Woolf, 2008: 5). Nevertheless, the evidence of this doctrine is available on the 
frameworks that the United States proposed at the time, such as the Baruch Plan 
                                                        
2 Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to 
prevent them from doing something that another State desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard 
Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the ready, yet never used. This concept will be further explained 
in the end of this section. 
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(Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011; Buck, 1983: 9) that called for the creation of an 
international atomic development authority automatically. Its approval by the 
United Nations Atomic energy Commission rejected automatically the Soviet 
proposal, which aimed for American nuclear disarmament before any 
international agency was created (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011). 
 
The strong critics towards the probability of success led the Secretary of 
Defense at the time, Robert McNamara, to outline the new doctrine of “damage 
limitation”, which counter-forced all Soviet conventional and nuclear military 
capabilities (Woolf, 2008: 6). The manifestation of this new doctrine is evident 
when taking into consideration that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) and the United States, respectively, resumed their nuclear tests after an 
informal moratorium of November 1958, only fifteen days apart from each other 
(Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011).  
 
During the following decade Secretary McNamara revived the precedent 
nuclear foreign policy through an “assured destruction” doctrine, where the United 
States was supposed to convince the Soviet leadership about the destruction of 
Soviet society in case of an attack against the United States or any of its allies 
(Woolf, 2008: 6). This doctrine is evident, for example on the Treaty of Tlateloco, 
opened for signature on February 14, 1967 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011), 
which created a regional non-proliferation regime. On Protocol II of this binding 
legal instrument, the United States guaranteed negative security3 for the first 
time, as a response to any attack against the denuclearized Latin American 
States (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015). 
 
Throughout the 1970’s the United States transformed its doctrine to a 
“Flexible Response” and later, in the same decade, to a “Countervailing Strategy”; these 
two were supposed to target retaliations on strategic war-making capabilities 
within the USSR area of influence and on the political field as an integral part of 
the U.S. strategy (Woolf, 2008: 6). This is evident on the several bilateral Treaties 
that the USSR and the U.S. signed such as the Vladivostok Accord (1974) and 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I) (1970), which aimed to reduce the 
nuclear capability of both States (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011). In summary, 
                                                        
3 Negative Security: Realists establish a negative interpretation of security that makes reference 
exclusively to a lack of direct military risk, thereby citizens are protected against foreign threats  
(Mohammad Agus Yusoff, 2012) 
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these strategies, even if adapted to the reality at the time, are all based on a 
forceful deterrence strategy favoring the US.  At the beginning the US 
accomplished this by threatening the USSR with attacking back and later by 
adding international regimes and sanctions to the precedent formula. 
 
This reality changed drastically when the USSR collapsed, because it 
seemed as the milestone that would diminish the importance of nuclear weapons 
in American security policies (Norris, Kristensen, & Paine, 2004: iv). This 
unsurprisingly didn’t happened, because as the Clinton Administration stated,  
“nuclear weapons remained important to deter the range of threats faced by the United States” 
(Woolf, 2008: 7). By 1998, the Administration had already identified new States 
that would threaten American interests through the enlargement of their offensive 
capabilities by acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as it was 
stated on the National Security Strategy for a New Century (1998). Iran -as one 
of these States- will be studied in the following chapter. (The White House, 1998)  
 
Even if bilateral agreements and American participation in international 
nuclear security programs flourished after the USSR fell, much was done to 
secure the nuclear material (Boureston & Ogilvie-White, 2010: 10) from these 
“latent proliferators” (Simpson, 1997) as they are identified as threats even before 
the end of the Cold War. For example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program (CTR) signed on November 1991 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011), 
which ought to reduce American exposure concerning the former Soviet Union 
countries by promoting denuclearization and demilitarization (Boureston & 
Ogilvie-White, 2010: 11).  
 
During this period, the conceptualization of non-proliferation had to be 
changed and extended so that it included the “ambiguous” nuclear States, known to 
possess nuclear material, which weren’t subject of international monitoring at the 
time (Simpson, 1997: 18). Nevertheless, the core long-lasting policy of reserving 
the right to use nuclear weapons wasn’t altered. On the contrary, it was endorsed 
because it used the Nuclear-Nonproliferation Treaty to find a legal umbrella to 
justify a first move against “States in good standing under NPT or an equivalent international 
convention” (Woolf, 2008: 8).  
 
Further, in response to emerging threats to U.S. national security, the 
Bush Administration has argued that the United States must alter its deterrence 
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strategy from ‘one size fits all’ deterrence, to ‘tailored deterrence’ for rogue powers, 
terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors (Woolf, 2008). However, one event 
spurred a radical change in the American foreign policy and its evaluation of 
threats. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, George Bush declared 
the ‘War on Terror’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2003), which created new 
strategies, doctrines, and structures to confront the new security environment 
(Woolf, 2008: 9) where non-State groups needed to be on the spotlight (Levine & 
Levine, 2006: 14). This so-called ‘tailored deterrence’ was based on a new approach 
towards the threat that included the recognition of the threat objectives and 
necessities (Woolf, 2008: 10), which made tailored deterrence more difficult to 
achieve in comparison to the one used during the Cold War (Levine & Levine, 
2006: 14). Still, this doctrine was materialized in the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005, which defined what 
nuclear terrorism is and established obligations for the signatory States in case a 
civilian incurred in an act of nuclear terrorism (United Nations, 2005). 
(International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005) 
As evidenced above, deterrence has been a recurrent strategy on 
American Nuclear foreign policy. Therefore, it is important to define what 
deterrence is, meaning a relationship in which one or both actors try to persuade 
the other to abstain from executing threatening actions by intimidating or 
reassuring the other that the costs of an attack will far exceed the benefits (Woolf, 
2008). According to Levine & Levine (2006: 13-15), in the case of the United 
States, the strategy is still applied mainly to Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and Syria 
because the States are thought to be the ones providing shelter, financial 
resources with nuclear materials or weapons to terrorist groups. 
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1.1.2. Zero-tolerance towards Proliferation 
 
The 9/11 events served to establish the most important characteristics of 
what came to be known as the “Bush Doctrine” (Tannous, 2008: 5), the former 
President himself described it as:  
 
“A strategy to protect the country that (…) make[s] no distinction between the terrorists 
and the nations that harbor them (…) take[s] the fight to the enemy overseas before they 
can attack us (…) And (…) advance[s] liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy's 
ideology (…)” 
(Steeman, 2012: 8) 
 
These specific events gave the United States a facilitator to implement 
an assertive doctrine to achieve the everlasting goal of American hegemony 
(Clark, 2003: 89). The attacks gave the United States an justification to continue 
implementing strategies in order to shape the world according to U.S. interest -as 
throughout all of American History- in a completely upfront manner (Steeman, 
2012: 8).  
 
The Bush Doctrine aimed specifically at rogue States and what America 
considered terrorist groups (Delahunty & Yoo, 2009); and established one main 
strategy of preventive war to fight them back (Dowd, 2008). The ultimate 
objective of this strategy was to dissuade adversaries from taking actions that 
would give the United States abilities to react with all its strength (Norris et al, 
2004: 27); meaning, the Bush doctrine, as all of the ones before, is basically a 
deterrent Doctrine.  
 
As James Pfiffer (2003) explains in his study “George Bush: Policy, 
Politics and Personality”, the Bush Doctrine is characterized by four elements 
(Jervis, 2003: 365), which are strongly related to the President´s personality and 
have had positive and negative effects on the execution of it (Dowd, 2008). Jervis 
(2003:365) identifies also these elements, as the following: close relation 
between the domestic needs and the international agenda; the preventive war as 
the only means to defeat new threats; the use of unilateral action; and need to 
emphasize American hegemony in world politics (Jervis, 2003: 365). These 
elements combined haven’t changed the Cold-War Doctrine of deterrence; on the 
contrary they have ratified it under the label of ‘counter-proliferation’ (Norris et al, 
2004: v). These four elements will be described in order to understand their 
impact on the American Nuclear foreign policy. 
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Unilateral action is considered a vital aspect of foreign policy after the 
9/11 terrorists attacks (Steeman, 2012: 8). This unilateralism involves not only 
willingness to undergo unaccompanied military action -or any other unilateral 
measure- but it also means that the U.S. was not going to expect approval from 
the international community, through the United Nations Security Council as 
empowered organism, to do so (Steeman, 2012: 10). One example of this solitary 
action was the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 (Norris et 
al, 2004: 26). This brought a feeling of mistrust among the international 
community because it opened the possibility of planes carrying both, 
conventional weapons or missiles, therefore rising the risk of miscalculation and 
intensification of the conflict (Norris et al, 2004: 7). 
 
Preemption was almost the autograph of the Bush Doctrine, meaning 
that the U.S. could decide over attacking -before the threat materializes- any 
country that, based on expectations, could incur on aggressive conduct 
(Steeman, 2012: 11).  Even if American military has always had the possibility of 
firing first, thereby acting preemptively (Norris et al, 2004: 26). The difference lies 
on the fact that preemption is now emphasized as a fundamental piece of foreign 
policy, in opposition to how the usage and development of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) as backup strategies in former Administrations (Norris et al, 
2004: 27).  
 
Even if preemption doesn’t infringe International Public Law, based on 
the right of self-defense (Steeman, 2012: 12), it is clearly established that it is 
only admissible in case of an imminent threat (Clark, 2003: 89). As Clark (2003: 
89) explains, the adjusted concept of imminent threat is a –somehow- distorted 
requirement because “the greater the threat, the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend” but the U.S. uses its right to fight back even when no 
such ‘imminent threat’ to security exists (Steeman, 2012: 12).  
 
According to the Proliferation Security Initiative of the United States 
(2003), the security systems created during the Bush Administration aim to 
directly impede production weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, 
and related materials from reaching rouge States and non-States actors in terms 
of global cooperation. Even though the proliferation concern might be a higher 
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priority for nuclear States, based on the fact that their monopoly might be 
endangered.  
 
The United States has always thought they are the nation ‘destined’ to 
spread freedom through democracy; based on the liberal rhetoric that (Waltz, 
2000) democratic States do not conflict with each other (Steeman, 2012: 12) 
According to Pfiffer (2004), the spread of universal values (Pfiffner, 2004: 176) 
through diplomatic and financial means, customs, law enforcement, and other 
security systems (U.S. Department of State, 2003) to all countries, sometimes  
even through war (Pfiffner, 2004: 176) was set as priority in the Administration. 
 
The main targets of this explicit intolerance towards proliferation were a 
group of countries, which President George W. Bush baptized as “The Axis of Evil” 
because they probably were backing terrorist groups up (Tannous, 2008: 6). 
Even if it cannot be denied that, States and terrorist groups have a strong relation 
because the latter needs funds, training camps and other resources that can only 
be found on the territory that belongs necessarily to a State (Tannous, 2008: 25). 
On the other hand, the United States took advantage of this situation to articulate 
the feeling that Evil, e.g. terrorism, was indivisible but at the same time distributed 
all over different geographic locations (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007: 423). In this 
manner, the government could defend American interests in these rouge States 
by occupying their territories (Steeman, 2012: 11), as it did in Iraq.  
 
It is important to identify the reasons that lead the United States to 
catalog under such terms three specific States: Iraq, Iran and North Korea 
(Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007: 421). First the United States alleged Iraq was 
developing biological weapons because the United Nations didn’t inspect the 
territory for a three-year period (Bolton, 2002: 98). This can be explained through 
the President’s preference for visceral reaction and action (Pfiffner, 2004), 
reflected on shifting the focus of attention from the results of the “War on Terror” 
against Osama Bin Laden, to Weapons of Mass Destruction (Heradstveit & 
Bonham, 2007: 423).  
 
Iran was part of this alliance based on the thought that the country had 
an interest on developing nuclear weapons and missiles (Bolton, 2002: 95), the 
American antagonism to theocratic regimes, and Iranian declarations supporting 
terrorist groups such as Hezbollah (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007: 424). Finally, 
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North Korea was considered a member of the Axis of Evil because, from the 
American perspective, the country gave priority to investment in nuclear and 
chemical research, not cooperating with the IAEA, instead of prioritizing the 
needs of its population (Bolton, 2002: 94). 
 
It is important to highlight that there were several other countries such as 
Libya, Syria and Cuba that were considered possible future participants of this 
coalition, based on their aggressive declarations against the United States 
(Bolton, 2002: 95), ballistic missile development (Bolton, 2002: 96), and 
sheltering fugitives from the United States (Bolton, 2002: 97), respectively. 
Nevertheless, within this same list countries like Pakistan, with proven nuclear 
development were never considered to be part of the “Axis of Evil” (Norris et al, 
2004: 33). These double standards were not unusual during the Bush 
Administration. A clear evidence of this statement regarding nuclear issues is the 
prerequisite of extensive verification of nuclear plants in Iranian or North Korean 
territories before considering any negotiation in contrast to the permissiveness on 
the same matter of the Moscow Treaty signed with the Russian Federation 
(Norris et al, 2004: 33). 
 
Conclusively, it can be determined that American Nuclear foreign policy 
during the Bush Administration awarded nuclear weapons a major role in 
security, thereby encouraging other States to award importance to them too 
(Norris et al, 2004: 40). This was primarily achieved through the use of rhetoric; 
qualified enough to contribute to a new view of the world (Heradstveit & Bonham, 
2007: 421), which was a bipolar one (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007: 426) because 
the Axis of Evil is supposed to be defeated by the “Forces of Good” (Heradstveit & 
Bonham, 2007: 422), the United States in this case. This American strategy to 
maintain power within the international system, encapsulates the approach of 
“status quo States”, which are satisfied with the current distribution of power and are 
not willing to change it (Mearsheimer, 2006: 76). 
  
 18 
1.1.3. United States position on the United Nations Security Council 
 
After World War II, the international community, represented by 51 
delegations, felt the need of creating a new and globally recognized organization 
to establish a normative order, motivation that created the United Nations System 
(Clark, 2003: 5).  Within this international regime, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) is the organ in charge of the safeguarding of international peace 
and security (United Nations, 2016). 
 
The UN Charter (1945), on its Article 39, awards the UNSC the 
responsibility of determining the existence of a threat towards international 
security, and the possibility to make recommendations to the States in case of 
dispute in order to restore order in the international community. Additionally, the 
United Nations System ratifies that UNSC resolutions are binding to all States 
(Adams, 2012: 5), allowing this organ to sanction States according to Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter (1945).  These sanctions, according to Article 41 of the same 
Charter, may include “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations” (United Nations Charter, 1945).  
 
It is important to understand these wide range of attributions, from 
recommendations to coercive measures (Norris, Kristensen, & Paine, 2004: 27), 
in addition to the UNSC organization, to explain the power that the United States 
has over the most important security organ in the only “global organization” (Adams, 
2012).  The United Nations Security Council is formed by 15 members, five of 
whom are permanent (Adams, 2012: 6) and awarded veto power 4, and ten are 
assigned or two-year periods according to a geographical distribution (United 
Nations, 2016).  
 
More than 30 resolutions have been approved on the Security Council 
regarding nuclear proliferation (UNSC, 2016), and frequently these have been 
the result of American efforts to increase the political support and legality of 
initiatives to satisfy its goals (McDonald & Patrick, 2010: 16).  Many resolutions 
have acted on a preventive manner, like Security Council Resolution 1540, which 
compels all members of the United Nations to improve trade controls for nuclear 
                                                        
4 Veto Power: wielded solely by the five permanent members of the United Nations enables them to 
prevent the adoption of any "substantive" resolution, as well as decide which issues fall under 
"substantive" title. 
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related materials and criminalize proliferation (Rademaker, 2005). But there have 
also been coercive resolutions, specially aimed to the “Axis of Evil”, attributing 
sanctions based on violations to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, consenting 
inspection missions and endorsing intimidation of terrorist organizations 
(McDonald & Patrick, 2010: 16).  
 
In the case of North Korea, the Security Council has established 
sanctions on resolutions such as SC 1828/2010 were specific North-Korean 
citizens are banned from traveling and their assets were frozen (James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2015). Since 2006, through the power of the 
Security Council, the United States was able to establish an embargo on Iran 
when Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1949 were, on its majority unanimously 
approved, preventing the trade of nuclear-related material to Iranian citizens, and 
the asset freezing of Iranian individuals in 2006 (Clawson, 2015; Davenport K. , 
2015) 
 
1.2. Policy Making during the Obama Administration 
 
Barack Obama’s election professed a dramatic change on American 
foreign policy (Steeman, 2012: 34). Obama’s Doctrine proposal has been 
baptized a “smart strategy”, “opened hand policy”, and “strategic listening” (Hoop, 2009: 1) 
all to describe the shift of American Diplomacy towards a cooperative leadership, 
through the creation of partnerships around the globe based on shared interests 
(Steeman, 2012: 45), which differ largely from the Bush Doctrine explained 
above. Nevertheless, the strategy presented by Obama still ratifies a neorealist 
dynamic based on the coalition of sovereign States united by a common goal or 
enemy (Kramer, 1998; Steeman, 2012: 44), in this case counter proliferation 
against rouge States and extremist groups. Nevertheless, the policy has been 
presented in a way that tries to show a multipolar approach by re-reading the 
international system and the reintegration of the United States to international 
institutions (Hoop, 2009: 2). That is why the following sections will explain 
Obama’s approach to nuclear security by identifying the differences and 
similarities with the Administration that came before him, with special emphasis 
on the new approach to nuclear threats.  
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1.2.1. New Pillars for International Nuclear Security 
 
Just months after Barack Obama took office, the elected President 
addressed the nuclear matter in Prague, where he highlighted the main points of 
his nuclear policy, which can me summarized into the pursue of peace and 
security within a world without nuclear armament (Department of Defense, 2015: 
1). The new policy acknowledges that the conditions existing during the Cold War 
are not present now-a-days but it also emphasizes that the defense systems 
haven’t changed much since then; this combination has reduced the threat of 
nuclear confrontation but has increased the risk of nuclear attack (Obama, 2009). 
Consequently, Obama proposed a “well-structured, broadly understandable and supported 
policy” based on multilateral solutions to major international problems, which will 
grant the U.S. legitimacy and ultimately power (Obama in Steeman, 2012: 35). 
 
During his speech in Prague, Obama (2009) ratified that in order to 
achieve a nuclear weapon free world the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty is crucial through international cooperation, embracing the 
State Interdiction Principles, resource assignment to international inspectors i.e. 
IAEA, and consequences for defiant States accordingly to the international 
nuclear framework. Regarding Iranian Nuclear Program, specifically, the 
President emphasized the importance of bringing Iran to its right place in the 
international community, meaning normalizing political and economic relations, to 
safeguard security for its neighbors, American allies and the United States itself 
(Obama, 2009). 
 
The strategy to materialize these words is clearly described on the 
Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 where the United States shifts the 
responsiveness towards nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but continues 
to deter with land, air, and naval forces (Department of Defense, 2015: 33; 
Department of Defense, 2015: 5). Through this strategy the United States wants 
to refuse terrorists protective shelter (Steeman, 2012: 38), based on regional 
security mechanisms against regimes likely to host threats (Steeman, 2012: 38).  
 
Regarding proliferation States, American foreign policy aims to make 
them understand that attacks against the U.S. or any ally would be responded 
efficiently and devastatingly (Department of Defense, 2015: 33); therefore the 
American policy remains a deterrent and coercive one similar to that of his 
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predecessor, requiring a unipolar regime in order to provide common security. 
(Steeman, 2012: 44). A case for this unilateralism could be the Middle East, 
specifically the Israel-Palestine Conflict, translated in the tripartite discussions 
with the United States (Hoop, 2009: 4) and the multilateral negotiations between 
the G5+1 and Iran.  
 
The lack of enough capabilities to identify, forbid, and defeat trafficking 
efforts of nuclear related material (Department of Defense, 2015: 3 - 9) is the 
reason that guides the United States attempts to give the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) enough resources and rights necessary to carry out its 
mission successfully (Department of Defense, 2015: 4).  Naturally, this can’t be 
achieved exclusively by the U.S (Department of Defense, 2015: 10), on the 
contrary it can only be done by sharing interests with other great powers. This 
reality conditions the Obama Administration to keep an impartial position towards 
its allies, what has been difficult to achieve in the Middle East (Steeman, 2012: 
39). In summary, the strategy tries to balance a multipolar cooperation; extended 
deterrence to State and non-State actors; and strengthening of the nuclear 
regime (Department of Defense, 2015: 31) while looking to prevail American 
ideals around the globe. 
 
Many forums have been developed by President Obama to bring to the 
spotlight of the international community the steps needed to improve international 
security. The first, and most important until now, was the Nuclear Security 
Summit that took place in 2010 in Washington D.C. (Obama, 2015), because it 
was the conference where the international community determined that a lack of 
non-proliferation guarantee could lead non-nuclear States to undertake nuclear 
deterrent strategies on their own, what would result on disentanglement from the 
NPT regime, and therefore higher possibility of nuclear weapon use (Department 
of Defense, 2015: 1). Anyhow, the American initiatives can be summarized as: 
the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, negotiations to compose a treaty 
to end the production of fissile material for military purposes, a fuel depository for 
peaceful uses under international control, the continuity of a World Summit 
regarding nuclear weapons and components storing, and finally, and most 
importantly, the consolidation of a much powerful NPT regime (Ayala, 2009: 15).  
 
Other conferences have followed, in Seoul in 2012 and in The Hague in 
2014; which have also been important because the concrete steps to achieve the 
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American “nuclear-weapon free world” have been pointed out (Obama, 2015). Two 
actors of the international arena have been identified as a concern: new nuclear 
States and non-State actors. Even if the channels to sanction nuclear terrorism 
are still unclear, this policy takes advantage of the lack of resources, based on 
the strong relation between economics and security (Delange, 2009: 74), to limit 
the acquisition of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology even within 
the black market. Many threats can be considered to be a nuclear threat from a 
sub-State group that could construct a small-yield nuclear weapon to other 
groups that might take or buy a nuclear weapon from a “rogue State” (Mauroni, 
2012: 4). Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has established as a global 
goal to award top priority and create systems to stop terrorist groups from 
acquiring these, profoundly challenging current status quo of nuclear affairs 
(Department of Defense, 2015: 6). In this context, the United States in 
coordination with its allies specially from Europe, in the counter-proliferation 
quest have partnered to safeguard their common interests (Department of 
Defense, 2015: 31), and established sanctions to Iran and North Korea in order 
to pressure them to change their nuclear policies (Hoop, 2009: 5).  This strategy 
ratifies American power by redefining the dynamics in the international system 
(Delange, 2009: 73).  
 
1.2.2. Comparison and Contrast between Counter - Proliferation and Non 
– Proliferation 
 
The ideas of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation are used 
nowadays as synonyms. Nevertheless they both have different origins, goals and 
means to achieve them, reason why it is worth dedicating the following section to 
highlight these differences. 
 
 Nuclear weapons are not a recent invention; therefore the notion of non-
proliferation is not new either (Ellis, 2003). This concept was materialized for the 
first time on the Resolution 2028 of the United Nations General Assembly and it 
refers to what Homi Bhabha classified as vertical and horizontal proliferation 
(Garrido, 2005: 97). The first type of proliferation indicates the augmenting 
number of nuclear weapons, whereas the second one refers to the non-nuclear 
States acquiring them (Garrido, 2005: 95). The Treaty and its adherence hasn’t 
stopped States from developing military nuclear programs (Garrido, 2005: 97).  
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The Treaty on Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the foundation of 
the whole non-proliferation regime because it establishes, on its 5th Article, the 
commitment for the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to develop a process of 
disarmament (Non Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 1970); thereby 
avoiding vertical proliferation. Additionally, it requires the Non Nuclear States to 
sidestep from the development of nuclear weapons (Non Proliferation on Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty, 1970); thus preventing horizontal proliferation. Though, after 
more than five decades after its entry in force, its goals haven’t been achieved 
(Lara, 2007:94). On the contrary, the regime seems weak because vertical and 
horizontal-proliferation have occurred and continue to happen. 
 
More recent examples of non-proliferation regimes include the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which, as many other 
multilateral nuclear Treaties, has almost universal adherence but hasn’t been 
ratified specifically by those States considered a nuclear threat: Pakistan, India, 
North Korea, China, Israel and Iran (de la Torre, 2008: 23). This condition raises 
the question of how efficient this new regime, which allows a system to detect 
seismic movement and noble gas emissions around the world to determine the 
existence of nuclear testing (de la Torre, 2008: 23), is truly effective or not.  
 
On the contrary, counter-proliferation began as a response to illegal 
development of nuclear programs started in Israel, Pakistan and North Korea 
during the 80’s (Fortuna, 2011: 157). Nevertheless, the concept was further 
developed throughout the first Bush administration and formally executed for the 
first time under Clinton administration (Ellis, 2003: 116).  
 
The new conditions presented after the end of the Cold War, such as the 
appearance of new Nuclear States, the slow reduction of nuclear arsenals and 
terrorist groups have motivated the international community to strengthen the 
nuclear regime (Cirincione & Bell, 2010) in order to revert the effect of the already 
proliferated threat.  
 
In Prague, Obama (2009) explained the changes in the foreign policy, 
from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation. This can be evidenced on the 
resolution of stopping the manufacturing of new weapons and reduce the role of 
nuclear weapon in the American Defense Strategy (Obama, 2009). The signing 
of the most recent START agreement, in 2010, includes the reduction of 
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weapons (Cirincione & Bell, 2010: 56); therefore it is a mechanism of counter-
proliferation. Still, all these efforts aren’t enough and much it is needed to actually 
stop non-State actors and Non-Nuclear States from acquiring a nuclear bomb, 
that means also stopping the flow of the know how, technology and resources 
(Cirincione & Bell, 2010: 57).  
 
Atomic weapons are political weapons. They enable States to become a 
Nuclear Weapon State -according to the NPT only 5 of these are supposed to 
exist- and creates the need to recognize more Nuclear Weapons States under 
the NPT. This recognition would mean losing the monopoly of nuclear power for 
the G5 and placing the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in a disadvantaged position. 
Thus, risking the international peace and security that has been established until 
now. 
 
1.2.3. Approach to Nuclear Threats 
 
To understand the new approach towards nuclear threats, proposed by 
President Barack Obama, it is necessary to first identify what the United States 
during this Administration has conceived as a threat (Department of Defense, 
2015: iv). On 2010, President Barack Obama announced that the only real risk to 
American security in long and short term is the possibility of terrorist 
organizations procurement a nuclear weapon (Mauroni, 2012: 3). This 
phenomenon is called “nuclear terrorism” and involves any individual that commits 
an illicit and deliberate offence against the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by fulfilling one or more of the following 
conditions: 
  
1) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device: 
a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or  with the intent to 
cause substantial damage to property or to the environment;  
b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear 
facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material: 
i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or  
ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; 
or; 
iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization 
or a State to do or refrain from doing an act 
 (International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism, 2005)  
 
Even though the current international law instruments don’t tackle 
directly the issue of nuclear terrorism (Clark, 2003: 99) and it hasn’t been 
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confirmed that these groups already have a nuclear weapon or enough resources 
to acquire one yet (Department of Defense, 2015: 7), the international community 
- guided by the United States- has developed different State-oriented initiatives to 
create conditions that will build stronger mechanisms to address this threat 
(Department of Defense, 2015: 7).  
 
Iran, and North Korea remain categorized as “Rouge States” because of 
their non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations; their confronted rulings 
against the UNSC and resistance to resolve disagreements through diplomatic. 
This categorization lies on the fact that their actions have weakened the NPT 
regime and brought incertitude into the international community as a whole 
(Department of Defense, 2015: 3), and their respective regions (Department of 
Defense, 2015: 4). Still, these two, as countries, share many attributes, being the 
violation of the NPT just one among others, but these two societies diverge 
notably (Perkovich, 2015). 
 
On the one hand, Iran is the most populated country in the Middle East 
and has enough human and financial resources to grant security and stability for 
the theocratic regime without nuclear weapons (Perkovich, 2015). This might be 
one reason to understand why the United States proposes a new holistic 
approach to the Middle East and especially to Iran (Hoop, 2009: 6). The strategy 
involves establishing new relations, preserving opposition to Iranian possessing 
nuclear weapons, through a dual track strategy, which Europeans support 
entirely (Delange, 2009: 15). This double track means the combination of the 
highest diplomatic elite out into action to negotiate without preconditions, and the 
application of the most severe sanctions in case of incompliance (Lara, 
2009:137)  
 
This strategy is particularly efficient given the fact that Iran does not live 
as an autarkic State, which means that the economy itself and social aspects of 
life can be and have been strongly affected by the sanctions imposed until now 
(Ehteshami, 2009). This actually has a historical reason, because the whole 
economic system in Iran is based on the exploitation of oil reserves, which the 
United States helped to introduce (McEachern, 2011: 8).  It is also important to 
mention that, even if Iran has an questionable democratic regime; the election of 
Hassan Rouhani, to substitute Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, drastically changed the 
approach of Iran towards the United States since 2013.  
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On the other hand North Korea has a weak economy. As a matter of fact 
it is recognized as one of the poorest in the Northeast Asian region (McEachern, 
2011: 4), and this reduces the effectiveness of any economic sanction the United 
States might apply. Therefore, the United States maintains its old strategy of 
ensuring a confirmable closure of North-Korean nuclear weapon program and the 
destruction of all of its arsenals through diplomatic dialogues within the six party 
talks (Lara, 2009: 138) which wasn’t achieved though the Agreed Framework of 
1994 (Perkovich, 2015).  
 
The North Korean nuclear development history is also entirely different 
from the Iranian one. All petitions that North Korea did to obtain a nuclear plant 
were denied by China, the USSR, and then Russian Federation, and ultimately 
the United States, contrary to the Iranian nuclear program (García, 2008: 15). 
This fact, led the North Korean government to develop a nuclear reactor on its 
own, which triggered the international community alarms for nuclear weapons in 
the 80’s (García, 2008: 16). 
 
Furthermore, the new mandate of Kim Jong Il didn’t change much the 
North Korean role within the international community; on the contrary the regime 
uses a brutal leadership inside and outside its borders (Chanlett-Avery, 2016: 4). 
This style of leadership can be explained based on the fact that the ideology of 
North Korea’s State shortfalls the theoretical and theological foundation of a 
religion or belief on which to stand (McEachern, 2011: 3). Clear evidence of this 
is that on the exact same day in which Obama gave his nuclear-arms free world 
speech in Prague, North Korea responded by shooting its forbidden large-range 
missiles (Ojeda, 2009: 8). Therefore, to understand the reason why North Korea 
relies on nuclear weapons to deter any potential coercion from its neighbors, it 
must be clearly stated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is weak 
(Ehteshami, The foreign policy of Iran, 2009). This statement must be understood 
through the neorealist perspective, in which a weak State is that one which lacks 
a variety of resources to compete in the international arena (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
These differences have motivated the U.S. to step aside and avoid establishing 
official diplomatic relations with North Korea. On the contrary, the U.S. uses a 
“Strategic Patience” approach that pressures China to be the active promoter for 
North Korea to re-join the Six Party Talks (Chanlett-Avery, 2016). 
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Finally, even if Iran and North Korea lack decision-making power within 
the international system, they do confront American hegemony inside highly 
valued regions. Therefore, they have both been a focus of attention for American 
policy-makers (McEachern, 2011), especially because of their nuclear 
development programs. Nevertheless, there are radical differences between 
these two States, and even if they are commonly related as one proliferation 
danger, these differences generate much clearer motivations for Iran to meet a 
nuclear deal with the United States than the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (Perkovich, 2015). These differences, both inside the country and outside 
of it, are the reason why the JCPOA was signed with Iran and not with North 
Korea; these characteristics are though to be discussed on the second chapter of 
the present dissertation. 
 
1.3. External Actors Making an Impact on American Foreign Policy 
 
Policy-making, especially Foreign Policy, involves taking into 
consideration external factors that contribute to build the reality a certain State is 
facing. This is the reason why this section is dedicated to describe the most 
important external actors of the American Nuclear Foreign Policy at the time of 
the JCPOA adoption.  
 
1.3.1. American-Israeli Relations 
 
After the United Nations General Assembly provided the Jewish people 
with a territory, the United States of America turned out to be the first country to 
provide de facto recognition to the State of Israel (Zanotti, 2014:34). Since then, 
U.S.-Israeli relations of all kinds, including defense, diplomatic, economic and 
security elements have developed enough to make the international community 
believe that Israel is the main American partner in the region (Zanotti, 2015, 
pg.36).  
 
History and data corroborate the fact that the United States and Israel 
share a significant relation. Until 2004, Israel was the major growing recipient of 
U.S. overseas cooperation programs since World War II (Zanotti, 2014: 40). 
Much of this assistance is military; consequently Israeli Army became one of the 
most technologically refined forces in the world (Zanotti, 2014: 36). 
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At the political level, the United States has also had special handling of 
Israel. In 1987 Israel was entitled “major non-NATO ally”; which gave privileges to 
Israeli investors in the United States, and in 2007 potential power to do research 
to help the Department of Homeland Security on its mandate regarding 
counterterrorism (Zanotti, 2015:36). This dissertation only reaffirms the tolerant 
attitude that the United States has had towards nuclear ambiguity since 1969 
(Zanotti, 2014: 54). Another milestone in this relation is the U.S.-Israel Strategic 
Partnership Act of 2014 that gave Israel the same Strategic Trade Authorization 
(STA) as the U.S. in order to acquire certain weapons that only 36 other countries 
currently have (Zanotti, 2014:37).  
 
Yet, much of these conditions have changed since the Obama 
Administration came to power. Obama chose former Senator Mitchell as special 
delegate for Middle East, which spotted the end of Israeli majoritarian influence 
on American policy in the region given Mitchell’s personal background (Birnbaum, 
2009: 46; Baker & Rudoren, 2015). In the nuclear matter, Obama has stated his 
intention to establish the Middle East as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (Zanotti, 
2015:54), which certainly has implications for Israel (Zanotti, 2014: 8).  
 
The object of study of this dissertation is one example of this new 
dynamic. For many decades Israel has spotted Iran as an imminent threat to its 
security (Zanotti, 2014: 8; Herzog, 2015: 2), because Iran is a regional influence 
based on its ideology, which denies Israel its right to exist at all (Zanotti, 2013).  
 
Historically, Israel has asked for increasingly sanctionatory measures at 
the multilateral and bilateral spheres, which the United States has supported 
(Zanotti, 2014: 8) but as negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 continued, 
Israel saw itself on a vulnerable position and its Prime Minister, Netanyahu, gave 
a controversial speech asking to change the conditions to obtain a “better deal” with 
stronger sanctions to Iran (Zanotti, 2015: 11). From the Israeli point of view, if 
Iran succeeds on the development of nuclear weapons, even if Iran doesn’t use 
these, the intimidation to its neighbor States would create and generate a pro-
Iranian block in the region (Zanotti, 2015: 12). Additionally, Netanyahu 
announced strong opposition to any final agreement with Iran, unless Iran 
recognizes Israeli right to exist (Zanotti, 2014: 18).  
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Finally, Israel believes a trustworthy and stable diplomatic outcome must 
include powerful sanctions together with a likely military option (Herzog, 2015: 4). 
This is based on the suspicion of Hassan Rouhani’s real intentions, calling him a 
wolf on sheep clothes, who is accused of using a more indulgent rhetoric but the 
interests remain the same (Herzog, 2015: 8). It is important to highlight this 
perception of the negotiations because Israelis see the Obama Administration as 
lacking of assertiveness towards the volatile situation in the Middle East (Herzog, 
2015: 4). 
 
1.3.2. American Relations with JCPOA allies 
 
According to structural realism dynamics of States are explained by 
associating the actions of the powerful ones, in this case the P5+1, and their 
effect on others in the structure (Powell, 1994). On a regular basis, structural 
realism analyzes States as competitors, but in the case of JCPOA agreement it is 
clear that a coalition stands as the powerful part. Kramer (1998), on his 
explanation apropos of cooperation, justifies the dynamic with the existence of a 
common threat or when a hegemon is able to induce cooperation practices 
through positive or negative motivations to cooperate (Kramer, 1998). Therefore 
it is important to establish the reasons why these five countries, all consider Iran 
a nuclear threat because, according to Kramer, that would be the reason for their 
cooperation with the U.S. 
 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
 
Since nuclear weapons appeared, the Atlantic nations, predominantly 
the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, have complied with a shared 
security relationship that is mostly dependent on the American commitment to 
grant success (Pierre, 1971). In this context, the for a long time, the United States 
maintained nuclear weapons in strategic European countries, but since Obama 
took office most these have been retired to comply with the new American 
proposal (Department of Defense, 2015: 32). With the changing environment and 
the new actors in the international community, the P5 has unified to overcome the 
nuclear threat, but still, subtle differences among each particular relation with the 
United States remain, and are worth describing. 
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The United States and the United Kingdom relation can be traced back 
for centuries. They both share a wide background resulting from a combination of 
common history, and long-term cooperation in several issues including security 
as evidence in their active participation within the United Nations Security Council 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Mix, 2015: 1). Therefore, it is said that 
the United Kingdom is the worthiest ally of the U.S. in the region (Mix, 2015: 3). 
 
Although it was said that during the Obama Administration, relations 
between these two separated a little, it was demonstrated on the British Security 
Agenda of 2010 that they both honor their long time partnership (Her Magesty 
Government, 2015). Their shared view on the role of nuclear weapons as means 
to deter threats and their assurance to preserving only the minimum deterrent 
required (Defense, 2015) have shaped an approach based on defense and 
security between both countries (Her Magesty Government, 2015). 
 
Regarding the threat of Iran, since 2010 the United Kingdom prioritized 
the need of strengthening bilateral relations with traditional allies, emerging 
economies and key regional States (Her Magesty Government, 2015) i.e. Iran. 
This strategy was already being executed since 2002 when the United Kingdom 
along with France and Germany initiated negotiations about the Iranian nuclear 
program (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016). Since 2013, the United States, the 
Russian Federation and China joined the negotiations but the United Kingdom is 
still the country that has supported President Obama the most on achieving a 
global lock-down of exposed nuclear material, as it was proposed in Prague (Her 
Magesty Government, 2015). 
 
The French Republic 
 
France is another important actor within the JCPOA negotiations 
because within the three European actors it is the only one that throughout 
history has had opposed standpoints with the United States and has acted 
strongly about it. Still, fundamental issues are still shared, such as terrorism and 
nuclear proliferation as the greatest threats for security nowadays (Gallis, 2006: 
2).  
 
In this context it is important to highlight that the Bush Administration 
was often criticized for its unilateralism, what certainly changed after Obama took 
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office, bringing France and the United States closer together. This, because the 
French Republic follows three principles: liberty, equality and fraternity; that are 
materialized on its foreign policy through multilateral cooperation in international 
matters, especially cooperation with the European Union (Gallis, 2006: 2).  
 
Regarding the Iranian nuclear threat France has proposed a harder 
approach than many other European countries (Belkin, 2011), which matches the 
American double track strategy proposed by Obama. During the negotiations, 
France positioned itself as an impetuous defender of the non-proliferation 
principles (Nicoullaud, 2015) by proposing strong sanctions such as a ban of 
Iranian oil and refined petroleum, and intents to cease business with Iranian 
companies (Belkin, 2011). This behavior has been strongly questioned based on 
possible French political debts with Israel and other Arab countries, which can’t 
be at all dismissed taking into consideration that diplomacy itself means 
balancing the defense of principles and interests (Nicoullaud, 2015). A clear 
example of this was the French withdrawal from a major Iranian natural gas 
project (Belkin, 2011), when France looked for international approval as an 
indicator of success even if that meant loosing a vast advantage, just like the 
JCPOA negotiations. On the specific negotiations of the JCPOA France supports 
lifting the sanctions, even if this can also mean the development of nuclear 
activities in Iran, but also supports a strong retroactive sanctions for 
responsibility, both that award international approval (Nicoullaud, 2015) 
 
The People’s Democratic Republic of China 
 
Throughout history Sino-American Relations have changed from uneasy 
impasses to a highly dependent combination of political an economic relations 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). This interdependence appears to expand 
into other matters along with a shared responsibility for concentrating on global 
security hazards, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction, proliferation and 
terrorism (Department of Defense, 2015: 5; Lawrence, 2013: 3). 
 
Since 1993, when China signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
concern towards the non-proliferation regime has increased to maintain nuclear 
weapons as part of the Chinese Grand Strategy to stabilize the region (Blackwill 
& Tellis, 2015: 30). The United States has approached this country in a very 
particular manner, since there are no multilateral alliance structures, like in 
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Europe for example; the United States has extended a deterrent policy based on 
bilateral alliances and security relation with China and other Asian actors 
(Department of Defense, 2015: 35). This has, in a way, required China to be an 
active participant of American initiatives against Iranian proliferation, at the 
expense of not being the second largest trade partner of the United States in the 
context of evident financial crisis in the global economy (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2015).  
 
In this context, China has positioned itself as an impartial and positive 
actor skillful enough to balance between the parties, primarily between 
Washington and Tehran (Lawrence, 2013: 26). China is an actor that has strong 
relation with both the U.S. and Iran, when taking into consideration the important 
contributions that China made to the Iranian nuclear program, is the only one 
able to accomplish this mediation based on its neutral relations with all parties. 
Therefore, China’s opinion relates the Iranian program inside an international 
security question but at the same time, within the UNSC and the P5+1 
negotiations directing the Iranian nuclear matter towards a new security model 
based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination that could also 
be applied on Asian risky areas (Scott, 2015).  
 
The Russian Federation 
 
After the Cold War ended, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
relations between the United States and the Russian Federation have struggled 
to be cooperative (Nichol, 2014). Engaging with Russia does not represent a 
central concern to the United States anymore (Nichol, 2014: 3), but it remains the 
only Nuclear State that could present itself as a nuclear adversary to the United 
States; therefore the U.S. has increased cooperation to avoid and oppose 
nuclear proliferation and terrorism (Department of Defense, 2015: 4), to have the 
Russian Federation as an ally. 
 
One of the main consequences that the 9/11 had on Russian-American 
relations was that the tensions of the 1990’s ceased to increase in order to 
reshape their relation on the basis of having terrorism as a common enemy 
(Nichol, 2014: 49). Since then, both countries have deployed their nuclear 
capabilities by more than 70%, to exclusively retain the arsenal required to form a 
firm deterrence (Department of Defense, 2015: 5). The Obama administration 
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has ‘reset’ relations to be based on trust, through the signing of a new “Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty” in 2010 (Nichol, 2014) and the implementation of the 
Moscow Treaty (Department of Defense, 2015: 12).  
 
Regarding, the specific actions taken against Iran and its nuclear 
program, Russia has supported the sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
within the context of the United Nations Security Council (Nichol, 2014). In spite 
of the discrepancies between both countries on the implementation plans to 
manage essential topics (Department of State, 2014); specifically disarmament, 
non-proliferation regimes, the Iranian nuclear program, terrorism and others 
(Hoop, 2009: 7), the Obama Administration has successfully managed to find 
common interests to begin an alliance. In the case of Iran, it is clear that none of 
these two countries want Iran to develop nuclear weapons, which leads Russia to 
support American initiatives of economic sanctions to setback Iranian violations 
to the NPT regime (Department of State, 2014). 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany 
 
Relations between Germany and the United States have experienced a 
transformation, from patronage to interdependence in the past 70 years 
(Silberfeld, Stanton, & Sutton, 2015). The strong economic, political and security 
bonds created after World War II, the German Reconstruction and the 
Reunification continue to be the epicenter of a major intercontinental partnership 
that seeks to strengthen the progressively fragile status quo in the international 
system concerning the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism (The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2015: 3). 
 
This interdependence has gone beyond traditional for its historic 
background, to become fundamental (Silberfeld, Stanton, & Sutton, 2015), as 
Angela Merkel and Barack Obama have highlighted (The German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, 2015: 4). Beyond the significant trade between both 
countries, the pursue of security and prosperity the agreement to maintain the 
world order against terrorism and revisionist States is the foundation of their 
alliance (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2015: 10). 
 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable and even questionable the participation of 
Germany in the negotiation rounds and signature of the JCPOA. Germany is the 
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only counterpart of Iran that is not considered neither a Nuclear State nor a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, what certainly raises 
questions about its motivations to participate in such active way within the new 
regime. On the one hand it might look like Germany stands in the name of 
transparency in the context of the negotiations, as an interested third-party actor 
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015). On the other hand, by looking deeper 
into German current conditions as first economy within the European Union, it is 
clear that Germany expects revenue from this Treaty, specifically 5 billion euros 
in the short-term and multiplying that number in the long-term according to the 
German Chamber of Commerce due to all the investments in infrastructure that 
Iran will need to fulfill its requirements (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Therefore, the 
German participation can be easily explained on neorealist terms. 
 
1.3.3. American Relations with its JCPOA counterpart: The Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
 
After World War I, when the Iranian territory was acknowledged, Iranian-
American relations remained friendly. During the 20th century Iran government 
was a monarchy, supported by the United States, which gave in to Western 
interests becoming an important regional player for many years during the Cold 
War (Ehteshami, 2009: 284). Still, it was after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that 
the country became a center of attention because it was perceived as a 
rebellious; religious conducted, and unallied State (Ehteshami, 2009: 283). This 
major change of sides generated a profound mistrust on the Iranian nuclear 
program that was once supported by the United States. 
 
Based on the strong anti-Americanism feeling that the Revolution 
initiated, which led to heartless treatment of the American delegation in Iran, the 
United States terminated all official diplomatic relations with the country. Until the 
present day, after more than 30 years, the United States remained unrepresented 
in Iranian territory (Beemun, 2013: 196), but this hasn’t inhibited the U.S. from 
pressuring the country in many ways. It is important to highlight that Iran, in 
general, has an anti-interference policy not exclusively to the United States but 
also to Russia and any other actor in the system because of its long tradition of 
subjugation that concluded with the British protectorate during the 19th century 
(Beemun, 2013: 197).  
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The Iranian rhetoric required the United States to implement policies that 
would stop the country from becoming a threat to international security, especially 
regarding nuclear issues. These included several Congress Acts, like the “Iran-Iraq 
Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992” and the  “Iran-Libya Sanctions Act”, which forbids the 
assignment of merchandises or technology that could provide knowledge or 
materials to Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and fines any 
foreign and U.S. venture in Iran’s energy sector surpassing $20 million 
(Davenport K. , 2015: 2). These are only two examples of the several sanctions 
that the United States has arranged unilaterally and within the United Nations 
Security Council to prevent in a political and economic manner, the expansion of 
Iranian threat (Beemun, 2013: 199), what has left Iran isolated. 
 
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration acknowledges the 
indispensable role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the stabilization of the Middle 
East because of the shared interests on drug banning, natural resources 
management and nuclear energy (Beemun, 2013: 196).  In this context, 
President Obama has had the challenge of breaking the precedent policy 
towards the “Axis of Evil” and establishing a more balanced policy that favors the 
normalization of relations between Washington and Teheran (Hoop, 2009: 6). 
This policy has been well received by the current President Hassan Rouhani, 
who wants to participate more actively in the international system (Liebich, 2015), 
and has been materialized through the negotiations and the deal signed on 2015 
between the P5+1 and Iran that discharges the sanctions imposed, if Iran allows 
the IAEA to monitor the nuclear program (Davenport, 2015: 1). This first 
approach doesn’t necessarily mean that Iran has completely changed its policy 
and will permit Western influence, on the contrary the several sanctions created 
conditions that put Iran on a vulnerable condition and created a negative 
motivation for the country to cooperate. 
 
At the end of this chapter the first objective of this dissertation, which 
was to determine the motivations of the United States to change the strategy of 
sanctions and negotiate with Iran, has been achieved. First, the study of different 
American doctrines to grant relative security in terms of Baldwin throughout time 
has shown the evolution of the concept of threat to the United States. The 
analysis has displayed that even nowadays the nuclear foreign policy of the 
United States is based on deterrence. Deterrence, as a strategy is applied to both 
Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. These two types of 
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actors are important to American foreign policy. Nevertheless, since the Bush 
Administration, the American government has increased its attention to the latter. 
Specifically, the Bush Administration catalogued Iran, North Korea and Iraq -in 
the context of the War on Terror- as the Axis of Evil that must be defeated. The 
deterrence strategy extends to the Obama Administration but with a so-called 
“opened hand” policy towards Iran. The difference lies on creating international law 
instruments that tackle nuclear terrorism in a cooperative manner. Furthermore, 
this cooperation fulfills the parameters of cooperation according to neorealist 
theorists. Meaning that cooperation only exists when States form alliances 
against a common threat or when a hegemon is able to induce cooperation 
practices through positive or negative motivations. The alliance with the rest of 
the JCPOA Parties is based on eliminating the common threat of a nuclear Iran, 
while the United States negatively encourages Iran to cooperate. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MODIFICATION OF IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TO LEAVE ITS PARIAH 
STATUS 
 
“The deal can and should herald a new era and lead to positive outcomes regarding the 
establishment of sustainable peace and stability in the region5 
(Rouhani, 2015). 
 
It is crucial for this dissertation to study the evolution of Iranian Nuclear 
foreign policy in order to understand the radical transformation of the Iranian 
government towards the United States in nuclear issues since the Rouhani 
Administration. Throughout the following chapter some milestones of Iranian 
History and significant political motivations will be emphasized -stressing on the 
differences between the two latest governments - in order to have a proper 
understanding of the motivations leading to the changes in the Nuclear foreign 
policy of Iran.  
 
2.1. The Construction of Iran’s Foreign Policy Until the Ahmadinejad 
Administration 
 
The fact that Iran was one of the greatest empires during the 5th and 6th 
centuries BC, the invasion of foreign powers (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 18-19), the 
introduction of Islam as the official religion (Boroujerdi, 2005: 4), and its 
geographic characteristics, are just examples of the elements that have shaped a 
complex Iranian foreign policy (Boroujerdi, 2005: 10). Iran’s foreign policy can be 
understood from a defensive realist perspective since 1979, when the country 
begun questioning the established international status quo and its leaders (Haji-
Yousefi, 2010). During the Ahmadinejad Administration the concern to keep Iran 
influential in the Middle East and independent –critical to the status quo- was 
evident. Nevertheless, it proved to have a high cost of opportunity for Iranian 
citizens. 
  
                                                        
5 Official United Nations Iranian Translation into English 
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2.1.1. Political Background: what the Shah and the Islamic Revolution left 
behind 
 
The importance of Iran in the international community is not a result of 
recent American interest. On the contrary, the region has historically been of 
global concern. Iran stands in the center of the world economy’s most essential 
region because the Middle East is still a stock of natural resources i.e. oil and gas 
(FATHOLLAH-NEJAD, 2007: 9). Additionally, Iran turns out to be an inevitable for 
the transport of goods because of its multiple borders with the Caspian Sea, the 
Sea of Oman, countries in Asia Minor, Middle East and Eurasia (Novillo, 2012), 
establishing Iran as an indispensable player in the world economy (Brzezinski & 
Gates, 2004: 11). 
 
Even though Iran holds nearly 11% of the world’s oil reserves 
(Brzezinski & Gates, 2004: 11), and owns the Strait of Hormuz6 (Addis, et al., 
2010: 2), its importance doesn’t limit to an economic component. Iran has great 
political influence in the region and the world (Centre for the Study of National 
Defense, 2010) because of its established connection with opposition movement 
in neighbor countries, religious revolution in a modern world (Brzezinski & Gates, 
2004: 11), persistent incitement among Shiites, and internal instability. All these 
aspects together have brought Iran several supporters and adversaries around 
the world (Roshandel, 2011: 79-80).  
 
In the context of a complex, unpredictable, and enormously important 
region to the United States, Iranian behavior has extensive consequences for the 
Middle East and American interests therein (Brzezinski & Gates, 2004: 10). The 
religious and political mentality, including the radical anti-Americanism, that the 
Islamic regime has inflicted are seen as irreconcilable with the contemporary 
organization of the international system (Roshandel, 2011: 14). Several analysts 
have interpreted the political alliances and hostilities in the region as a power 
struggle between Sunni and Shiite-ruled States (Addis, et al., 2010: 1). These 
elements have heavily influenced policy examinations regarding Islamic 
governance and jurisprudence (Brzezinski & Gates, 2004: 11) applied in Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran (Addis, et al., 2010: 1) and their policy-making. 
 
                                                        
6 A narrow chokepoint through which more than 40% of the world’s traded oil transits. 
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The Islamic Republic of Iran, former Persia, was founded in 1935 and it 
continued to be ruled by a Shah7 until 1979 when the Islamic Revolution brought 
the monarchy down and rejected Western Influence. Riza Pahveli, the first Shah 
of Iran, was a military leader who ruled the country with a nationalist ideology. 
The Shah looked towards the integration of the economy by building 
infrastructure (Zayar, 2010: 12) and developing the oil industry that was 
established in 1908 across the region of the South West Khuzistan (Zayar, 2010: 
12; Boroujerdi, 2005: 4). According to Zayar (2010: 12), Iranian population could 
be recognized as one of the largest employed in the industrial production across 
the Middle East because of the growing figure that represented 20.000 workers in 
1920 and increased to 31.500 employees in 1940. During the Shah’s regime, the 
governmental budget was mainly used to modernize the country, and was mostly 
financed by oil revenues and taxes. 
 
This modernization was largely implemented thanks to German 
machinery, which posed a problem after the outburst of World War II. As a 
consequence of the perceived favorable positions and alignment with Germany 
(Katzman, 2016: 1; Novillo, 2012: 63), Great Britain and Russia decided to invade 
the country (Zayar, 2010: 7) in order to force the Shah to renounce the throne in 
favor of his son (Novillo, 2012: 63). Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, who became the 
last Shah of Iran (Novillo, 2012: 64), had a strong anti-communist ideology that 
led the United States to identify an ally in the region (Katzman, 2016: 1). This 
collaboration aimed to protect the Persian Gulf from direct Soviet influence and to 
counterweigh pro-Soviet Arab regimes by allowing the United States and its allies 
to use and keep troops within national infrastructure i.e. roads, buildings, ports, 
etc. until the end of the Cold War (Zayar, 2010: 7).  
 
 In the hope that the pressure of nationalists in the Parliament against 
the previously mentioned policies would reduce, the Shah chose Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadeq, a popular left-orientated parliamentarian, as Prime Minister in 1951 
(Katzman, Iran, 2016: 1). Only two years passed, when the Prime Minister 
attempted to nationalize the oil industry  (Fernández 1953:45 in Novillo, 2012:63), 
which had been managed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company since 1913 
(Katzman, 2016: 1). Logically, the Shah opposed this decision because it 
jeopardized Iranian relations with the Western World. For this reason instability in 
                                                        
7 Equivalent to an Emperor in Persian Empire 
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the country surged up, resulting of the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the 
departure of the Shah because of riots led by the nationalists (Katzman, 2016: 1; 
Novillo, 2012: 63). In essence, the return of the Shah from his exile and restoring 
him to power was given by the implementation of the “Operation Ajax” 8 (Katzman, 
2016: 1) what clearly intensified the Shah’s alliance with the United States.  
 
 After the Shah returned to power he implemented the “White Revolution” -a 
set of economic, education and health measures- that granted moderate political 
and economic stability to the country until 1973 (Zayar, 2010: 10). Despite this 
policy, Iranian economy was still strongly reliant on oil (Katzman, 2016: 3). By 
1974 when the petroleum prices quadrupled, Iranian oil revenues also increased 
(Zayar, 2010: 10). However, according to Zayar (2010: 10), this phenomenon 
was complemented with: growing inflation, enormous internal migration to 
metropolitan areas, resulting in lack of housing, infrastructure, utilities efficient 
distribution, and other conditions necessary to grant satisfactory standards of 
living. 
 
 The uneven living conditions -due to the foreign investment unequal 
diffusion- were evident in the conjunction of sophisticated and simple forms of 
economy and the vast distortions in the economy (Zayar, 2010: 14). The rural 
areas didn’t appreciate any fundamental change in their social structure because 
all the wealth was accumulated in a few hands in the cities (Zayar, 2010: 12). 
With this perception in mind, the arrival of people from the countryside to the 
towns increased, resulting in an influx of an average of 380.000 farmworkers 
moving annually to the cities by mid 1970s (Zayar, 2010: 14). The consequent fall 
of food production and rise of prices forced the Shah to discontinue his $69 billion 
worth development program, causing general violent strikes led by the 
Communist Party that paralyzed the system (Zayar, 2010: 10-13), which were 
responded with even more violent military reactions. 
 
 The Shah’s efforts to develop the country ended up articulating his own 
gravediggers, because the Iranian proletariat acquired immense power. The 
Gross National Product (GNP) augmentation of almost 10% was portrayed in 
roughly three million young industrial laborers only in the oil sector by 1978 
(Zayar, 2010: 34). Their strikes represented a losts of at least $74 million per day, 
                                                        
8 The Operation Ajax was the first American undercover operation to be implemented in the so-called Third 
World (Novillo, 2012: 63). 
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and soon their complaints became a political demand to overthrow the Shah 
(Zayar, 2010: 34; Farzamnia, 2009: 155). The dynasty system, which had lasted 
approximately 2500 years, collapsed on February the 10th, 1979, with the biggest 
mass mobilization in Iranian history (Farzamnia, 2009: 147).   
 
 Even if it was clear that only the active participation of the working class 
could lead to the victory of the Revolution, the absenteeism of a leader presented 
itself as a main obstruction to achieve it (Zayar, 2010: 39). Ayatollah Jomeini, a 
fundamentalist Shiite religious and political leader, hijacked the revolution and 
directed it from his exile in France (Farzamnia, 2009: 155; Zayar, 2010: 68), 
turning Paris into the headquarters of the Shiite propaganda against the Iranian 
regime (Farzamnia, 2009: 157). As the only organized, unyielding, and assertive 
leader, Ayatollah Jomeini managed to unite nationalists, socialists, communists 
and religious forces (Farzamnia, 2009: 152) to finally establish a conservative 
theocratic State (Zayar, 2010: 68).  
 
 According to Farzamnia (2009: 161), Ayatollah Jomeini’s first 
declarations weren’t passionate. On the contrary, this exact absence of 
excitement and gratefulness towards the people that supported him foretold the 
severe, harsh and relentless regime that the Revolution was going to establish 
(Farzamnia, 2009: 161). The first symbol of the new Iran was approved less than 
a year after the Revolution, a new Constitution that established the Islamic ideals 
(Novillo, 2012: 64) through the concept of “velayat-e-faqih”9 (Katzman, 2016: 1) that 
shifted the foreign policy radically under the influence of religious ideas. The 
Khomeini regime had little control over the Iranian population at first. The violent 
environment and easy access to conventional weapons lead to situations like the 
hostage crisis in the American Embassy (Farzamnia, 2009: 163 – 164), causing 
the rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States (Novillo, 2012: 64), and 
thereby defying the customary order and antagonizing the status quo (Arghavani, 
2013: 82).  
 
The Islamic Revolution is certainly a crucial event that left a mark on 
Iranian social, political, economic, and predominantly foreign policy dynamics 
(Mohammad, 2011: 279; Haji-Yousefi, 2010). Iranian foreign and security policies 
have been subjugated to a set of revolutionary values and rhetoric (Mohammad, 
                                                        
9 Concept used to refer a regime ruled by a “Supreme Leader” according to an Islamic jurisprudence.  
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2011: 279) that are specified in Article 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1979). These principles include “prevention of the foreigners’ 
domination”, “the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence”, 
“all round strengthening of the foundations of national defense […] for the sake of safeguarding the 
independence, territorial integrity, and the Islamic order of the country”, and “framing the foreign 
policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria […]”. These principles clearly 
demonstrate Iran’s will to keep itself inaccessible from international influence 
(Haji-Yousefi, 2010). 
 
2.1.2.  Decision-making structure and internal actors of Iran’s Foreign 
Policy 
 
Internal structures and their actors play strategic roles on the mechanisms 
used to create foreign policy in compliance with the principles mentioned above. 
These principles are the result of a unique combination of Iranian culture of pride 
and –according to the author- victimization, embedded in individual feelings of 
the decision-makers (Ramazani, 2009: 11). The structures within Iran are not an 
exception to this blend because it conceals parallel lines of religion and 
parliamentary democracy (Maleki, 2012). The foreign policy, has acted according 
to these religious principles but it has been characterized as provocative, 
agitating, subversive and sometimes terrorist by the international community, 
especially after the Islamic Revolution (Ramazani, 2009: 13).  
 
Even if Iran recognizes itself as a democratic Republic (Dastjani, 2016), 
and has a democratic elected President and Parliament (Boer, 2009: 36), 
according to Boer, Linz and Rakel, the Iranian political system qualifies as a non-
democratic regime because the religious branch dominates the making of foreign 
policy proposals, approve the fitness of all candidates running for any popular 
voting positions (Boer, 2009: 35), and other attributions that award more power to 
the clerical branch, which will be explained in the forth coming pages. 
 
In this sense, the policy making in foreign affairs brings together the most 
important administrative bodies of both the government and the religious 
branches (Maleki, 2012), and reformists and conservatives (Salehzadeh, 2013) 
as actors in the political scene. The bodies responsible of policy making are: the 
Supreme Leader, the President, the Head of the Expediency Council, and the 
Foreign Minister (Maleki, 2012). Each office will be described. 
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According to the Constitution of 1979, the Supreme Leader incarnates all 
authority and power in the State (Dastjani, 2016).  Besides commanding the 
Armed Forces, the Supreme Leader establishes the guidelines of general policy 
making in Iran (Boer, 2009: 35). Consequently, the Supreme Leader’s final word 
accepting or rejecting is decisive for every foreign policy initiative (Maleki, 2012). 
Following, the second most powerful office is held by the President (Rakel, 2008: 
56) as part of the customary Republican governmental branches. Contrary to the 
Supreme leader, the President is elected by popular suffrage (Boroujerdi, 2005: 
20) and this office is not responsible for the foreign policy decision (Rakel, 2008: 
56 in Boer, 2009:38) because the executive power is somehow shared with the 
Supreme Leader (Boroujerdi, 2005: 20).  
 
The Expediency Council, which belongs to the third most powerful 
institution in Iran, is the religious supervisory foundation (Boer, 2009: 35). All 
three religious supervisory bodies have as common aim to safeguard the 
implementation of Islamic principles in all public activities that take place in the 
Islamic Republic (Boer, 2009: 35). The Expediency Council is appointed by the 
Supreme Leader and has the precise mandate of arbitration and mediation 
between the majlis10 and the Guardian Council over suitability of laws with the 
Islamic law (Moslem, 2002: 32; Rakel, 2008: 54 in Boer, 2009: 36). Finally, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is –on paper- the office in charge of all issues related 
to international relations. However, because of the constant overlapping of 
activities between different bodies within the State, the Minister is almost 
exclusively the Iranian delegate to the United Nations (International Campaign for 
Human Rights in Iran, 2013).   
 
Having a clear view of the offices involved in foreign policy decision in Iran 
it is not enough to understand the Iranian decision-making processes, because 
they are greatly manipulated by personal relations, also known as informal 
structures of power (Boer, 2009: 40) that haven’t yet been described. Decision-
making processes in Iran result from a complicated, multi-dimensional interaction 
of governmental and non-governmental partakers. Several issues such as family 
ties, personal relationships, overlapping of authority, and religiously influenced 
politics (Byman, et al., 2001: 21-22) contribute to conflicting goals (Maleki, 2012) 
                                                        
10 Members of the Parliament 
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and difficulty to identify decision-makers (Byman, et al., 2001:21-22). Because 
people are frequently tempted to skip regular bureaucracy to achieve consensus 
(Byman, et al., 2001: 23), personal networks are considered even more important 
than institutional power (Byman, et al., 2001: 25). 
 
As general guideline, Iranian foreign policy has four groups of countries 
that are considered a priority, these are: countries that share borders with Iran, 
Muslim States, the so-called Third World and others that supply resources to Iran 
(Maleki, 2012). Nuclear issues are not the exception to this canon. In fact the 
nuclear program, as centerpiece of nuclear policies in these dynamics, plays a 
key role to determine the Iranian position within the international system. 
Throughout the years after the Islamic Revolution, the nuclear matter turned out 
to be a controversial issue until 2005 when all actors agreed that the costs 
couldn’t match the benefits of developing a nuclear program (Chubin, 2015).  
 
In 2002, Iran faced a crucial moment that determined its relation in 
nuclear matters with the entire world. The disclosure about its undeclared nuclear 
enrichment facility in Natanz led the Khatami Administration to an uncomfortable 
situation because of negotiations with the United States and certain European 
countries to invest in nuclear power plants (Brzezinski & Gates, 2004). The 
government and the Supreme National Security Council agreed to meet 
international requests as an ineffective attempt to avoid worsening the incident 
(Chubin, 2015). As a result, the entire relationships between Iran and the West 
broke apart out of distrust (Dastjani, 2016). 
 
2.1.3. Ahmadinejad’s severe speech against the Western World 
 
In the following section the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 will 
be analyzed by taking for granted that his triumph was given, almost entirely, by 
his charismatic personality and his almost personal rivalry with the international 
community (Farzamnia, 2009: 223). Additionally, the provocative policy against 
the United States and Israel will be analyzed in depth. On the contrary, the 
support to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 16) will be 
approached in the next sub-chapter.  
 
The elections of 2005 were decisive for Iranian foreign policy, with 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory (Arghavani, 2013: 83). The personal 
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characteristics of President Ahmadinejad helped to shape the Iranian foreign 
policy in actions and speech (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 16). As an active revolutionary, 
Ahmadinejad personified a leader mainly for low class people based on his 
distrust of the Western countries (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 17). Ahmadinejad’s 
imprudent rhetoric about international injustice and hate speech against the 
existence of Israel (Ramazani, 2009: 13 in Boer, 2009: 41) and Iranian policy of 
ignoring prohibitions to enrich uranium established by the IAEA (Novillo, 2012: 
68) contributed to a hostile relation with the international community and isolated 
Iran from the international community. Thus, the Ahmadinejad Administration, 
through its policies, created a suspicious environment about the real intentions of 
the Iranian Nuclear Program. 
 
It is important to highlight that the nuclear program didn’t start in 2005 
with Ahmadinejad, nor is the result of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. On the 
contrary, the Nuclear Program begun during the Shah’s regime (Novillo, 2012: 
64) and it was not questioned until Iran changed its ideology to contest the 
American leadership in the international community (Dastjani, 2016). Moreover, 
the situation worsened when President Ahmadinejad announced a proposal to 
wipe off Israel from the map and refused to recognize the existence of the 
Holocaust in 2006 (Gharibabadi, 2009; Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 12). These 
declarations framed Iran as number one threat to Israeli and international security 
because they showed direct confrontation with the Western World. These Iranian 
motivations to develop nuclear weapons brought drastic opposition, which was 
materialized into the several urgent sessions the IAEA held, and the various 
resolutions the United Nations Security Council established to sanction all Iranian 
nuclear activity (IAEA News Center, February 2006). 
 
 The applied sanctions proved Ahmadinejad that even if Iranian relations 
with China and the Russian Federation were close, none of these countries 
would sacrifice their monopoly of nuclear weapons to let Iran continue its nuclear 
activities, even within the NPT framework (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 10). Instead they 
both supported American initiatives to apply unilateral and multilateral sanctions 
to the Islamic country, resulting in an even more aggressive Iranian discourse.  
 
 The Iranian foreign policy during this period was mainly aimed to 
balance power against the United States within the region (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 
13). The strategy was executed through the support given to Hezbollah, Syria, 
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rebel groups in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gharibabadi, 2009). Simultaneously, the 
nuclear development worked as a means to denote progress, sense of 
distinctiveness, and raising respect in comparison with other States (Clarke, 
2013: 495). The Chinese and Russian presence in the region encouraged Iran to 
implement this policy (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 13). Consequently, American 
hegemony was challenged by Iran playing an important part in shaping global 
developments, as a destabilizing actor in the surrounding region (Sharma, 2013). 
 
According to a former deputy of Iranian foreign Minister in Ahmadinejad 
first cabinet and professor of international relations at Tehran University, Iran 
shaped the world into “domination” and “anti-domination” inverted mirror dynamic 
(Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 7). This phenomenon can also be enclosed in the use of a 
dual-speech by the regime: “the discourse of independence and the discourse of resistance”, 
both that provided meaning to Iran’s nuclear policy during Ahmadinejad’s regime 
(Clark, 2003: 498). By emphasizing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Iran 
victimized itself towards the eyes of other Middle Eastern countries that felt the 
American presence as alien. But at the same time, Ahmadinejad’s committed to 
the nuclear program can be understood as a result of the dichotomy of a long-
lasting sense of susceptibility to both local and global enemies, a permanent 
feeling of nationwide degradation by external powers, and the prevailing 
confidence in the superiority of Persian society (Clarke, 2013: 493). These two 
examples demonstrate the dual-speech and inverted mirror concepts, which were 
mentioned before. Additionally, the Iranian government explained its incapacity to 
develop nuclear weapons due to Islamic religious principles but these 
declarations were not coherent with the aggressive speech and dangerous 
alliances that Iran had at the moment, like Hamas and Hezbollah (Chatham 
House, 2006; Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 9). 
 
By this period, the foreign policy of Iran could be summarized into 
developing relations with the nearby States, undermining the emerging concerns 
regarding its nuclear activities, opposing allegations based on Iranian hegemony 
within the region, and finally reaching an asymmetrical balance against the 
United States through coalitions with the Syria, for example (Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 
11). All which resulted threatening to the international security and encouraged 
even harder sanctions to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian nuclear 
program  -in this case- exemplifies Waltz’ defensive realist phenomenon. Nuclear 
development contributes to boosting Iranian power in the system –by increasing 
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the effectiveness of self-help operations– but such pursue is heavily punished by 
the system (Clarke, 2013: 498). 
 
2.2. Foreign Policy During the Rouhani Administration 
 
Hassan Rouhani’s surprising victory in the Presidential elections of 2013 
brought expectations of a drastic change on Iran’s foreign policy (International 
Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, 2013). Rouhani’s campaign promises 
portrayed a new approach to the international community, one that differs 
dramatically from the one established by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Coville, 2013) 
in terms of a cooperative approach to the economic, political and nuclear matters 
with the Western World (International Crisis Group, 2013: 9) However, Rouhani’s 
tactic to re-integrate Iran to the international community responds to the need of 
mending the social unrest caused by the destructive impact on living conditions 
that the isolation brought to the country (Sharma, 2013). The signing of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) implies the cease of Iran as a pariah 
State in the international community at a high cost for traditional Iranian policy-
makers. This is why the following sections will attempt to explain why Iran 
couldn’t afford to be a pariah State any longer. 
 
2.2.1. Iranian Context for the Victory of Hassan Rouhani 
 
Iranian population is active when it comes to elections. Iranian streets 
were filled with protestors demanding to know what had happened to their votes 
after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected in 2009, and were also crowded in 
2013 to celebrate Hassan Rouhani’s victory (Maloney, 2013). This outcome 
appears to be the result of a political growth within Iranian population that looked 
for a new balance between all parties in the political arena (Coville, 2013), a 
complete opposition to the Ahmadinejad’s regime.  
 
 Rouhani has a large political background, as part of the centrist cleric 
party since the revolution (Maloney, 2013) and holding different offices related to 
security, nuclear development, and diplomacy for more than forty years (Flichy, 
2013) he positioned himself as the only capable of reforming and reopening 
Iranian relations to the world (Maloney, 2013). Nevertheless, his main advantage 
was the bitter discontent of the Iranian population (Maloney, 2013), as the result 
of eight years of poor use of diplomacy. The precedent Administration led to deep 
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tensions in economic, political, social and international issues (Coville, 2013), 
witnessed by the population through the austerity measures, the vast damage to 
basic Human Rights, and the increasing inflation (Maloney, 2013). 
 
According to the Iranian Central Bank, the inflation growth by 2013 was 
around 54,1%, which raised prices in food nearly 64,7% (Coville, 2013). Clearly, 
the Iranian Economy was facing a never-seen before crisis that was worsened by 
the international sanctions and directly promoting social conflicts inside the 
territory (Kian, 2014). In this context, the population wanted to see an 
improvement of the economic situation to avoid the on going impoverishment of 
the lower social classes, which was only achievable through the lift of 
international economic sanctions (Coville, 2013). This internal socio- economic 
context in addition to the regional and international situation was unfavorable to 
the Islamic Republic but extremely useful to Rouhani, who promised to take the 
Iranian leadership and seek a way to end international sanctions and isolation 
without losing face (Kian, 2014). Iran's population expected more rational and 
less politicized management of economic issues (Coville, 2013), and this 
moderation was embodied in President Rouhani (Kian, 2014).  
 
 Rouhani’s image wasn’t build on one day. On the contrary it is the result 
of almost twenty years of work at the country’s highest national security body, the 
Supreme National Security Council, as part of the Expediency Council’s research 
branch, and a variety of governmental offices including the parliamentary branch 
(Ditto , 2013: 1; Shanahan, 2015). Hassan Rouhani -as a man who started his 
religious studies at a very young age, studied Judicial Law and obtained a 
doctorate in 1999- personifies a complete different background as that of 
Ahmadinejad (Funke, 2013). Even if they both can be closely related to the 
revolution, Rouhani is more of an ideologue who turned into politician and 
academic (Ditto , 2013), making out of Rouhani a regime insider (Shanahan, 
2015) rather than a beneficiary from it.  
 
 In his position, Rouhani is concerned with resolving the nuclear issue, 
strengthening the economy, ending Iran’s isolation from the international 
community with a sophisticated set of strategies (Shanahan, 2015) that face 
challenges such as modernity, globalization, civil liberties while reconciling his 
identity as a Muslim and part of a theocratic regime (Ditto, 2013). Despite his vast 
experience, Hassan Rouhani became widely known mostly because he was 
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chosen to be the chief negotiator on Iran’s nuclear program (Ditto, 2013: 1; 
Funke, 2013). Nevertheless, this exact experience makes the current President 
realize the importance of resolving the nuclear issue to witness the end of Iranian 
economic isolation (Shanahan, 2015), which reflects the requests of the vast 
majority of Iranian population for the conciliation of the political field to improve 
their living conditions and right for peace (Kian, 2014).  
 
 Regardless of his experience and recognition, Rouhani appeared 
among the least likely to win among the eight candidates that the Guardian 
Council authorized to run for office (International Crisis Group, 2013). At first 
shine, his direct criticism to previous Administrations, especially on the nuclear 
issue, didn’t portray him as an imminent victor (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
Nevertheless, he continued to address Iranians’ worries and arising their 
expectations (Funke, 2013) by telling his supporters that his promises of a 
peaceful, prosperous and dignifying lifestyle would be noticeable within a year 
(Funke, 2013). These promises raised expectations both, within Iran, and the 
international community to begin a process of normalizing relations with other 
countries in the Middle Eastern region and the world (Rizvi, 2014). 
 
2.2.2. Hassan Rouhani’s Campaign Promises  
 
As explained before, Hassan Rouhani’s win was mainly given because 
of the Iranian expectation of change. During his campaign Rouhani spoke about 
“the rights of people” cataloged in Article 20 of the Iranian Constitution, which include 
political, social, cultural and other human rights in compliance with Islam, but until 
the present day not all promises have been fulfilled (International Campaign for 
Human Rights in Iran, 2013). Rouhani has been characterized as a pragmatist 
(Przeczek, 2013: 69-70). In that context, the campaign promises that have been 
accomplished are strongly related to create a proactive foreign policy that looks 
cooperative and open to establish relations with the West (Przeczek, 2013: 69-
70).  
 
While the Iranian population still hopes for guarantees to defend the 
rights of women (International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, 2013), other 
promises, such as the new economic policies have already been executed. Since 
the beginning of this Administration, unemployment –especially among the 
youngest population- has been a priority, and Rouhani has focused himself on a 
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private investment approach (Chantam House, 2013) that can only be carried out 
through foreign investment. This strategy has been useful but not determining to 
end recession, decreasing unemployment or reforming the exchange market 
(Rouhani Meter, 2015). 
 
Before Hassan Rouhani, Iranian policies -especially foreign policy - had 
been wrapped in a strict anti-Imperialist, Islamic, system challenging dogma 
masked in revolution that is actually managed by a rigid elite (Sadjadpour & Ben-
Taleblu, 2015: 5-6) that owns 1/3 of the country’s wealth (Clemens, 2014: 53-54). 
Thereby, leaving Iranian population isolated in economic privation and political 
insecurity (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 1). Between 2012 and 2013, rising 
prices (inflation rate of 27%), high unemployment levels (nearly a quarter of 
Iranian young people were unemployed) and high rates of inflation were typical 
conditions in Iranian daily life (Clemens, 2014: 53-54). Even though Iranian 
population wishes to be flourishing and comprehensively incorporated in the 
international community (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 5-6), sanctions have 
contributed to create unpromising conditions for Iranian society that are evident in 
different indicators. As in many other pariah States –like North Korea– life 
expectancy rate in Iran is approximately 70 years, which is abnormally lower than 
those in neighboring States (Clemens, 2014: 53-54). This information is 
supported through a report of the Global Research that outlines the ‘destructive 
impact’ of international sanctions on Iran’s healthcare system, especially due to the 
shortage and rising prices of medications (Sharma, 2013). These singularities 
can be explained by the international sanctions to the private sector to Iran, that 
lead to an inefficient economy in terms of lack of free market. This situation only 
worsened by markers such as the high infant mortality rates as high as 60 per 
1000, and ¼ of adult illiteracy (Clemens, 2014: 53-54). 
 
In order to find a way out of the described situation, Rouhani saw the 
need of changing the Iranian approach towards the Western World. In first place 
he presented himself as a peaceful leader, heralding the new era of moderation 
and justice in Iran, as the only one able to combine the ideological precepts of 
the State with the real needs of the population (Sharma, 2013). In this manner, 
Rouhani shows himself as a rescuer of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the 
international community by looking for possible solutions to the nuclear situation 
in recognition of the importance of this issue to re-integrate Iran to the 
international community (International Crisis Group, 2013: 9).  
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This context brings Hassan Rouhani to power in 2013. As President of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, he promised to resolve the situation that the 
Ahmadinejad nuclear policy brought to the country within six months (Kasra, 
2015). Although it has taken him more than two years, agreements between the 
P5 + 111 and Iran were signed in June 2015 (Iranian Diplomacy, 2015), which 
promises to be the start of an economic upturn for Iran in order to counterbalance 
the sanctions that have cost the country almost 160 billion dollars a year in oil 
exports and more than 100 billion dollars of frozen assets in foreign banks (BBC 
News, 2015). 
 
2.2.3. Conciliation with the Western World 
 
Hassan-Yari (2013), Sharma (2013) and Katzman (2016) State that 
Rouhani’s strategy has a direct and positive impact at the international level.  A 
more sophisticated political and diplomatic language shows that Iran looks for 
constructive engagement and urges the West to respond properly to a mutually 
beneficial cooperation (Sharma, 2013). In summary, there is no incentive to 
continue sanctioning Iran when it shows itself flexible and moderate in its 
perspectives (Sharma, 2013). 
 
However, it is suitable to explain the concept of Pariah State in the first 
place to understand the reasons why the Iranian community couldn’t afford 
conserving this status by 2015 before the conciliation issue is tackled. According 
to Harkarvy’s (1981: 2) “pariahood” is a premise related to the nonexistence or 
deficiency of obedience to international conventions, which consequently leads to 
global “ostracization” (Lawal, 2012: 232). The concept given by Harkarvy 
opportunely implies that power alliances determine if a State is Pariah or not, 
which empowers this same structure to compensate or punish States according 
to their wishes and impulses  (Lawal, 2012: 229). Consequently, one can infer 
that Pariah status is a biased categorization. The categorization of Pariah State 
not only isolates a country, but the international community also deeply questions 
the aptness of its leaders, its legitimacy, its policies and its ideology (Lawal, 2012: 
229). Nevertheless Lawal (2012: 238) asserts that one situation specifically has 
been recognized as an objective criterion to recognize a Pariah State, illegal 
                                                        
11 The P5 is the group of countries with veto power at the United Nations Security Council (United States, 
China, France, United Kingdom and Russian Federation); the +1 refers to Germany in this context. 
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acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
new contenders of nuclear expertise are isolated from the international 
community as a response to the inattention to the nuclear monopoly (Lawal, 
2012: 238). 
 
According to the same author, even though the terms “rogue State” and 
“Pariah State” are nowadays swapped in the speech, there is a great difference 
between these two concepts that is worth mentioning to understand the Iranian 
situation. A rogue State -correctly said- denotes leadership of an unreasonable, 
corrupt, dishonest, problematic, and malicious State. Hence, the two notions 
aren’t mutually exclusive but this doesn’t mean they are always linked together.  
 
Iran, in the structure of the international community, is a State that has 
many capabilities such as natural resources and geostrategic location, which 
according to structural realism would give the State power within the system. 
Nevertheless, this country has little decision-making power in the dynamics of the 
system because it has been identified as a rouge State by the hegemonic powers 
in the structure.  Additionally, the United States, Britain and France have 
designated Iran as a Pariah State because of its relentless determination to 
acquire nuclear arsenal (Lawal, 2012: 232). Iran is both a rogue and a Pariah 
State because it is powerful and disregards the international regime based on the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is part.  
 
Since the nuclear issue is so important to Iran, Western negative 
reaction towards the reformist agenda would have incited Iran to have a more 
obstinated and isolated policy (Sharma, 2013). Consequently, the Western 
powers took advantage of the situation and managed to open opportunities for 
commercial agreements (Hamidi, 2013) in order to reintegrate Iran in the 
international community.  
 
This openness is clearly present in the framework of Iranian nuclear 
agenda through the Lausanne negotiations and finally drafting the JCPOA 
(Bazoobandi, 2014). Even if it didn’t change its negotiation style with the new 
Administration combining a variety of tactics that include: assessment, probing, 
delaying, exaggerating, and counter-threatening when endangered (Ramazani, 
2009); the implications of the JCPOA are beneficial for both parties 
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(Beheshtipour, 2016). President Rouhani, describes his nuclear policy as 
constructive, meaning, balancing between ideas and chances, selecting proper 
discourse, sidestepping a role of differentiating itself from other regional actors, 
reassuring international cooperation, evading acts that make Iran look as a 
security hazard to other, and joining into the global economy  (Bazoobandi, 
2014), in this way the JCPOA helps both sides to find a shared line without 
eluding their main interests and reaching a pact which is actually plausible 
(Beheshtipour, 2016). 
 
After Rouhani’s announcement that he wanted to change methods, end 
unnecessary aggressive speech, and to be transparent; his image as an 
experienced negotiator, project initiator, and a credible interlocutor (Makinsky, 
2013) gave the Western powers no reason to question the Iranian leader true 
intentions. Nevertheless, he has also stated clearly that he will insist on 
continuing the country’s nuclear program, on recognition of its “inalienable right to 
enrichment” (International Crisis Group, 2013), which was kept until the end of the 
JCPOA negotiations. The pragmatism that characterizes him led the Iranian 
delegation to agree limitations to the uranium enrichment, along with the 
verification mechanisms, that are crucial in preventing Iran from building a 
nuclear weapon (Hamidi, 2013).  
 
When Lawal (2012: 234) analyzes political power, he highlights the 
influence of international economic relations as a technique to determine the 
influence of a country in the system. As complicated as they are, economic 
relations are given by the influence of trade, monetary policies, global 
interdependence and international economic institutions in the political structures 
of each country (Spero, 1985 p. 263 in Lawal, 2012: 234). Since international 
relations are a fundamental source of power according to neorealist theory, 
economic sanctions have been identified as a means to grant compliance or 
isolate States in the system through international institutions. (Lawal, 2012: 235-
236). This has been the case for Iran that has faced a Jekyll and Hyde situation 
because it is sanctioned as a State but the real victims are the citizens in the 
country. The risk of civil insurgence because of the life conditions in the country 
and the economic crisis caused by the sanctions were the motivations that lead 
Iranian politicians to commit to the JCPOA negotiations and signature (Dastjani, 
2016). 
 
 54 
2.3. External Factors Influencing Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
Even if Iran’s policy-making is almost completely concentrated in the 
Supreme Leader and extremely individual-centered, foreign policy is still 
influenced by external dynamics that build the reality Iran faced during the period 
of study, and are heavily rooted in history. For this reason the following section is 
dedicated to describe some of most important external actors of the Iranian 
foreign policy and their reactions to the JCPOA adoption.  
 
2.3.1. Iranian-Israeli Relations 
 
Since Israel was first funded as a State until the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution, between 1948 and 1979, both countries shared good relations 
(Addis, et al., 2010: 39). The relation was relatively normal (Katzman, 2015: 15), 
to the point that de facto embassies (Dassa, et al., 2011: 11) were held in each 
other’s capitals, and had wide-ranging network of collaboration ties (Katzman, 
2015: 15). However, the military, economic, and intelligence cooperation implied 
during this period was based on shared geopolitical interests and suspicions like 
the Pan-Arabism and Soviet threats (Dassa, et al., 2011: 9). 
 
During the 1950’s and the 1960’s, Israel provided the Islamic Republic of 
Iran with arsenal and training for its scandalous intelligence group, SAVAK, while 
Iran sold oil at reasonable prices to Israel in comparison to other providers in the 
Gulf region (Addis, et al., 2010: 39). This strategy was mainly motivated by 
rationale collaboration against the common threat of Pan-Arabism led by Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, which forced Iran and Israel, along with other non-Arab States like 
Turkey and Ethiopia to look for a counterbalance in the region (Dassa, et al., 
2011: 10). 
 
Several other issues were addressed by Iran and Israel during the 
Shah’s regime. For example, the support to Iraqi-Kurds against the central Iraqi 
government by the 1960s showed evidence of realist motivations to collaborate 
between Mossad12 and SAVAK to support Kurds in their battle (Dassa, et al, 
2011: 11) against a common regional threat (Dassa, et al, 2011: 1). This strategy 
aimed to draw Iran closer to the United States, thanks to strong ties with Israel, 
                                                        
12 The national intelligence agency of Israel: Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations 
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until the Islamic Revolution (Dassa, et al, 2011: 11) when Iran was seen as an 
ideological threat to Israel (Addis, et al., 2010: 39).  
 
On the one hand, one might say that confrontation between Israel and 
Iran is by all means avoidable since they lack border conflicts (Addis, et al., 2010: 
39), nor do they strive economically (Dassa, et al., 2011: x), and they differ zones 
of interest, the Levant and the Persian Gulf respectively (Dassa, Nader, & 
Roshan, 2011: 1). On the other hand, Iranian military support and financing to 
Hezbollah (Addis, et al., 2010: 39) offers a mistrustful image that can make the 
conflict escalate based on a threat to Israeli existence as a State. Therefore, the 
relations between these to countries can be easily understood from the neorealist 
point of view, as they were once allied against a common enemy but now they 
are confronted due to an atomic hazard to the existence of one actor.  
 
In spite of the strong anti-Semite speech, during the years after the 
Revolution, some Iranian Presidents -i.e. Rafsanjani and Khatami- made efforts 
to pursue pragmatic policies to cooperate with Israel (Dassa, et al., 2011: x). As a 
consequence of these efforts, rational relations though economic, social and 
political cooperation between both countries (Dassa, et al., 2011: x) prolonged 
until the 1980s (Dassa, Nader, & Roshan, 2011: 9). Nevertheless, these attempts 
to lessen Iranian isolation were developed in a much more restricted manner in 
comparison to the Shah’s regime (Dassa, Nader, & Roshan, 2011: 9) 
 
The strengthening tension of the Arab-Israeli conflict led Iranian 
authorities to support Palestinians by Islamizing the Arab and gave Iran a way to 
get over the legacy of the former close cooperation with Israel and therefore with 
the Western World (Ehteshami, 2002: 298; Dassa, et al., 2011: x). Although Iran 
could set aside its relation with Israel to perform a new foreign policy in the region 
the cost was a new Arab identity within the region, which was not broadly 
accepted by the Iranian population (Ehteshami, 2002: 298). As was the case in 
1987, when Iran maintained relations with Algeria, Turkey and Pakistan –Arab 
populated States- during to counterbalance Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Egypt, and Israel. Jordan. Morocco, Tunisia. North Yemen, and Afghanistan 
(Ehteshami, 2002: 297).  
 
Under the Administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the 
perceived ideological threat intensified to a point only seen at the time of the 
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Islamic Revolution (Dassa, et al., 2011: xi). The severe anti-Semite speech 
escalated to the point in which Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be erased from 
the map; Israeli leaders suspiciousness regarding the Iranian possession of 
nuclear weapons arose (Addis, et al., 2010: 41). In this context, Iran framed Israel 
as its geopolitical and military rival (Dassa, et al., 2011: 3). Nevertheless, it is 
considered that Israeli-Iranian cooperation was developed to confront the Iranian 
ambitions threatening Israeli security and existence during between 1980 and 
1990 (Addis, et al., 2010: 41).  
 
This dynamic resulted in a mutual deterrence between Israel and Iran, in 
which each country developed a military and industrial strategy to shape a 
perception of domination over regional allies (Dassa, et al., 2011: 3). Both 
leaders constantly used repellant speeches against the other to show the 
imminent existential threat that the nuclear weapons represent for each other in 
case of using them (Addis, et al., 2010: 39). In this scenario Israel counts with the 
advantage of sharing close relations with the Western World and therefore having 
strong leverage to impose sanctions to Iran and its nuclear program, while 
avoiding any penalties or consequences for presumably possessing nuclear 
weapons and not being part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Katzman, 
2015: 15).  
 
The unexpected victory of Hassan Rouhani as President in 2013 didn’t 
represent a dramatic change in Iranian approach to Israel. The countries still lack 
of economic affairs (Addis, et al., 2010: 41) largely because Iran continues not to 
recognize Israel as a sovereign State (Chantam House, 2013: 9). Even if it was 
implausible for Rouhani to adopt a similar rhetoric to Ahmadinejad’s, the current 
regime has adopted a model to avoid antagonizing Israel, but still not establishing 
any relations with it (Chantam House, 2013: 9). In this manner, Iran’s antagonism 
to Israel keeps backing the Israeli leaders declarations (Katzman, 2015: 15) that 
it would be a “historic mistake” to lift economic sanctions for Iran (Sharma, 2013) 
because it represents an existential threat due to nuclear development and 
support for insurgent armed forces (Katzman, 2015: 15).  
 
Finally, this tension between both countries can’t be described as a 
sustainable deterrence because an increase of the scenarios in which Iran could 
develop nuclear weapons means that Israel can choose to act in a preemptive 
manner, leading to the escalation of the crisis to an explicit confrontation of 
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asymmetrical parties (Dassa, et al., 2011: ix) due to the lack of diplomatic 
relations, civilian control or emergency communication means (Dassa, et al., 
2011: 4). Clearly, the recently signed JCPOA is not a tool that will ease the 
relation between the two countries since Prime Minister Netanyahu alerted the 
international community of the global problem that Iran represents (Addis, et al., 
2010: 40). Nevertheless, the United States is in a position of dominance over 
Israel too, which means that any decision that Iran makes must be carefully 
calculated. Iranian retaliation in case of Israeli preemptive action may lead to the 
obstruction of oil shipments going through the Straits of Hormuz (Addis, et al., 
2010: 41). In this case Waltz’ explains that the Western powers would rather 
have a verifiable commitment with Iran to solve the security dilemma than to 
satisfy Israeli suggested constraints (Waltz, 2012: 3) 
 
2.3.2. Iranian Relations with other States in the Region 
 
It is important to understand Iran’s relations with other States because -
as described in the precedent sections- no other country in the Middle East has 
the combination of large dimensions, geo-strategic position, enormous and well-
informed population, long history and immeasurable natural resources; being 
Saudi Arabia the only comparable country in the region (Sadjadpour & Ben-
Taleblu, 2015: 1). Given these conditions most of Iran’s neighboring States face a 
struggle when it comes to establish their relations with the country. Prioritizing 
possible profit to compensate security distresses is a common strategy in the 
Middle East (Addis, et al., 2010: 2). Nevertheless, Middle Eastern States have 
identified ambition of regional dominance in Iran, no matter who rules the country 
(Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 1). 
 
This perception is rooted in a long-term hostility between Sunni and 
Shiite Islam existing in the region (Kuwait Times, 2016). Since Shiites represent a 
small proportion of the mostly Sunni Muslim population in the region (Sadjadpour 
& Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 5), it is the center of a sectarian tension in the region to limit 
the power yielded to a Shiite majoritarian State, as is the case of Iran 
(Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 5; Kuwait Times, 2016). Consequently, the 
Iranian nuclear program –as means to acquire power in the realist paradigm- is a 
key issue in the region (Addis, et al., 2010: 2). All of Iran’s neighbors share the 
view that a nuclear Iran is undesirable because it may lead to an arms race that 
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complicates the relations between States inside and outside the region (Addis, et 
al., 2010: 4).  
 
Almost all of Iran’s neighbors share the primary concern that uncertainty 
over Iran’s nuclear program could lead to a regional arms race or war that could 
spill over into their territories, complicate their relationships with the United 
States, and/or badly damage their economies (Addis, et al., 2010: 2). While 
almost all of Iran’s neighbors share the view that a nuclear Iran is not desirable -
especially if its development leads to a regional arms race or military conflict- 
almost none is willing to publicly challenge Iran on the issue because of their 
economic dependence on or relationships with Iran (Addis, et al., 2010: 2). 
 
In this religiously influenced context, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
practically no real allies in the region other than Syria and Iraq (Sadjadpour & 
Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 3). Other countries with which Iran currently cooperates are 
Lebanon and Yemen (Kuwait Times, 2016). All these States have unstable 
governments, are filled with civil discord (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 2), 
and face a de-facto division (Kuwait Times, 2016). These conditions help Iran to 
establish itself a pivotal State capable of influencing its allies. 
 
It is said that Iran uses mainly four strategies to expand its influence 
area. These strategies include: the creation of non-State actors and militant 
groups in other countries, manipulation of Shiite population, promoting rage 
against the Western World, and influencing voting processes to warrant its 
supporters in power (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 2); all these have been 
corroborated in the previously mentioned States. For example, after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iran helped to stabilize the country while backing up the 
factional conflict of Islam fractions (Katzman, 2016: 41). 
 
Regarding Iran’s association with non-State actors the U.S. Department 
Country Reports on Terrorism highlights the support to Lebanese Hezbollah, 
Hamas, Iraqi paramilitary, Taliban troops in Afghanistan, and Palestinian radicals 
(Addis, et al., 2010: 3). In this case, alliances with these groups mean both, 
expansion of the area of influence and opposition to Israel and the western 
powers. However, these relations aren’t static; they are equally fragile as any 
other, and are heavily religiously influenced. According to an analyst of the 
Congressional Research Service (2016) for example, since 2012 Iran and Hamas 
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have had divergent views on the current Syrian conflict based on the regime’s 
lack of action against Sunni rebels in the country. These divergent opinions have 
originated a fracture in the association that has downgraded Iranian sponsorship 
to the terrorist group (Katzman, 2016: 16).  
 
According to the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, 
Iran supports an array of U.S.-designated terrorist organizations and militant 
groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian terrorist groups, Iraqi 
militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. By creating internal divisions, 
exploiting existing political and sectarian discord in places like the Palestinian 
territories and Lebanon, and maintaining a Hezbollah’s proxy military presence 
on Israel’s northern border, Iran can perpetuate conflict without directly involving 
its own troops while using continued Arab-Israeli strife to justify its own militant, 
revolutionary rhetoric at home to shore up domestic support (Addis, et al., 2010: 
3). A clear example of this strategy is available when analyzing Hezbollah’s major 
part in decision-making and control in Lebanon, where the group has developed 
acts of terrorism and armed action to back Iran and their own interests up on 
numerous occasions (Katzman, 2016: 16).  
 
In this environment of distrust, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was 
created during the Iran-Iraq War to achieve unity among Arab States in the region 
i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates 
(Katzman, 2016: 7).  Still, this objective was never totally fulfilled because 
members don’t share similar geopolitical conditions, resources or motivations 
(Ottaway, 2009: 8). The only shared opinion among the Sunni members is that 
Shiite domination means Iranian power (Ottaway, 2009: 8), which creates an 
unclear and vastly dubious idea of Iranian supremacy (Ottaway, 2009: 8). This 
concept is especially ambiguous when taking into consideration that even within 
Shiites there are factions, like the Iraqi Arab Shiites and the Iranian Persian 
Shiites (Ottaway, 2009: 8).  
 
Due to its lack of cohesion in its policies, the GCC has been an outsider 
in the negotiation process of the JCPOA (Ottaway, 2009: 19). Despite the division 
of the GCC members based on matters of State interests as boundaries, nautical 
borders, access to natural resources, and others (Ottaway, 2009: 20); the GCC 
could execute a significant function in the process of reintegrating Iran into the 
international community fulfilling Iran’s expectations of the Treaty (Ottaway, 2009: 
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19).  
 
As part of the GCC and equally influential as Iran in the political and 
religious matters, Saudi Arabia has been the dualistic counterbalance to Iranian 
power in the region (Addis, et al., 2010: 4). It is important to highlight this country 
over other members of the Council because of the religious, racial, political and 
geopolitical rivalry with Iran (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 3). Despite their 
close work during the Cold War, as regional American allies (Addis, et al., 2010: 
5), both countries understand themselves as expected heads of the larger Muslim 
world (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 3). The rise of the new regime –after the 
Islamic Revolution- accentuated the already present antagonism between both 
countries (Addis, et al., 2010: 5) because Saudi Arabia desires Iran’s position as 
pivotal State (Ottaway, 2009: 10). 
 
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia sees Iran as an opponent, and Iran’s 
nuclear program as a destabilizer in the region (Kuwait Times, 2016). A potential 
conflict can be identified (Addis, et al., 2010: 5) if the Saudi Arabian policy 
continues to provoke Iran; hence it creates a vicious circle of mistrust and hostility 
that worsens regional antagonism (Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015). 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia does not yet offer the other GCC members credible 
headship or protection to oppose Iran (Ottaway, 2009: 10). For this reason, 
cooperation to achieve common goals and interests like regional security could 
be a better strategy for Saudi Arabia to acquire power, influence and avoiding 
atomic danger at the same time (Kuwait Times, 2016). 
 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to diminish the role of other 
members in the GCC regarding Iran, but to highlight with these examples that the 
country’s main allies and antagonists respond to a neorealist dynamic in which 
the motivation for alliance is always a common threat. However, in the end every 
actor wants to acquire the maximum amount of power through neorealist 
mechanisms, as is the case of Turkey that uses economic ties with Iran to 
achieve protagonism towards the United States in the dialogues with the Middle 
East (Delange, 2009: 16; Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 5). 
 
2.3.3. Iranian Relations with the P5 + 1 
 
Many expectations have risen since the signature of the JCPOA in 2015, 
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especially among the signatory States (Dastjani, 2016). Without the sanctions 
Iran can expand its oil trade, which is an important commodity for at least two of 
the other signatory States, and expect strong investment of circa 79 million to the 
country that represents revenue for the other four countries (Kuwait Times, 
2016). Yet, benefits do not only exist in the form of economic revenues, this 
Treaty could suggest an additional regional ally in the fight against Islamic State 
and the termination of the civil war in Syria (Kuwait Times, 2016), although these 
are topics that are still a draft on the Iranian agenda (Dastjani, 2016).  
 
United States 
 
Several events have marked Iranian-American relations, some of which 
have been already mentioned as the American intercession to re-position the 
Shah in power after the coup d’état in the 1950’s, and the discover of secret 
nuclear facilities in 2002. Nevertheless, the events of November 4th, 1979 heavily 
defied their relation. On this date, around 400 Iranian radical students took the 
US Embassy in Tehran and held prisoners 63 Americans for 444 days, with 
consent of the regime (Ballesteros, 2010: 66). Just like the American overthrow 
of Musaddeq was imprinted into the Iranian mentality, the hostage crisis in 1979 
was engraved into the American collective consciousness (Ramazani, 2009: 12). 
Since then, relations between both countries have been conditioned by a 
reciprocal suspicion (Dastjani, 2016).  
 
Rouhani and Obama, as newcomers into the American-Iranian relations, 
gave a fresh start and a sense of trustworthiness, giving the opportunity for the 
JCPOA negotiations to begin (Dastjani, 2016). Openness to negotiate with Iran is 
also easier in comparison to other rouge States -like North Korea- because of 
linguistic resemblance and knowledge of Iranian citizens of Western culture 
(Clemens, 2014: 55). The United States took advantage of these conditions to 
establish a new bond built upon the recognition of Iran as pivotal State that could 
be a positive ally to stabilize the region (Kuwait Times, 2016). Nevertheless, 
Obama’s antagonists question the effectiveness of the deal by saying that it fails 
to guarantee that Iran will never obtain nuclear arsenal (Kuwait Times, 2016).  
 
On the one hand, these suspicions have been ratified in a way. Even 
though Iran acknowledges the latent economic advantages that a deal means for 
the country, it still considers the United States its main security threat (Clemens, 
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2014: 55). Additionally, after the nuclear deal was signed and the hopes of wider 
compromise raised, the Iranian Supreme Leader made it clear that Iran still 
mistrusts the United States and therefore it resists a political normalization 
(Sadjadpour & Ben-Taleblu, 2015: 2). On the other hand, it is important to 
remember that the American Grand Strategy –the document that specifies the 
principles for American foreign policy - wouldn’t allow losing control of the 
situation. During his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Obama 
himself highlighted that the United States wouldn’t have agreed on a bad deal 
with Iran (Obama, 2015).  
 
Russian Federation 
 
Relations between Russia and Iran have always had a dash of conflict, 
and seem to linger so (Katz, 2015). Russia – just like the United States- has 
represented an alien dominant nation. Since the beginning of the XIX century, a 
series of territorial occupation has characterized their relation. Nevertheless, 
since 1989 Iran and the former Soviet Union showed hints of cooperation through 
the conclusion of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr thanks to Soviet aid (Katz, 
2015). Yet, as a secular, the Soviet Union remained an ideological abomination 
to the Iranian leaders.  
 
In this century, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the election   
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President, anti-Americanism positioned itself as the 
perfect ideological coincidence. By this time Vladimir Putin supplied uranium to 
Iran as a mechanism to show support for Iranian foreign policy (Katz, 2015). 
Since 2013, after the election of Hassan Rouhani, Iranian-Russian relations have 
been characterized by the normalization of diplomatic relations. At this moment, 
Russian relations with the West are highly deteriorated while Iran tries to 
approach these powers, thereby losing the ideological bond held before (Katz, 
2015). 
 
As exposed in the JCPOA, Russia and Iran aim to improve the current 
strategic partnership in the management of energy resources (Ballesteros, 2010: 
71-72). As main exporters in the region, both countries share the interest of 
controlling  the gas supply -allowing their influence on market prices- what is only 
achievable with the lifting of the international sanctions. Additionally, Russia is 
still the main provider of nuclear technology for civilian purposes to Iran 
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(Ballesteros, 2010: 71-72), which makes Russia especially concerned about the 
prevention of the negative use of nuclear technology in the regions of the 
Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia because it could be a threat to 
Russian security in the future (Waltz, 2012).  
 
The People's Republic of China 
 
China and Iran are the prevailing beneficiaries of a common 
background. Both countries share the background of lingering and powerful 
civilizations, what definitely conditions both their social constructions, sense of 
individuality, and relations with others in the system (Harold & Nader, 2012). In 
this manner, China and Iran coincide on their perceptions of themselves within 
the system, as victims of the Western powers. This perception has being 
perpetuated in both States through the acknowledgment of historical chronicles 
portraying the international system as biased and controlled by Western powers 
(Harold & Nader, 2012).  
 
Iran and China came to collaborate -more profoundly on arms and 
energy issues- as a consequence of both countries changing its foreign and 
domestic policies to be more pragmatic since 1989 (Harold & Nader, 2012). 
Since the two countries stayed isolated by the United States and its allies in the 
system, China has demonstrated its loyalty to Iran by being unenthusiastic to 
encourage sanctions against Iran. Notwithstanding, its efforts to be independent 
from external influence, Iran has become deeply dependent on China at a 
commercial, political, and, to some degree, militarily level (Harold & Nader, 
2012). It is important to highlight that the commercial factor has the most 
meaningful importance in their relationship, because China is the biggest 
purchaser of Iranian embargoed oil (Ballesteros, 2010: 73).  
 
Finally, China has participated as a key diplomatic representative in the 
JCPOA negotiations because it adopted a mediator role between Iran and the 
United States (Garver, 2016). In the context of these negotiation rounds, Russia 
and China have been moderate with the requirements established to Iran 
permanently looking to safeguard harmonic bilateral relations (Ballesteros, 2010: 
71). At the same time, China convinced the Iranian delegation of the numerous 
benefits that the country would receive by coming to terms with the international 
community about the nuclear development program (Garver, 2016). 
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Consequently, it can be understood that China wants to achieve recognition and 
influence in the Middle East as a way to expand its power at the international 
level. 
 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
French Republic and Germany 
 
Iran’s relations with Europe in general have been hostile because of its 
strong relation with colonialism and domination. After the Islamic Revolution, the 
Iranian nuclear program has been a cause of alarm for the United Kingdom and 
France as the only two European countries allowed to develop nuclear weaponry 
in Europe according to the general legal framework on nuclear matters. Based on 
this threat, France and the United Kingdom have a lengthy record of 
unsuccessful nuclear negotiations with Iran, all of which left almost no ground for 
optimism (Bensch, 2015). Nevertheless, the new Iranian leaders have created 
the conditions for European States to find ways for Iran to develop nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes in 2015 (Bensch, 2015), it is important to 
understand the individual performances and motivations of each State to support 
the deal. 
 
Britain and Iran have maintained uneasy relations as consequence of 
the colonial past they share (Ballesteros, 2010). Nevertheless, certain episodes 
of their relation have worsened the cooperation between these two, especially 
after the Islamic Revolution. After the 2010 election of Prime Minister, David 
Cameron tried to ease affairs with Iran, which marked a historical configuration 
for this relation (Behravesh, 2013). However, British interest to reconcile with Iran 
must be understood as part of a wider policy of geopolitical alliances. This was 
exemplified during the JCPOA negotiations when the United Kingdom suggested 
in a conciliatory manner the lift of financial penalties against Iran because “a deal is 
on the table and it can be done” (Behravesh, 2013). 
 
Germany is an interesting State worth mentioning because even though 
it shares a common background of communist rejection -as a result of the Cold 
War- its policy is pragmatic, which has constrained relations with Iran because of 
its close ties with the United States (Kiani, 2012: 140-143). Although at the 
beginning of the JCPOA negotiation rounds, the Iranian delegates misinterpreted 
German motivations and interests regarding the nuclear program because it 
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doesn’t have nuclear weapons (Perthes, 2006). However, it was this exact 
condition that allowed Germany to play a more active role than the other two 
Europeans countries in the negotiating group because its arguments weren’t 
considered double standarded. This European country had comparatively greater 
level of trust, which allowed it to provide constructive ideas for a solution. 
Specifically, the opening up of new suggestions in the field of energy partnership 
and regional security could contribute considerably (Perthes, 2006).  
 
Finally, France and Iran have had a succession of crisis after crisis since 
the advent of the Islamic Revolution. The arrival of the populist Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad to power in Iran in 2005, strained relations between Paris and 
Tehran because of Ahmadinejad’s severe speech and eclectic policies (Rotivel, 
2015). One event that complicated diplomatic relations the most in the last years 
was the Clothilde Reiss affair. The problem was that this French researcher was 
arrested in Isfahan in July 2009, while attending the demonstrations that followed 
the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Rotivel, 2015). Consequently, she 
asked the French Embassy in Tehran to help safeguard her rights, which lead to 
10 months of house arrest at the Embassy before being allowed to return to Paris 
(Rotivel, 2015). Fortunately, Hassan Rouhani has established policy that tries 
conciliating the country with the rest of the world. This approach has brought 
good reaction from the French Republic that has increased French investment in 
Iran since 2013 even though the sanctions aren’t lifted yet (Le Monde, 2016). 
 
Conclusively, one can determine that the second specific objective for 
this dissertation, which was to identify the reasons why Iran decided to negotiate 
the limits of its nuclear program with the United States was fulfilled. The 
recapitulation of historical events that helped shape Iranian foreign policy was 
needed to characterize Iran as a pariah State before Hassan Rouhani came to 
power. In fact, this classification aided to identify the assets that yield power to 
Iran within the region, the motivations for the country to challenge the distribution 
of power in the international community and the cost of Iranian lust of power. As 
could be appreciated, Iranian ambition to acquire additional power was blocked 
by the international community – as Waltz explains in the defensive realist 
dynamic – in the form of sanctions. Obviously ratifying that until Ahmadinejad’s 
regime, Iran could be categorized as a revolutionary State. 
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Moreover, the motivations for Iranian government to negotiate a deal 
with the United States are clear from the neorealist perspective. Since power is 
conditioned by the amount of resources a country has –especially economic 
ones- the sanctions applied to Iran largely limit its power, creating a rational 
incentive for Iran to quit its antagonistic behavior. Iran is therefore, a powerful 
actor in the international system, which is not worth confronting militarily because 
of the high costs that would mean the escalation of the conflict. But, it is not 
powerful enough to counterbalance the sanctions that the United States and the 
international community have established. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE JOINT COMPRENHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION MAKING HEGEMONY 
PREVAIL 
 
It is fundamental for the present dissertation to make evident the use of 
Public International Law as an instrument to perpetuate hegemony of the ruling 
powers. The following chapter will firstly present a teleological approach to the 
general legal framework on the nuclear matter, namely the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Secondly, a subjective analysis of 
Articles established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), using a 
combination of verbatim and logic methods of documentary analysis. Finally, the 
chapter will describe the concept of hegemony to be used for the understanding 
of the JCPOA as a tool of American hegemony over Iran.  
 
3.1. General Legal Framework for Nuclear Security 
 
From the time when the Westphalia Peace Treaty of 1648 was signed, 
international law has developed as an apparatus to normalize international 
relations (Lawal, 2012: 229). This machinery works around the consensus 
between States through treaties and custom (Clark, 2003: 97). The present 
dissertation will focus on treaties, which are written agreements between 
sovereign States (Clark, 2003: 90). International Treaties -as the JCPOA- are 
part of the international system as a method to classify those States working 
within from those outside the accepted patterns of the global community (Lawal, 
2012: 229). In the case of nuclear security, the key commitment of the law is to 
tackle unusual threats presented by conventional actors i.e. States (Clark, 2003: 
97). It is of interest for this section to identify the ideals and principles that 
motivate the making of instruments regarding the nuclear matter.  
 
3.1.1. Ideals of Nuclear Frameworks in the Public International Law  
 
According to the neorealist theorist Stephen Krasner (1982), an 
international regime can be defined as the “the set of principles, norms and decision-
making procedures, around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area”. The creation 
of the International Non-Proliferation regime emerges out of the need for the 
construction of a solid and structured structure. This structure -with strong 
international entailment- is accountable for solutions to both Nuclear States and 
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all humanity, in the latent problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Novillo, 
2011: 12). This regime institutes compulsory rules that emphasize the broadly 
accepted rule that the increase of nuclear weapons jeopardizes the security of all 
nations (Lettow, 2010: 8).  
 
The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime is patched together 
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and its safeguards system, export control measures for nuclear material, 
that include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, UN Security Council resolutions, 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, e.g. the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI), and bilateral nuclear cooperation deals between supplier and purchaser 
States of nuclear material (Lettow, 2010: 6), meaning that all nuclear weapons 
and the acceptability of their testing, production, and stockpiling are determined 
by disarmament law. As a regime, these mechanisms are much more than short-
term understandings. On the contrary, these commitments cross the barriers of 
jurisdictional boundaries in sovereign States and keep static even if the direction 
of power or the interests of the actors on the international scene are changed 
(Krasner, 1982: 93). 
 
Ideally, a legal framework must also seize susceptibility to evolve as to 
admit adjustments in the face of fluctuating conditions. The elaboration of a legal 
framework has reflected the following specific characteristics according to 
Herbach (2012). First, States must become part of the relevant treaties in the 
matter. Second, they must additionally take action in agreement with the 
procedures and patterns recognized in the instruments. Third, the legal 
framework must be adequate to accomplish the goals for which it was created 
(Herbach, 2012). In compliance with the latter description it is important then to 
highlight the principal objective of the regime. According to Lettow (2010), the 
International Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime aims mainly at preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless it is important to highlight, the efforts to 
prevent horizontal proliferation that have been more evident and recurrent than 
those preventing vertical proliferation (ILPI, 2014).  
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3.1.2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Preliminary efforts to design an international system allowing States to 
have access to nuclear equipment for peaceful purposes started in 1946 (United 
Nations, 2015). The first formal proposal was created in the United States as the 
Baruch Plan, that wanted all nuclear material to be handed to a new United 
Nations organ, and that all nations in the world should be banned from owning 
nuclear weapons (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008).  Even though this proposal 
couldn’t materialize based on political differences mainly between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union (United Nations, 2015), the United States 
embraced a unilateral statute outlawing the allocation of its nuclear weaponries to 
any other State (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008). Further attempts to stop Nuclear 
Proliferation established in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
which was given the triple duty of monitoring, delivering information and aid to 
States pursuing the use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and for executing 
examinations of nuclear plants to ensure that they haven’t deflected from 
peaceful use of enriched uranium and plutonium created in such reactors (United 
Nations, 2015; Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008). 
It can be said that the NPT negotiations officially begun after the 
common agreement of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on a 
resolution to negotiate a treaty, which would prohibit countries without nuclear 
weapons from obtaining them and authorized IAEA inspections, in 1961 (Bunn & 
Rhinelander, 2008; Siracusa, 2012). Yet, only after 23 years of different initiatives 
a serious Treaty proposal was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
the United Kingdom (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008). What it came to be the Treaty 
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation was first signed by 93 countries (UNODA, 2015), 
and later signed and ratified by other 100 States (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008), 
making it the most universal Treaty of all but at the same time an odd example of 
institutionalized discrimination in Public International Law (Garrido, 2005: 97). 
This discrimination –that will be explained more profoundly later in this section- 
can be briefly explained through the bipolar historical context in need of 
legitimacy of both coalitions (Bunn & Rhinelander, 2008), similarly to the 
distribution of veto power in the UN Security Council (Novillo, 2012).  
As a multilateral Treaty, the author of this legal instrument is ineludibly a 
collective author. Nevertheless, there are certain States that were more diligent in 
the construction of the document and thereby were more influential on its content, 
 70 
for example the United States, the current Russian Federation (former USSR). 
Therefore, the NPT converges a wide variety of interests from Nuclear States to 
Non-Nuclear States (Novillo, 2012). A clear example for this conjuncture was the 
Indian proposal to include a more rigorous mechanism to avoid vertical 
proliferation, contrary to what the United States and the Soviet Union were 
proposing.  
Consequently, the NPT has been considered a “grand bargain” in which 
Non-Nuclear States quit nuclear development in swap for a binding agreement 
from Nuclear States to eliminate their arsenals (ILPI, 2014). Thus, one can 
determine that the Treaty is mostly addressed to Non-Nuclear States. 
Additionally, one can establish as main intention of the NPT to prevent additional 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, limit nuclear arsenals in the world, and to limit 
the number of States with access to nuclear weapons (ILPI, 2014). This objective 
and Treaty was thought to be unconcealed, official, public and international; to 
categorize the Treaty on its objective and addressees.  
Twelve pre-ambulatory clauses and eleven articles constitute the Treaty. 
Throughout the text there are several concepts that are worth pointing out, as the 
following: 
 
- Parties to the Treaty: according to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations, “party” is any State or an international organization 
that has agreed to be compelled by the Treaty in question and for which the 
Treaty is in active (United Nations, 2015).  
 
- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: according to the United 
Nations, proliferation is when additional States or non-State actors of the system 
i.e. terrorist groups, can acquire or produce nuclear weapons or material that 
could be used to produce such arms (United Nations, 2015). 
 
- Nuclear Disarmament: according to the United Nations and 
Disarmament Yearbook of 1945-1970, disarmament is the discontinuance of 
nuclear test through the elimination of all nuclear weapons (UNODA, 1970). 
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- International Peace and Security: as de OEDC (2010) explains, 
this expression is broad and imprecise enough to allow practically infinite 
possible interpretations (OECD, 2010). In absence of a definition proposed by the 
United Nations this dissertation will use the neorealist approach to describe the 
term, meaning that international peace and security is the temporary balance of 
power in the system (Bieler, 2015; Waltz, 2000; Mearcheimer, 2006). 
 
- Nuclear-weapon State Party: according to the definition given in 
the NPT itself, these States are those that produced and detonated a nuclear 
device before January 1st, 1967 (NPT, 1970). These are the United States of 
America, the Russian Federation, the French Republic, the United Kingdom and 
China (United Nations, 2015).  
 
- Non-Nuclear-Weapon State Party: according to the same Treaty 
all those nations that did not explode a nuclear gadget by January, 1967, are 
considered Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties, and as such, they consent the 
obligation of international nuclear safeguards on every civilian nuclear activity 
and materials to avoid their military deviation to making bombs (Greenberg, 
2010). 
 
- Safeguards: according to the International Agency of Atomic 
Energy, safeguards are a set of undertakings through which the IAEA 
corroborates that a State is not exploiting its nuclear materials -such as uranium 
and plutonium- in a military manner (IAEA, 2002). 
 
- International Atomic Energy Agency: in its mission statement, the 
IAEA establishes that it is an autonomous international organization -within the in 
the United Nations system- that works as for nuclear cooperation by assisting 
Member States to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, creating nuclear 
risk management criteria and verifying compliance to the NPT (IAEA, 2014). 
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Having understood these terms it is also important to categorize the 
Articles by thematic foci. Many authors agree that the NPT is built upon three 
pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament 
(Lodgaard, 2011; Novillo, 2012; Kerry, 2015). Therefore, the following section will 
clutch the Articles in the NPT in one of these three pillars to later explain 
historical cause-effect relationships and ideological motivations. Non-proliferation 
is the first topic addressed in the NPT in its Articles I, II and III. In Article I, the 
Treaty categorizes certain States as Nuclear-Weapon States, and requires these 
States not to transfer nuclear un-finished or finished material to any other, 
including other Nuclear-Weapon State. Additionally, this first Article establishes a 
prohibition for these nations to “assist, encourage, or induce any Non-Nuclear-Weapon State 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control 
over such weapons or explosive devices”, which to this analysis appears to emphasize 
the importance of horizontal over vertical non-proliferation. Following, Article II is 
entirely devoted to highlight the commitment of Non-Nuclear States not to “receive” 
nor “manufacture” or “acquire” nuclear arsenals, including not looking for aid to 
develop these kind of weapons. Finally, Article III makes Non-Nuclear-Weapon 
States consent IAEA in situ safeguard inspections to verify the compliance of 
these States to the obligations acquired in the previous Articles. Regarding this 
first pillar, it is important to highlight that much is specified about the obligations 
and restrictions that Non-Nuclear-Weapon States have regarding non-
proliferation. Nevertheless, once one realizes that there are only five Nuclear-
Weapon States it is noticeable that a sort of a monopoly is established, and its 
responsibilities and obligations are not as specific and emphasized as those of 
the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. This uneven description of responsibilities and 
larger explanation of restrictions to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States have resulted in 
an unbalanced distribution of rights, which disfavors Non-Nuclear-Weapon 
States.  
 
The second pillar -peaceful use of nuclear energy- is materialized in 
Articles III, IV and V. In Article III the Treaty declares the IAEA the legitimate body 
to execute a safeguard system – according to the Agency’s pre-established 
mechanisms – specifically in Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. These safeguards are 
intended to confirm the use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, which 
generally include nuclear energy for civilian use and medical research (Novillo, 
2012). In Article IV the Treaty enunciates an “inalienable right […] to develop research, 
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production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination […]”, which is 
considered the great giveaway to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in exchange of 
quitting any ambitions of nuclear weapons development (Greenberg, 2010: 106). 
Nevertheless, Greenberg (2010: 106) points out that a deeper understanding of 
this Article discloses the complete opposite intention. The same author highlights 
that even if at the beginning the Treaty seems to grant all States equal rights, by 
adding the expression “[…] and in conformity with Articles I and II […]” the “right to participate 
in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information” this is subordinated to the restrictions remaining in Articles I and II as if 
all transfer of material or know how were thought to lead to proliferation of 
nuclear weapons (Greenberg, 2010: 107). Consequently, it can be said that 
Article is coherent and reinforces the main purpose of Non-Proliferation of the 
Treaty. Finally, Article V reinforces the possibility for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 
to have access to information related to possible peaceful benefits of nuclear 
explosions. Nonetheless, Non-Nuclear-Weapon States must acquire this 
assistance through special international deals or though the suitable international 
body i.e. IAEA.  
 
Lastly, the pillar of disarmament is handled in Article VI and Article VII. 
On the one hand, Article VI establishes the need to pursue negotiations in “good 
faith” to conclude the arms race between States. Despite the importance of this 
pillar to contribute to vertical non-proliferation, this Article is not as precise and 
rigorous when describing a specific deadline or timeframe to achieve this goal 
and execute the actions to achieve it. Consequently, more than forty years have 
passed and there’s almost inexistent evidence of advances to achieve this 
ambition, including Nuclear-Weapon States (Novillo, 2012). Additionally, because 
of such vague description of obligations Nuclear-Weapon States have 
acknowledged Article I as political vows, worrying little about mechanisms to 
implement them (Greenberg, 2010: 102). On the other hand, Article VII highlights 
the possibility for States to develop regional legal instruments to grant complete 
lack of nuclear weapons. Once again, the Article emphasizes the mechanism 
available to prevent horizontal proliferation. 
 
Considering the three thematic foci and to which extend each one of 
these are disaggregated in the NPT, it is considered that the Treaty makes a 
special emphasis on preventing horizontal proliferation as intentional approach of 
the Treaty. Severe discrimination between the rights and obligations of Non-
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Nuclear-Weapon States and Nuclear-Weapon States is evident; vague 
descriptions of Nuclear-Weapon States makes difficult for Non-Nuclear-Weapon 
States to identify –and therefore report- incompliance of the former. In this 
context, several cause-effect relations have been evident –and some have been 
explained before- but the most important one is the legitimation of a nuclear 
monopoly in five countries (Siracusa, 2012). This is the most important cause-
effect relation because these five countries are the same States owning a veto 
power within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which causes a 
conflict of interests between maintaining the monopoly and execute the UNSC 
mandate of preserving international peace and security. Consequently, the 
Nuclear-Weapon States have focused their attention; and what is more, their 
power on Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and prevention of horizontal proliferation.  
 
3.1.3. Additional Treaties 
 
This dissertation has made special emphasis on the documentary 
analysis of the NPT because is the Treaty with the widest adhesion within the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, the regime itself is build thanks to 
a wide international structure of deals and institutions designed to avoid the 
propagation of this kind of weapons and promoting disarmament (NTI, 2015). As 
part of this regime there are Partial Test Ban Treaties (PTBT), Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (PTBT or LTBT), and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaties (CTBT) 
that restrict detonation of nuclear weapons in areas such as outer space, specific 
underwater locations; and all nuclear weapons test, respectively (NTI, 2015).  
 
Additionally, there are Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties that forbid 
the elaboration, engineering, control, ownership, hosting, examination, location, 
and carrying of nuclear weapons within specific geographical regions (NTI, 2015). 
For the purposes of the present dissertation the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 
(NWFZs) are specially interesting to overview because, contrary to the other set 
of legal frameworks NWFZs include rights and responsibilities of Non-Nuclear-
Weapon States, which is similar to the case of the Parties in the JCPOA. 
Nowadays, there are five active regional NWFZs: Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific, Treaty of 
Bangkok for South East Asia, Treaty of Pelindaba for the African Continent, and 
Treaty of Semipalatinsk for Central Asia (NPT, 1970). 
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The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) highlights in its Article 3 the zone of 
application of the Treaty in the following words  
“Upon fulfillment of the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of application of 
this Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere within the 
following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America 
and its territorial waters): starting at a point located at 35° north latitude, 75° west 
longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30° north latitude, 75° west 
longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30° north latitude, 50° west 
longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 5° north latitude, 20° west 
longitude; from there directly southward to a point 60° south latitude, 20° west longitude; 
from there, directly west- ward to a point at 60° south latitude, 115° west longitude; from 
there, directly northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115° west longitude; from there, along a 
loxodromic line to a point at 35° north latitude, 150° west longitude; from there, directly 
eastward to a point at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude.”  
(Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967). 
 
It is interesting to notice that this Article excludes in its definition the only 
Nuclear-Weapon State –the United States of America- from any responsibility 
related to disarmament. The use of geographic-coordinate system results to be 
attention grabbing because it creates a double-edged situation. On the one hand, 
it isn’t flexible on the geographical extension for the application of the Treaty, 
including all countries in Latin America. On the other hand, this rigidity leaves the 
possibility open for military nuclear development in any overseas territories that 
the countries may have outside these specifications. The chosen mechanism to 
define the territory results interesting when considering that the American 
delegation for the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor on November 
1963 of creating this legal instrument. Since the only State with overseas 
territories in America is the United States of America, the use of such territorial 
definition could be considered an American provision in case the U.S. may 
somehow acquire responsibilities and obligations in the context of this Treaty, as 
it happened in 1968. The United States signed Protocol I of the Treaty, which 
binds de jure or de facto territories that are internationally responsible in the 
nuclear matter to the Treaty (Department of State, 2015). This means Puerto 
Rico, Guantanamo Bay and Virgin Islands as American territory within the 
geographical description ceased to be Third Parties in the Treaty, but not other 
extra-continental territories of the U.S. Additionally, Article 20 of the Treaty 
highlights that any violation to the Treaty shall be reported to the United Nations 
Security Council so that sanctions can be applied. It is not necessary to highlight 
again that this condition creates a conflict of interests and it was already 
explained before. 
 
The Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) compromises all countries located in the 
extensive area of the South Pacific not to produce, acquire or hold any nuclear 
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explosive device “anywhere inside or outside the Treaty zone”, which is basically the 
gained obligation in all Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones. Nevertheless what is 
important to highlight here is the lack of adherence of the United States to all of 
the three Protocols to this day. Likewise, Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
Protocol I of this Treaty also demands all Nuclear-Weapon States to apply the 
prohibitions of the Treaty in territories they own in the region (Treaty of 
Rarotonga, 1985). Lack of adherence to this Protocol ratifies –in a way- the 
strategic definition of territory given in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and absent in the 
Treaty of Rarotonga because the United States owns several Islands in the 
region.  
 
The Treaty of Bangkok (1995) establishes basically the same 
commitments as the other NWFZs Treaties. As a special characteristic this 
Treaty prohibits the release of radioactive trash and other radioactive material at 
sea anywhere within the region (Treaty of Bangkok, 1995). Regarding this Treaty, 
it is interesting to highlight that no Nuclear-Weapon State has signed its Protocols 
mostly because the United States and France criticize the definitions of territory 
(James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2013) that is included in 
section b) of Article I in the following terms “land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, 
archipelagic waters, the seabed and the sub-soil thereof and the airspace above” of all Parties. 
Once again, territory -as a source of power for neorealism- is the centerpiece of 
debate for Nuclear-Weapon States as most powerful States in the International 
Nuclear System to decide whether or not to become part of Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-Zone Treaties.  
 
Like other NWFZ Treaties, the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) and the 
Treaty of Semiplastnik include a Protocol for the five Nuclear-Weapon States to 
sign and ratify—and consequently respect—the status of the zone, by providing 
negative security guarantees. The obligations are essentially the same as in the 
other NWFZ Treaties mentioned above and both Treaties rely on the United 
Nations Security Council to be the legitimate organ to sanction any inobservance 
to the Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996).  
 
As seen in all previous examples of nuclear-related Treaties in which 
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States are participants, Nuclear-Weapon States support 
the creation of these instruments but fail to compromise themselves in a concrete 
disarmament process. In some cases, like the Treaty of Rarotonga and the 
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Treaty of Bangkok, this lack of commitment becomes clearer as the United States 
fails to sign and ratify the Protocols. Presumably, the American absence in these 
legal documents can be explained in its interest to develop nuclear weapons in 
its geostrategically located extra-continental territories. 
    
3.2. JCPOA Documentary Analysis 
 
At this point it is crucial to devote a section to analyze the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action since it is believed that it exemplifies the American 
intentions of American hegemony regarding the nuclear matter in the 
international system. The subsequent section will follow a method of 
documentary analysis in which the Treaty will be placed within a historical 
background, classified by type of document and purposes. Secondly, the text of 
the Treaty will be analyzed in a literal and logical manner and finally, the content 
of the Treaty will be explained. It must be clarified that this is not a legal analysis 
and it will not venture to do a deep analysis of technical enrichment limitations 
imposed to Iran, it will rather conceive all restrictions as equivalent tools, 
specifically Iranian-American dispute of power.  
 
3.2.1. Background and Documentary Classification 
 
July 14th, 2015 was the official date in which the P5+1 (United States, 
Russian Federation, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) closed a 
deal with Iran to warrant Iranian nuclear program peaceful purposes (U.S. 
Department of State, 2016). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the 
Treaty is the result of almost 20 months of nerve-wracking negotiations and 
previous temporary agreements (Gibson, 2015: 4). By 2012, the international 
economic sanctions applied to Iran started to show effects: currency depreciated 
leading to high levels of inflation and civil complaints (Gibson, 2015: 14). 
Fortunately, the 2013 elections in the United States and Iran opened new 
opportunities of communication and trust to begin new dialogues for a 
prospective nuclear deal. These negotiation rounds took place in Geneva in 
October 2013, and by November 24th a provisional nuclear agreement was 
proclaimed (Gibson, 2015: 16). This arrangement momentarily suspended 
sanctions to Iran and made compulsory the need of negotiations to get a 
comprehensive resolution to the Iranian status within the international community 
(Killick, Forwood, Nordin, Van-Haute, Vermeeren, & Burke, 2015). Six months 
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after the interim deal became effective, Iran had already reduced the vast 
majority of its 20% of enriched uranium available in the country (Gibson, 2015: 
17).  
 
In mid 2014, the negotiations taking place in Vienna faced a drastic twist 
(Rozen, 2015). In that period, ISIS rebels took control of sizeable sections of Iraqi 
and Syrian territories, including Mosul (Iraq’s 3rd largest city; Gibson, 2015). The 
Islamic State quickly impersonated a sharp and common danger to the Shi’a-
dominated -Iranian-aligned Iraqi regime-, Iran and the United States (Rozen, 
2015; Gibson, 2015). This particular event changed Iranian initial behavior in the 
Geneva meetings, which included more open Iranian leaders, saying that they 
expect respect, reject threats and look for solutions (Ramazani, 2009: 14). The 
Iranian and P5+1 negotiators met in Vienna in November again but no progress 
was reached because of the distance between the parties on the core concerns 
of the Treaty (Rozen, 2015), which lead to a temporary break in the meetings. On 
March, 2015 the talks were resumed in Laussane, Switzerland; nuclear 
negotiators from all sides worked tirelessly, at all hours of the day, where 
negotiators worked hardly to establish all aspects of what became  the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a framework laying out the foundation 
the nuclear agreement (Gibson, 2015: 24).  In April, the P5+1 and the Iranian 
representants announced that they have agreed on the JCPOA main guidelines. 
Nevertheless, much work was left to do, until mid-July 2015 specific conditions of 
the Treaty were discussed (Gibson, 2015: 26). Finally, on July 14th, 2015 the 
agreement was signed by all six Parties. 
 
Since six States signed the Treaty, this source of law must be identified 
as the result of a collective authorship. Yet, because of the descriptions and 
sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States there was much 
more negotiation opportunities for these two than China or Russia. In this 
manner, the JCPOA congregates a wide variety of interests but those of the 
United States and the European Union are more evident in the text. The main 
purpose or the Treaty is clearly stated as to “ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be 
exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue” (JCPOA, 
2015). This Treaty is a public, official, international instrument specifically created 
for Iran’s situation. Additionally, it is meant to be recognized by all the 
international community.  
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3.2.2. Literal and Logical Documentary Analysis 
 
The Treaty is composed by six sections that include: Preface, Preamble 
and General Provisions, Voluntary Measures regarding: Enrichment, Research 
and Development, Stockpiles, Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing, and 
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures, Sanctions; Implementation 
Plan, and the Dispute Resolution Mechanism. 
 
Throughout the Treaty there are several concepts that are worth 
explaining to have a clear interpretation of the Articles, such as: 
 
- E3/EU+3: China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and a Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
 
- Enrichment activities: according to the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC), these are activities that rise the proportion 
of atoms by dividing them in order to release energy (U.S. NRC, 2014). 
 
- Right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: is one of the three 
basic pillars of the NTP, still there is a lack of a clear definition of what peaceful 
purposes are (CNND, 2013). Nevertheless, in the NTP this is an inalienable right 
of all Parties, including Iran (TNP, 1970) 
 
- Implementation Day: the day in which at the United Nations 
Level it is recognized that Iran has fulfilled all technical requirements stated in the 
JCPOA and simultaneously that the EU and the U.S. have terminated all 
provisions detailed in the JCPOA (JCPOA, 2015).  
 
- Adoption Day: 90 days after the ratification of the Treaty through 
a UNSC resolution, to make the JCPOA come to effect (JCPOA, 2015). 
 
- Enrichment capacity: it indicates the amount of intensification in 
the concentration of the U-235 isotope relative to the energy input and the 
amount uranium processed. The measurement unit is the separative work units 
(SWU) and it represents the quantity of separative job executed to enrich a 
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particular amount of uranium, all conveyed to kilograms (World Nuclear 
Association, 2016).  
  
- Enriched uranium: according to the U.S. NRC (2014) uranium 
atoms differ once they have been enriched in the number of protons in 
comparison to neutrons in the original atom (U.S. NRC, 2014). 
 
- Isotope separation technologies: mechanisms to modify mass 
configuration of an element without sacrificing chemical properties (De-Wolf-
Smyth, 2015). Despite the impossibility of separating molecules through 
mechanical forces, molecules are still subject to gravitational, electric, and 
magnetic fields (De-Wolf-Smyth, 2015). Thus, a variety of mechanisms such as 
gas centrifuge, laser separation, distillation, thermal diffusion, and electrolysis 
(De-Wolf-Smyth, 2015; U.S. NRC, 2014) are used to alter the energy levels by 
dimly modifying molecules, according to quantum-mechanical laws (De-Wolf-
Smyth, 2015).  
 
- Natural uranium level: Natural uranium at the mine consists of 92 
protons within the atom’s core or nucleus and different amounts of neutrons 
revolving around it (U.S. NRC, 2014). The total amount of protons plus neutrons 
gives the name of each possible isotope of uranium, meaning U238 holds 146 
neutrons, U235 holds 143 neutrons, and U234 holds 142 neutrons, in the nature 
(U.S. NRC, 2014). 
 
- Joint Commission: is the organ in charge of reviewing and 
approving all Iranian requests regarding development, acquirement of any 
nuclear material for current or new centrifuges (Albright & Stricker, 2015).  
 
- Tehran Research Reactor: light water research reactor provided 
by the United States in 1967 (ISIS, 2014). It could provide enriched weapon-
grade uranium if it is not overseen by the AIEA (JCPOA, 2015; ISIS, 2014). 
 
- Light water reactor: According to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (2002) this kind of reactor that involves pressurized water reactors and 
regular boiling water reactors. Light water is used as both moderator for the 
uranium and coolant for the whole system (IAEA, 2002).  
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- Heavy water reactor: according to the IAEA (2002) a heavy 
water reactor uses a strange isotope of hydrogen - one proton and one neutron - 
to form water. This isotope can avoid the need of enriching uranium for fuel, and 
using uranium ore instead (IAEA, 2002). 
 
- Fuel reprocessing: according to the World Nuclear Association 
(2016), reprocessing fuel is largely based on the transformation of “fertile U-238 to 
fissile plutonium”, which allows to gain about 25% to 30% additional energy in 
comparison to the original uranium used in the process (World Nuclear 
Association, 2016). 
 
 
- SDN List: Specially Designed Nationals and Blocked Persons 
List published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to register those 
countries and other bodies who are imposed economic and trade sanctions as 
part of American foreign policy and national security ambitions (University of 
Washington, 2013). 
 
- Finalisation Day: the day when negotiations between all JCPOA 
Parties are completed (JCPOA, 2015). 
 
- Transition Day: 8 years after Adoption Day, when a report stating 
that all Iranian nuclear material remains peaceful is made public (JCPOA, 2015). 
 
The Treaty approaches four main topics, and in all of the sections it is 
exceptionally detailed (The White House, 2015). Firstly, the Preface establishes 
the Parties in the Treaty, which include representatives of China, Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States an the High Representative 
for the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the one side; 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran  (JCPOA, 2015). Furthermore, this section 
explicitly describes the teleological objective of the Treaty, in the form of a 
specific objective as to certify that the nuclear program of the Middle Eastern 
country will be exclusively peaceful, but also an objective with international 
impact range as to certainly promote “regional and international peace and security”. 
Moreover, this preface specifies that all content included in the JCPOA is the 
result of mutually agreed restrictions and requirements between the Parties and it 
specifies that there will be a gradual development –reliant on international non-
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proliferation norms- of the program to enable the country to have undergo 
enrichment activities and commercial interchange of uranium.  
 
The Preamble and General Provisions section -in its item i- establishes 
the timeframe of legality of the Treaty as “long-term” without giving further 
information about the extinction of the Treaty. Items ii and iii reaffirm the JCPOA 
as a mean to warrant Iran’s nuclear program to be peaceful in the present and 
future. Additionally, in terms of peace item vi compels –implicitly- all the Parties 
involved to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the UN 
Charter. Finally, in item xiii the Treaty highlights the need of cooperation to 
develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy (JCPOA, 2015).   
 
Furthermore, the Parties considered important to highlight in item iv of 
the section in question that the correct implementation of the Treaty will grant 
Iran’s right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as established in the NPT for 
any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (JCPOA, 2015). Even though in item xiv it 
is recognized that the JCPOA represents an important modification to the 
traditional approach to Iran and its nuclear program, in items iv and xi it is made 
crystal clear that the Treaty should not be misinterpreted as any kind of exception 
to the internationally acknowledged principles of international law and customary 
practices (JCPOA, 2015). For instance, it is made explicit in item vii that the NPT 
remains to be the keystone of the nuclear regime as a whole (JCPOA, 2015). 
 
This section also to refers to sanction lifting and monitoring of 
compliance. In items v and viii, the JCPOA clarifies the commitment of E3/EU+3 
to lift all UNSC, unilateral, and multilateral sanctions related to trade, technology, 
finance and energy to Iran (JCPOA, 2015). Furthermore, it resolves that the 
E3/EU+1 will abstain from establishing additional sanctions that could destabilize 
the reached agreements in the Treaty. Nevertheless, these guidelines depend on 
the Iranian compliance to the voluntary adopted measures in the JCPOA, which 
according to the Treaty are subject to IAEA monitoring as specified in items ix 
and x of the Treaty (JCPOA, 2015).  
 
The third section of the Treaty refers to voluntary measures that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to meet during the negotiations. This section 
strictly refers to nuclear issues and it approaches separately three sub-sections. 
This section, as established before, will not be analyzed in depth because all 
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restrictions to nuclear enrichment –independently of their technical 
characteristics- will be considered equally effective as part of a political strategy.  
 
The fourth section of the Treaty approaches sanction lifting in 16 
Articles. Because this dissertation focuses in the American-Iranian relations, 
Articles 19, 20, and 26 will not be taken into consideration since they refer 
exclusively to sanctions to be lifted by the European Union. On the contrary, 
sanctions imposed by the UNSC, are going to be considered in this dissertation 
based on the influence that the United States has in this forum. Initially, Articles 
18, 28, 30 and 31 of the JCPOA establishes the termination of all 7 sanctioning 
resolutions issued by the UNSC (JCPOA, 2015). Regarding specifically American 
restrictions, the Treaty in its Article 21 clarifies that the United States will cease to 
apply sanctions to:  
 
“Financial and banking transactions […]; transactions in Iranian Rial; provisions of U.S. 
banknotes to the Iranian Government; bilateral trade of Iranian revenues […]; purchase, 
subscription or facilitation of insurance of Iranian sovereign debt […]; financial 
messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions […]; 
underwriting services […]; Iran’s crude oil sales […];  investment in […] goods, services, 
information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and 
petrochemical sectors;  purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of 
petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;  export, sale or provision 
of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;  transactions with 
Iran's energy sector, transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port 
operators;  trade in gold and other precious metals; trade with Iran in graphite, raw or 
semi-finished metals such […] for integrating industrial processes; sale, supply or 
transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’s automotive sector; […] 
services for each of the categories above; […] individuals and entities set out in […]  the 
SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act 
List; […] Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 – 7 and 15 
of Executive Order 13628”. (JCPOA, 2015) 
 
Additionally, Article 22 of the Treaty refers to the commercial passenger 
aircraft sanctions that the United States unilaterally applied to Iran, as mandatory 
to be lifted; as well as any local law inside the United States by encouraging 
officials to avoid actions against the spirit of the JCPOA, as Article 25 
establishes. Nevertheless, even if the listing of sanctions to be lifted appears to 
be extensive and all-inclusive, Article 23 of the JCPOA highlights that certain 
sanctions are extent of this list and will only be lifted eight years after the 
Adoption Day or when the IAEA concludes that all nuclear material in Iran exist 
for peaceful purposes (JCPOA, 2015). 
 
As Article 27 clarifies, all lifted sanctions must be publicly announced 
after the Iranian revision of matter and procedures of such declarations (JCPOA, 
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2015). This Article appears to entitle Iran the possibility of defending its rights, the 
same way Article 24 does. The latter, provides Iran the opportunity of protest 
against any restrictive measure that any E3/EU+1 might take that could 
compromise the implementation of the deal (JCPOA, 2015). Finally, Articles 32 
and 33 ratify that additionally to the sanctions lifting, all Parties will cooperate to 
develop projects supporting peaceful use of nuclear energy. These projects will 
mainly focus on trade, technology, finance and energy but could diversify later in 
time (JCPOA, 2015).  
 
The next section in the Treaty corresponds to the “Implementation Plan” that 
is basically the moment in which the international community, through the IAEA 
and the UNSC, confirms that Iran had fulfill all technical requirements to put all 
JCPOA commitments info effect. On this date, the United States officially lifts the 
sanctions listed on Sections15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V to Iran (JCPOA, 2015). 
Implementation Day was on January 16th, 2016 –while this dissertation was being 
developed– and was officialized without any setback  (European Commission, 
2016). The IAEA published an official report that was submitted to the IAEA 
Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council. From this moment, 
the way is clear for the United States for the lifting of nuclear-related economic 
sanctions imposed against Iran. In accordance with the Annex V of the JCPOA, 
Iran has reduced its uranium enrichment activities, eliminated its stockpile what 
could be highly enriched uranium and limited its stockpile of low enriched 
uranium (JCPOA, 2015). These technical characteristics enable Iran to apply the 
IAEA Additional Protocol regarding safeguard, as stipulated in the first section of 
the JCPOA (2015). 
 
Finally, the Treaty establishes a “Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, which 
consist of a Joint Commission as first instance, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs as 
second instance, and an Advisory Board as a parallel non-binding arbitration 
instance. According to Article 36 of the JCPOA this mechanism should solve any 
dispute in a period of 30 days, which is a considerably shorter timeframe than it 
would take to expose the matter to the ICJ, for example. A representative of each 
JCPOA Party, including the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy -as specified in Annex IV of the JCPOA- constitute the Joint 
Commission. This Joint Commission will not only hear disputes brought up by the 
Parties, it will also revise and approve any Iranian request to execute differently 
the JCPOA voluntary measures. In case of incompliance to the Joint Commission 
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decisions the Security Council is empowered to reconsider the sanction lifting to 
Iran, including their re-imposing as explained in Article 37. Nevertheless, this 
Article highlights the Iranian opposing position to the re-instauration of the 
sanctions as reason to terminate the Treaty unilaterally. 
 
3.2.3. Content Explanation 
 
After highlighting the main points agreed in the Treaty it is imperative -
even more important than listing the agreements- to understand how these deal 
yields power to the United States over Iran. The JCPOA postulates a ‘never seen 
before’ set of supervision requirements that haven’t been imposed to any other 
Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (Sick, 2015). According to President Obama, the 
JCPOA includes the most comprehensive and intense authentication mechanism 
ever conveyed (The White House, 2015). The Treaty establishes that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran will not be subject to any additional sanctions. Yet, this condition 
is subject to the Iranian compliance to a set of co-dependent measures, as a 
Rubic’s Cube- (Sick, 2015). This means that in case of violation the sanctions will 
snap back (The White House, 2015). 
 
As an official White House declaration (2015) stipulates, the government 
of the United States was not open to take a bad deal as a result of these 
negotiations. Therefore, the JCPOA meets all particular conditions they needed 
to avoid acting based on the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) 
(The White House, 2015). Nevertheless, the JCPOA shouldn’t be erroneously 
understood as an end in itself; on the contrary, it is the means through which the 
United States is granted control over the Iranian nuclear program. Firstly, the 
Treaty establishes deadlines to Iran for certain enrichment-limitation 
requirements while the IAEA permission to oversee all nuclear installations in Iran 
last indeterminately (JCPOA, 2015). In this manner, the Middle Eastern country 
has an everlasting prohibition to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, 
rejecting this Treaty would lead Iran to outbreak a regional nuclear arms race 
(The White House, 2015).  
 
Sanction lifting and the risk of re-imposing them are the main tools that 
the United States has used to grant Iranian compliance to the Treaty. The 
sanction lifting will happen –accordingly to the JCPOA- only after Iran concludes 
the nuclear stages as established in the Treaty. Even though some Parties of the 
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JCPOA proposed to lift the sanctions immediately, the United States insisted on 
preserving these for a time frame of 5 to 8 years unless the IAEA concludes the 
peaceful uses of the nuclear material before (JCPOA, 2015). Just then, the 
country will be able to recover partly of its confiscated money, which sums up 
circa 50 billion U.S. Dollars (The White House, 2015). This amount of money is 
highly representative when considering that Iran needs around 170 billion U.S. 
Dollars to develop its oil and gas industry, 100 billion U.S. Dollars to invest on 
agricultural projects, 100 billion U.S. Dollars to end infrastructure tasks, and 
about 100 billion U.S. Dollars to content the unyielding governmental duties (The 
White House, 2015).  
 
The United States is extremely aware of its immense influence and 
power within the international community to impose restraints on Iranian missile 
and arms, or any other economic activities. As recognized in the official 
statement of the White House (2015) regarding the JCPOA, the size of the 
American economy is evident on the influence of its financial system, and the 
impact of American unilateral agencies. In this context, Obama has held that Iran 
can’t be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and therefore the U.S. will exercise 
its right to undertake any necessary mechanisms to shield America’s safety (The 
White House, 2015). The JCPOA clearly evidences this when it allows the United 
States to organize the international community to take abrupt action -including re-
imposing sanctions - in case of Iranian incompliance (JCPOA, 2015).  
 
Among these mechanisms the United States has decided to keep in 
place various sanctions associated to non-nuclear matters, as backing up 
terrorism and human rights violations. Iran is still recognized by the U.S. as a 
State that has frequently supported international terrorism; accordingly, 
restrictions on foreign assistance, arms auctions, transfer of different sensitive 
technology and dual-use items, nuclear cooperation, and various financial 
restrictions are still effective. These include prohibitions to all U.S. individuals 
from endeavoring in commercial activities with Iranian financial institutions, 
including clearing U.S. dollars. A list of more than 130 persons, the SDN List, is 
made public in the Annexes of the Treaty to clarify that these are still considered 
threats to international and American security (JCPOA, 2015). Therefore, anyone 
who negotiates with or backs up these persons or organizations are penalized by 
being left out of the American financial system on the basis of American 
perception of Iranian support for terrorism or development of weapons of mass 
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destruction (The White House, 2015). The United States wants to make sure that 
the international community makes Iran pay a high price in case of incompliance. 
 
Furthermore, the Dispute Resolution Mechanism is another example of 
American faculty to influence decisions within the established systems. In the 
official statement made by The White House (2015) it is said that processes 
requiring full 24 days are not expected, as Iran recognizes that non-cooperation 
with the IAEA will foster substantial distrust among the P5+1 and carry a 
snapback of sanctions. This possibility is made substantially real since the 
JCPOA allows any member of the P5+1 to unilaterally re-impose the UNSC 
sanctions in the case of a violation for the initial 10 years of the Treaty without 
prejudice of the veto power of other members of the Council (The White House, 
2015). Additionally, the conformation of the Joint Commission that could appear 
to be impartial based on the representation of all Parties, in reality leaves open 
room for the United States to use stimuli –positive or negative- to acquire 
adhesion to its position. The conformation of the Advisory Board does not grant 
the American presence in it; hence, one could understand the grounds for the 
non-binding condition of its resolutions.  
 
3.3. JCPOA As Means to Grant Hegemony 
 
Hegemony is a widespread concept among international relations and 
political science; it is often used to describe an unequal distribution of power that 
allows States to be more influential than others in the international arena. 
Nevertheless, there are several approaches to this term that are worth 
mentioning in order to determine if the JCPOA can be categorized as a mean to 
grant hegemony. The following section will firstly revise the origins of the concept 
to understand basic assumptions. Secondly, the neorealist approach of the 
concept will be studied in order to specify the kind of hegemony under which the 
JCPOA will be categorized. Finally, this section will introduce the concept of 
hegemony according to neorealism in the field of International Law.  
 
3.3.1. Origins of the Concept 
 
The word hegemony has its origins in the antique Greek term ‘hegemonia’, 
which alludes to the prevailing and repressive position of one actor within the 
structure over others (Yilmaz, 2010). In 1926, the biggest contribution to the 
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Marxist thought and international studies was made by Antonio Gramsci - 
confined to prison by the Italian Fascism- known as the theory of hegemony 
(Bates, 1975: 351). As the theory is based on the Marxist thought, its foundation 
lies on the fact that both forces and ideas rule the man (Bates, 1975: 352). This 
means that according to Gramsci, hegemony is only accomplished by a fusion of 
force and the voluntary approval of the individuals for the system (Mattei, 2003). 
Thus, ideas aren’t able to eliminate the power struggle but are able to perpetuate 
the imaginary that makes the society work in differentiated classes (Bates, 1975: 
351). Even though Gramsci didn’t finish his work to establish a structured model 
for international relations, he set the foundations for other theoreticians to do it 
(Litowitz, 2000).  
 
The most representative author of this development is Robert Cox, 
who approaches hegemony as a “structure of values and understandings about the nature 
of order that infuse a whole system of States and non-State entities” (Cox, 1992 in Özçelik, 
2005: 99). Neo-Gramscian thought explains that at the international level, 
concepts related to hegemony involve relations, tactics, behaviors, 
organizations, and assets (Antoniades, 2008). According to Cox, in a 
hegemonic order, standards and concepts are fairly static and unchallenged 
(Özçelik, 2005: 99). The analysis of hegemony includes consensus, common 
dogmas and rational choice without lessening the significance of hard material 
power and dominance over material resources (Antoniades, 2008). 
Consequently, even if hegemony is sustained in a structure of power, State’s 
dominance –within this structure- in itself is not sufficient to create hegemony 
(Özçelik, 2005: 99). 
 
Even if the Gramscian approach is considered to be the conceptual 
basis of hegemony it is not the most commonly used in most International 
relations literature (Antoniades, 2008). Still it is important to mention the origins 
of this concept because the mainstream usage of the word came from Antonio 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony (Antoniades, 2008). The common use of the 
notion is related to a circumstance of disequilibrium of power in the international 
system, specifically one State exercising leadership or dominance over others 
based on its accumulation of power (Antoniades, 2008). Antioniades (2008) 
clearly explains the concept of hegemony as used in international relations by 
considering the use of force and/or an excessive degree of authority within the 
structures of the international system as well as on the behavior of its elements. 
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Finally, but the author clarifies that the concept excludes circumstances where 
relations are established under “direct and official control” of governmental 
institutions or territories (Antoniades, 2008). This means, establishing 
differences with other forms of dominance such as empires and colonies. 
 
Despite the fact that the Gramscian approach to hegemony is used by 
Marxism to criticize these power asymmetries, neorealism coins the concept to 
justify power distribution in the international system. As Hans Morgenthau 
(1966, in Özçelik, 2005: 91) summarizes, States aim to safeguard their power 
by saying that: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”. Therefore, 
power and hegemony -from this perspective- are strongly related to domination, 
force, and influence (Özçelik, 2005: 91). In this manner, the cornerstones upon 
which the supremacy of the hegemon recline might include geographical 
characteristics, natural resources, industrial capacity, financial resources, 
economic performance, military capability, population, demographic 
characteristics, respected diplomacy, efficient government, technological 
modernization, etc. (Morgenthau, 1965 in Antoniades, 2008).  
 
3.3.2. Neorealist approach to Hegemony 
 
The realist approach to hegemony commonly used in international 
relations is further developed by structural realists, and particularly convenient 
for the purposes of this dissertation based on the explicit reference of the 
theorists to the nuclear issue. The basic understanding of hegemony from the 
neorealist perspective can be evidenced in the work of Kenneth Waltz and John 
Mearsheimer. Even if they disagree on the means to achieve it, they both agree 
on crucial characteristics including that hegemony is the unipolar hold of power 
resources (Özçelic, 2005: 92); it is a fragile situation because anarchy of the 
system encourages States to equalize the hegemon; and that international 
institutions as well as international frameworks are tools that reflect and 
institutionalize the underlying power distribution in the system; and power is the 
competence of the State to use material resources for imposing its will over 
others (Rajendram, 2010: 7-10). These characteristics, gathered together are 
important because, as Gilpin specifies (1991: 28 in Özçelic K, 2005: 92), a 
hegemon “unites the other States into a single international system”. In general, all 
neorealist theories of hegemony imply that international stability is a 
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consequence of the accumulation of power capabilities in a single State, which 
uses its authoritative position to maintain order (Özçelic, 2005: 92). 
 
The conceptual difference between defensive realism and offensive 
realism also applies to the concept and the raison-d’etre of hegemony. On the 
one hand, Kenneth Waltz -as a representative of defensive realists- argues that 
pursuing hegemony is imprudent because the system will penalize the State 
(Mearsheimer, 2006). According to Waltz the system is created through 
modifications in the distribution of capabilities between their elements, making the 
international system change when the distribution of power is modified (Özçelic, 
2005: 92). The system itself provides motivations to pursue power; nevertheless, 
according to the same author the acquisition of power is not a goal in itself but 
rather a means to grant the survival of the State (Mearsheimer, 2006). Over 
enlargement of power capacities could also risk the survival of the State; thus, 
States should only maximize their power to what Kenneth Waltz identifies as 
‘appropriate amount of power’ (Waltz, 1979: 40 in Mearsheimer, 2006). Defensive 
realists consider that the offense–defense balance is usually heavily biased in 
favor of the defender, and any State that endeavors to expand its power is likely 
to lose (Mearsheimer, 2006). According to defensive realism, if all actors in the 
system acknowledge this reasoning –and they should since they act rationally– 
there should not exist disagreements involving great powers (Mearsheimer, 
2006).  
 
On the other hand, offensive realists as John Mearsheimer argue that 
the primary purpose of the State is to maximize all relative power to the point of 
hegemony (Toft, 2005). Additional to this instinctive goal, States deal with an 
unreliable international environment in which any other actor may damage 
another (Mearsheimer, 2001). Therefore, according to the author there is an 
added motivation to gain as much power as possible, in comparison to other 
States. Offensive realism maintains that expanding power resources can 
increase security without prompting a response from other actors because of a 
large power asymmetry (Mearsheimer, 2001). Mearsheimer (2001) explains all 
possible interaction results of the system, which include: bipolarity as two great 
powers opposing in different regions with low probability of direct confrontation; 
unbalanced multi-polarity as a system with several great powers but one with the 
latent possibility of becoming a hegemon; and balanced multi-polarity as a 
system without asymmetries to encourage a hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). In 
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this conceptualization -as all others based in structural realism- hegemony is the 
domination of the system (Toft, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2001) and it is virtually 
impossible to achieve based on geographical limitations (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the author recognizes that the concept can also be applied to 
regions or matters of jurisdiction, and in fact this type of hegemony is often the 
principal objective of States (Toft, 2005). To exemplify this condition the author 
mentions that the United States is currently the hegemon in the Western 
Hemisphere and even if there is a lack other regional hegemon in the world, the 
United States can’t be considered a global hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that both streams of neorealism 
agree that nuclear hegemony –specifically– is achievable when one side of a 
conflict holds nuclear capability while the other one doesn’t (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
This means that nuclear weapons have low offensive capacity if both sides have 
an equivalent punitive capability; neither gets any benefit from striking first 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). However, both inclinations coincide that non-nuclear war 
between Nuclear-States is possible but not likely, due to the risk of escalation to 
the nuclear level; but the equilibrium of conventional forces becomes irrelevant if 
a nuclear hegemon is the counterpart (Mearsheimer, 2001). Additionally,Waltz 
argues that there are three possible outcomes to the Iranian situation: the 
sanctions force Iran to renounce its quest; Iran stops its testing by guaranteeing 
compliance to hard restrictions to enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear development 
without the international isolation; or Iran continues to test nuclear material and 
publicly becomes a nuclear State (Waltz, 2012). Even though Waltz argues that 
the best possible outcome is for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to achieve 
security, on the light of the JCPOA signing the second scenario appears to be the 
culmination.  
 
3.3.3. Hegemony in International Law 
 
Even if it appears to be artificial to correlate concepts like law and 
hegemony because Gramsci never did an insightful analysis of this relation, the 
basic statements of this theory are helpful to understand any legal system 
(Kennedy, 1982). This ‘unnatural’ relation is also the result of an unrealistic 
contrast between international law and international politics, one echoing justice 
and the other egoism and supremacy (Krisch, 2005). The importance that 
Gramsci gives to consent is worth of analysis because it means that leading 
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elites can legitimize their actions in an accepted web of domination (Benney M. , 
1983). Therefore, it can be determined that legal systems are hegemonic 
systems operating at diverse levels, which are recognized by all actors in the 
system, due to the prestige of the ruling class that creates them (Kennedy, 1982; 
Litowitz, 2000). According to Litowitz (2000), the legal system is by itself 
hegemonic, based on three structural and formal aspects that stimulate 
obedience and acceptance. Firstly, the State is the one owning complete control 
of law-enforcement, capable of imposing codes at the individual and collective 
levels (Litowitz, 2000). Secondly, law is a tool of social conditioning that creates 
the reality according to what the elites consider and punish all inconsistent 
behaviors (Litowitz, 2000). Thirdly, the legal system is a restricted set of 
possibilities, as a conceptual scheme that doesn’t offer alternatives (Litowitz, 
2000). Therefore, it completely owns justice, as a monopoly. Since the ruling elite 
gives all these characteristics -accordingly to its specialized knowledge, technical 
impositions, and intellectual notions- the legal system preserves the social 
structure (Kennedy, 1982). This can be evidenced in the JCPOA on the 
limitations to the uranium enrichment, that the IAEA will verify because these are 
based on Western standards. Additionally, all mechanisms to solve disputes 
include American participation, which eventually could compromise the objectivity 
of its work. 
 
Again, as in the use of the term ‘hegemony’ in international relations, 
hegemony in international law is more easily explained when using the basic 
precepts of the Gramscian perspective adapted to a neorealist understanding of 
the international arena. Even though, international legal systems appear to 
detach themselves from politics by recognizing sovereign equality and are 
reluctant to grant formal recognition to supremacy structures (Krisch, 2005), this 
is obviously a naïveté according to structural realism.  As realism is considered 
almost entirely positivist (Steinberg, 2013), it is considered that international law 
is positive law, and its fundamental sources are treaties (Mattei, 2003: 400). In 
this manner, according to structural realism, international law can be described 
as a process of conveying political interests into legal entitlements, thus these 
cannot be isolated from the pursue of power out of which they are created 
(Koskenniemi, 2004). This treaty can be understood from a classic international 
positivism point of view. This approach considers States as the original, pre-
legal subjects of international law and that international law must have its origin 
on the will of sovereign States. This combination of state-centrism and 
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compliance to the principle of pacta sunt servanda perfectly match the 
conditions to recognize a hegemonic dynamic: voluntary acceptance of the 
unquestioned system.  
 
Consequently, international law becomes instrumental to the interest of 
great powers, becoming a hegemonic technique of stabilization (Krisch, 2005; 
Koskenniemi, 2004). In the case study, the United States as a status-quo State 
uses the JCPOA as a mechanism of stabilization of the Iranian actions 
regarding nuclear development because it is considered a revisionist State, as 
explained in Chapter 2.  
 
According to structural realism, States negotiate Treaties to 
accomplish individual interests, but powerful States are capable to impose 
international law on weaker States (Steinberg, 2013) because of the distribution 
of power resources and costs of isolation that enables them to impose their 
visualizations of world order (Steinberg, 2013; Koskenniemi, 2004). Therefore, 
International Law becomes an arena where States get involved in hegemonic 
endeavors by trying to impose rules, principles and institutions that will look 
after their own interests (Koskenniemi, 2004). In this context, unequal power 
distribution becomes essential to develop legal strategies because powerful 
States can stabilize the system by dominating it through the legitimacy that 
other States have granted them in previous legal forms, through hegemony in 
Gramscian terms (Krisch, 2005). Stephen Krasner –based on neorealist 
guidelines- proposed a vastly schematized theory establishing that international 
law can’t oppose the structure of the international system. In summary, the 
neorealist theory States that International Law is the result of the struggle of 
power between States, and that powerful States can force weaker States to 
acknowledge international conventions they would not customarily agree upon 
(Krasner 1999). This can be evidenced in Iranian acceptance of the negotiation 
process itself and the signing of the JCPOA, because these both were done on 
Western territories and with the participation of institutions created by the 
United States and other powerful States of the system e.g. the UNSC and the 
IAEA. Additionally, the open possibility of re-introducing sanctions imposes 
American interests –through negative motivation- to Iran, as explained in 
Chapter 1.  
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According to neorealism, there are two types of international law 
instruments: “non-political international law” and “political international law” (Steinberg, 
2013). Morgenthau (1940) establishes that the former consists of all Treaties 
that benefit States unrelatedly to international distribution of power sources as 
Law of Treaties, and the latter involves all Treaties benefiting States according 
to particular power holding as Treaties of Alliance (Steinberg, 2013). In this 
manner Krasner concludes that hard law is made through decision-making 
processes that typically reflect underlying power structures, and consent may or 
may not be coerced based on divergent or convergent self-interests (Steinberg, 
2013). Furthermore, Krisch (2005) explains that it is commonly harder to 
achieve consent in multilateral Treaties because on limited influence of the 
powerful State in all Parties and the possibility of unity to counterbalance such 
State. On the contrary, bilateral negotiations are more susceptible to be 
negotiated based on direct reciprocation, unequal commitments of the Parties 
and lack of formal equality; which is the result of the more powerful State 
influence on the other Party (Krisch, 2005). Nevertheless, the author highlights 
that even though these inequalities are more often found in bilateral 
agreements, these are generally accepted and therefore less obvious (Krisch, 
2005).  
 
Still, dominance of States does not limit itself to the formulation of the 
Treaties. It can also be identified in their interpretation process and compliance. 
For neorealism, interpretation cannot profoundly change the balance of power 
throughout which the legal instrument was created, meaning the international 
political situation represented in the Treaty (Steinberg, 2013). Nevertheless, 
hegemonic reassurance appears as the situation where States confront one 
another by referring to legal agreements with their own individualistic meaning 
for the term to encourage their own visions of the ideal world order 
(Koskenniemi, 2004). At this moment, powerful States will only back and obey 
tribunal verdicts if the interpretation does not overrule against the interests of 
powerful States. Consequently, interpretation reproduces status quo. Regarding 
compliance, Krasner specifies that States commonly comply with both non-
political Treaties and political Treaties, mainly because it is of interest of the 
signatories to avoid coercive measures (Steinberg, 2013). Therefore, imposition 
by negotiation to accept a legal instrument is part of hegemonic strategy in the 
form of blackmail (Mattei, 2003). This, as mentioned before, is clearly evident in 
the mechanisms of resolution of disputes because the American presence in 
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this instance will ensure a favorable interpretation of terms and concepts for the 
United States.  
 
This final chapter has had a high level of theoretical content. However, 
we can say that the third specific objective of this work has been accomplished 
by verifying the existence of a hegemonic dynamic between the United States 
and Iran through the clauses established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA). By analyzing the general nuclear legal framework through a 
teleological perspective and the JCPOA through a much detailed literally and 
logical document analysis, the elements that draw the most attention is the 
possibility for the United States of reintroducing the sanctions to Iran in case of 
incompliance for the sake of international security. Additionally, it is clear that 
Iran had to accept the constant verification of the IAEA to not risk the possibility 
of recovering these sanctions or additional ones. 
 
Additionally, the conceptualization of hegemony and structural realism 
in International Public Law has displayed the importance of the before 
described Articles in the hegemonic dynamics between both countries. The 
JCPOA according to Krasner can be considered a political international law 
instrument and thus the conditions stated in this instrument were largely 
influenced by the most powerful State. Finally, the JCPOA constitutes a 
prodigious example of hegemony in legal instruments as Krasner and Steinberg 
conceptualize, as a perpetuation of the underlying power distribution of the 
system. 
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VII. ANALYSIS 
 
At the end of this dissertation, it can be said that the general objective: to 
analyze the influence of American foreign policy in the signing of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) to remain a hegemon over Iran in 
nuclear issues was achieved. According to structural realism, the existence of 
nuclear weapons discourages entrepreneurship of any form of war because of its 
high potential of retaliation and the costly risk of destruction, which in fact 
explains the creation of a legally binding document between the United States 
and Iran. To understand the negotiations between a Nuclear-Weapon State and 
a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, Waltz suggests that the biggest change of the 
system so far has been nuclear development and its evolution has incorporated 
new actors in the nuclear relations. These non-traditional nuclear actors –like 
Iran– have determined changes in the American foreign policy until the present 
day. These modifications, according to neorealism, reflect the fact that the 
distribution of capabilities in the international system has also changed as it was 
detailed in the historical review of American foreign policy during and after the 
Cold War.  According to John Mearsheimer, this temporality is important because 
since then States are now motivated to acquire nuclear weapons to provide 
themselves additional safety. For instance, Iran -as a Shiite State in a Sunni 
populated region and anti-western State in a primarily western-dominated 
system- would have reason to feel the need of developing nuclear weapons to 
grant its existence in the system.   
 
According to Mearsheimer, neorealism responds to the five following 
assumptions. First, great powers are the main actors in the anarchic system. For 
instance, this materializes in the case study through the protagonist role of the 
United States over Iran in the system. Second, all States have the military 
capability to inflict harm other States. Here, the importance of how these 
artilleries vary over time in the United States and Iran will determine which 
country can inflict the greatest damage. Third, it is almost impossible to discern 
another State’s intentions with a high degree of certainty. These intentions can 
be divided in two: States that ultimately want to know whether other States are 
determined to use force to alter the balance of power are known as revisionist 
States and those satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force 
to change it are known as status quo States. On the one hand, Iran could be 
categorized as a revisionist State -from the American perspective- between the 
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Islamic Revolution and the Ahmadinejad Administration because it challenged the 
dominant actor in the system. Fourth, the main goal of States is survival, which is 
verified through Iran’s efforts to defend itself in a malevolent environment and the 
American mechanisms to tackle any potential threat through deterrence. Fifth, 
States are rational actors, capable of coming up with comprehensive strategies to 
maximize their prospects for survival. This assumption can be identified in the 
decision of negotiating a Treaty instead of direct confrontation, as a result of 
evaluating alternatives.   
 
Neorealism considers that the anarchic structure of the system 
encourages States to safeguard their security through the accumulation of power, 
in this case the United States has seen the need to prevent Iran from 
accumulating an excessive amount of power, materialized in the form of nuclear 
weapons. Here, the two different responses of neorealism to the dilemma over 
how much power is needed are evident in the foreign policy of each State 
studied.  
 
Offensive realism catalogues power capabilities into two: latent and 
actual. The former constitutes economy and population, while the latter is 
represented by military capabilities. As mentioned before, the United Sates can 
be considered a status quo State based on its ambition to prevent any shift in the 
distribution of Iranian nuclear capabilities. The American strategy to achieve this 
goal is the use of latent power –economic sanctions– to grant its supremacy on 
actual power capabilities. This strategy lines up perfectly with the offensive 
neorealist thought that emphasizes the importance of actual power over latent 
power capabilities. This branch of neorealism argues that maximizing relative 
power to the point of hegemony is the ultimate aim of every State. Even though 
global hegemony is hard to achieve, structural realism explains that a State can –
exceptionally- attain a nuclear monopoly. Therefore creating a global hegemony 
in this matter, as the United States attempts to preserve with the JCPOA. 
Mearsheimer distinguishes two overall strategies for States to gain power. The 
first involves direct attempts to gain relative power, while the second type is 
indirect and aims to check other aggressors from making gains. As both countries 
in question signed a Treaty that openly allows the IAEA to monitor all enrichment 
plant in Iran and sanctions in case of any Iranian incompliance, it can be 
considered a direct American attempt to gain relative power.  
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The United States intends to maintain the status quo, in which for 
decades it has been the hegemon. The sanctions established by the United 
Nations respond to the use of international institutions as places to exercise 
power for the most influential States in the system. This is evident based on the 
American behavior within the Security Council through the exercise of veto power 
given to the five permanent powers. Maintaining power   -as a hegemon- is a 
clear interest of the United States as means to keep international security, 
especially nuclear security. Even if at first sight the JCPOA might look like a 
sympathetic strategy, it clearly shows the use of negative motivations to control 
the system, which offensive neorealism specifies as means to exercise power 
over weaker States in the system. Deterrence –even with the modifications 
introduced to nuclear foreign policy during the Obama Administration- has been 
the strategy chosen by the United States to safeguard its survival as a hegemon 
in the system.  
 
On the contrary, defensive realism -as explained by Grieco and Waltz- 
argues that States seek to maximize their share of power and this pursue is 
ineffective because the anarchic system will take care of stopping it. The 
sanctions imposed to Iran by the international community after the undeclared 
enrichment plants where discovered, exemplify precisely this dynamic. Bieler 
proposes that in defensive neorealism the balance of power ensures peaceful 
stability. Ideally, power should be distributed. As this is not the case, Waltz 
confirms that the only mechanism through which the security dilemma is solved is 
through self-help. The development of an indigenous enrichment plant in Iran can 
be understood as the first steps to grant the effectiveness of a self-help operation 
by Iran. However, Waltz also stresses that the possibilities to maintain peace 
increase when States can obtain their major objectives without the use of force, 
which is exemplified in the signing of the JCPOA as means for Iran to find its way 
out of the international isolation.  
 
As States can never identify with certainty whether or not a State intended 
to alter the balance of power, thus the JCPOA is a temporary solution to the 
power dispute. In the case of Iran, even if the current intentions could be 
identified, there is no way to be certain about the revisionist goals that this State 
might have in the future. Accordingly, neorealism States that intentions are in the 
minds of decision-makers, who may or may not disclose their real intentions in 
speeches and policy documents. This is especially important because of the 
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Iranian policy-making structure studied in this dissertation. Additionally to the 
overlapped decision-making structure and the little participation that the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and the President have in comparison to the dominant 
participation that the Ayatollah has on foreign policy should demonstrate the 
unsteadiness that the international community and the United States face. 
Therefore, the JCPOA leaves the possibility for the United States to re-apply 
sanctions in case of incompliance.  
 
According to neorealism, power within the international structure is given 
through capabilities that each State has. Iran has many capabilities such as 
natural resources and geostrategic location. After the Islamic Revolution, Iranian 
foreign policy generated suspiciousness and feelings of insecurity in the 
international community, which caused retaliations from other States –including 
the United States- in the system. This retaliation was constructed on the limitation 
of capabilities. That is, economic sanctions and blockades to the country's main 
source of income, oil exports. Consequently, Iran’s attempts to change the 
system have been fruitless and have high discomfort to the country. In sum, the 
government has seen the need of changing the strategy to avoid more economic 
sanctions and thereby re-possessing its capabilities (economy and population) to 
re-introduce itself in the system. 
 
The JCPOA constitutes a legal document of great importance to analyze 
American attempts to display hegemonic power. Itself, the conformation of the 
parties in the JCPOA –the P5+1 and Iran– reflects what neorealism explains 
about cooperation. This form of interrelation only exists when States form 
alliances against a common threat or when a hegemon is able to induce 
cooperation practices through positive or negative motivations. On the one hand, 
the United States with the rest of the P5+1 have a common threat to fight –
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons– and that is the primary reason why they 
unite. On the other hand, the United States induces Iranian cooperation through 
sanctions.  
 
Furthermore, Kramer describes neorealism through the eyes of 
international institutions, diplomacy, international law and regimes as guidelines 
of behavior because all these explain and predict the actions of States, as the 
reflection of power distribution in the system. This means that, the United Nations 
Security Council, the IAEA, and the JCPOA including its mechanism of solution of 
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controversies are highly influenced by those States that are powerful at the larger 
scale, i.e. the United States. Consequently, the JCPOA is the embodiment of the 
status quo. The same author States that Treaties create an asymmetric 
coordination through military or economic pressure, which are categories that 
structural realism considers determinant for acquiring power and are present in 
the JCPOA in the form of lifting sanctions and the threat of re-introducing them. 
 
Structural realism categorizes two types of international law instruments: 
“non-political international law” and “political international law”. The former consists of all 
Treaties that benefit States unrelatedly to international distribution of power 
sources as Law of Treaties and the latter involves all Treaties benefiting States 
according to particular power holding as Treaties of Alliance. Through the 
teleological analysis it can be said that TNP is a political international law 
instrument because its power capabilities are directly affected, while for Iran it 
was a non-political international law instrument because of its adherence to the 
ideal to achieve international peace and security as a Non-Nuclear-State. This 
disparity can be extended to the regional nuclear Treaties analyzed in this 
dissertation because American adherence is highly political, while the other Non-
Nuclear-Weapon States obtain nothing in return but the satisfaction of 
contributing to international peace and security in exchange of sanctions in case 
of incompliance. Therefore, Krasner’s conclusions are verified as he States that 
hard law is made through decision-making processes that typically reflect 
underlying power structures, and consent may or may not be coerced based on 
divergent or convergent self-interests.  
 
Regarding hegemony, even if the classic Gramscian approach to the 
concept is not entirely suitable in the field of International relations, its basic 
statements are useful to understand the dynamic. According to Gramsci, 
hegemony is only accomplished by a fusion of force and the voluntarily approval 
of the individuals for the system, which is evident in the Iranian-American 
relations around the JCPOA. The recognition of the representatives in the 
negotiations of Lausanne and Vienna and the explicit agreement of the content of 
the JCPOA demonstrate the voluntary Iranian approval of the American role in 
the situation. Furthermore, the use of sanctions as motivators by the United 
States ratifies all the elements of Gramsci’s concept. According to neorealism, 
hegemony is materialized through international institutions because a hegemon is 
able to unite other States into a single international system. In this case, the 
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Unites States was capable of re-introducing Iran to the system, without disturbing 
the status quo that the NPT establishes. Furthermore, as specified before, all 
neorealist theories of nuclear hegemony imply that one State accumulates the 
sources of power (nuclear capabilities) and uses its authoritative position to 
maintain order, what is clearly evidenced in the JCPOA. The United States does 
play a hegemonic role over Iran because the Treaty limits Iranian capability of 
developing nuclear weapons, while the United States has no restriction to do so. 
Moreover, the Treaty explicitly allows the United States to re-introduce sanctions 
in case of perceived incompliance and allows it to keep certain sanctions in force 
after the ratification of the JCPOA, therefore institutionalizing the dominant role of 
the United States. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The hypothesis specified for the present dissertation aspired to verify the 
following statement: the modification of the American foreign policy in nuclear 
issues towards Iran would have been caused by the preponderant role of the 
United States in the international community and Iranian need to end the 
sanctions, which would be evidenced by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan Of Action (JCPOA) that maintains the current hegemonic system. It has 
been found that the hypothesis is verified, according to the following conclusions: 
 
 The American Grand Strategy fosters an ambiguous concept of security, which 
allows the United States to create foreign policy that will look for: American 
safety, American values, the amount of security American leaders consider 
appropriate, the extermination of threats identified by American leaders, using the 
means available in the United States. Nevertheless, as a rational State, the 
United States evaluates the possibilities of best strategy. In the case study, the 
United States avoided military confrontation due to the high costs that escalation 
would bring.  
 Deterrence has been an unceasing strategy in American foreign policy regarding 
nuclear issues. Nevertheless, the deterrent strategy has scattered since the Cold 
War until the Obama Administration. While during the Cold War the USSR 
concentrated all the nuclear threats to America, after the 9/11 attacks the nuclear 
potential proliferators have multiplied and diversified.  
  For both Iranian and American citizens the conjuncture around the Iranian 
nuclear program was of great importance. The new –more open– approaches to 
the topic given by Hassan Rouhani and Barack Obama were influential for their 
victories. The importance of the topic is given by the fact that nuclear weaponries 
represent political and factual tools in the security strategy of the States in the 
system. Furthermore, the strategies that both candidates presented and later 
executed created trust in the counterpart, which was determinant for the JCPOA 
to develop. 
 The American dual track strategy used with Iran is particularly efficient. Iranian 
active dependency on the international economy -especially the oil market- 
enables the United States to powerfully limit the Iranian power capabilities in the 
form of sanctions. Additionally, Iranian population interaction with other States, 
cultures and information around the world allows the United States to perform an 
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effective partnership from the less to the most powerful circles in the country. 
Therefore, the JCPOA as a result of the dual track strategy can hardly be 
adapted to other proliferator States e.g. North Korea.  
 Iranian geostrategic location, natural resources and political influence in the 
region that may cause high costs in case of direct confrontation is the reason why 
States avoid direct confrontation with this Middle Eastern State.  
 The nuclear program is not an indiscriminate concern –per se– for the United 
States, the concern lies on the interests of the government developing it. The 
Iranian nuclear program begun during the Shah’s regime that was a monarchic 
pro-American regime and had full support from the American government.  After 
the Islamic Revolution -even if a democratic regime was established and the 
nuclear program was stopped for a period of time- the United States considered 
Iran a threat based on ideological differences that could risk political alliances. 
This phenomenon is also evident on the sanctions applied to North Korea and 
the blind eye to the Israeli and Pakistani nuclear development.  
 During Ahmadinejad’s regime, the Iranian policy to balance power against the 
United States by denoting progress, sense of distinctiveness and raising respect 
through the commitment to the nuclear program carried a high price to pay. Iran 
faced social conflicts based on the elevated inflation growth, impoverishment of 
lower social classes, unemployment, and austerity policies caused by the 
international sanctions applied to the main economic sectors of Iran. Therefore, 
the motivations for Iranian government to undergo the JCPOA negotiations are 
clearly rooted on the economic cost of ideological opposition to the United States.  
 Contrary to the NPT, the JCPOA as a law instrument is a mechanism to tackle 
unconventional threats presented by conventional actors i.e. States to the status 
quo in the international system. The status quo reflected in the various legal 
instruments regarding nuclear proliferation focus on preventing horizontal 
proliferation while leaving legal loopholes concerning vertical proliferation. 
Additionally, they aim to prevent spread of nuclear weapons and fail to target 
nuclear terrorism directly.  
 Nuclear-Weapon States support the creation of NFZT but fail to compromise 
themselves in a concrete disarmament process. The lack of commitment 
becomes clearer as the United States fails to sign and ratify the Protocols of the 
Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Bangkok. Presumably, the American 
absence in these legal documents can be explained in its interest to develop 
nuclear weapons in its geostrategically located extra-continental territories. 
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 The JCPOA can be considered a tool of American hegemony because it fulfills 
both conditions to determine a relation as hegemonic, the fusion of force and the 
voluntarily approval of the individuals for the system. First, force is evident on the 
latent possibility of re-introduction of sanctions, explicitly explained in the JCPOA. 
Second, it is made crystal clear that the Treaty should not be misinterpreted as 
any kind of exception to the internationally acknowledged principles of 
international law and customary practices. Voluntary approval is also proven 
through the Iranian recognition of these customary practices and the deliberate 
signing of the JCPOA.  
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Having conducted the preliminary analysis and having obtained the 
findings presented above, the following recommendations are made: 
 
 As status quo States can never be sure about the real intentions of other States 
in the system, policy makers should focus on creating positive motivations to 
cooperate because these are less probable to create retaliation. These positive 
motivations might include rewards for States that share common objectives, such 
as support for their initiatives in international organizations or strengthening of 
commercial relations. In sum, even if negative motivations may show results in 
the short term for powerful States, positive motivations increase the possibilities 
of long-term feeling of security. 
 Due to the great tragedy that a nuclear outbreak would mean, American policy-
makers should focus on creating strategies –similar to the one developed for 
Iran– to approach other potential proliferators. Such strategy should be ideally 
constructed on the basis of trust as it was done with Iran. A first step to seem 
trustworthy to the counterpart might include the reduction of nuclear arsenals, as 
a concrete action to reduce vertical proliferation. This action could show real 
commitment to work in favor of international peace and security. 
 Revisionists States in the system should consider that the cost of opportunity of 
challenging the structure might exceed the benefits and lead to situations that 
can threat the very existence of the State. On the contrary, by considering the 
creation of alliances with powerful States in the system against a common threat, 
these might more efficiently grant security in the long term.  
 All legal instruments, especially political ones, perpetuate the power distribution 
given in the system. Therefore, citizens within States should be fully conscious of 
this reality to avoid misinterpretations of any signed Treaty. Furthermore, instead 
of being defiant to the system, States should get to know in depth all constants in 
the structure to use them in their favor to grant their security.  
 To other researchers in the field that might be interested in developing this topic, 
a more detailed analysis of the technical limitations that Iran agreed on the 
JCPOA might be elucidating to understand to what extend the limitations affect 
Iran. 
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ANNEXES 
  
INTERVIEW 
“IRANIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE JCPOA” 
 
Date of the interview: March 3th, 2016. 
Name: Yaser Dastjani Farahani 
Private Contractor since 1977. 
Nationality: Iranian 
 
The following interview was conducted at the Iranian Embassy in Quito, 
Ecuador. Due to security policies and diplomatic protocols this interview could 
not be recorded. The set of questions to the diplomatic representatives are 
presented in this document. The answers to this interview have not been 
transcribed by request of the Iranian Embassy in Quito. 
 
1. After decades of tense relations, why did Iran decide to come to an agreement 
on its nuclear program? Which were the motivations? 
2. How would you define Iranian negotiation style for the JCPOA?  
3. How did you build trust and make connections with the US, what was the 
determinant factor? 
4. Do you think this deal has established a milestone for future nuclear 
agreements with other nations? 
5. How do current agreed limitations on infrastructure affect Iran’s capability to 
generate nuclear energy for peaceful use? 
6. Ayatollah Khameimi said that the deal wouldn’t change relations with the United 
States how can this be understood? 
7. How does the Iranian population see the deal? 
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LIST OF SANCTIONS APPLIED TO IRAN  
U.S. sanctions: 
-- As a result of the hostage crisis in 1979, the U.S. 
government froze Iranian government assets in the United 
States and U.S. banks overseas, totaling $12 billion, 
according to the U.S. Treasury. That freeze was eventually 
expanded to a full trade embargo until an accord was 
signed with Iran in 1981. Most assets were unblocked and 
the embargo was lifted. 
-- In 1987, the United States imposed a new embargo on 
Iranian goods and services, "as a result of Iran's support for 
international terrorism and its aggressive actions against 
non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf," the U.S. 
Treasury says. 
-- In 1995, the United States banned "involvement with 
petroleum development in Iran," the U.S. Treasury says. 
Two years later, the United States banned "virtually all trade 
and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons, 
wherever located." 
-- In 2010, the United States passed the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. It 
revoked, for example, permission to import "certain 
foodstuffs and carpets of Iranian origin," the U.S. Treasury 
says. Those who violated the law could face a fine of up to 
$1 million and 20 years imprisonment.  
-- The law established that Iranian goods or services may 
not be imported unless they are gifts valued $100 or less; 
informational materials, or personal property of someone 
coming into the United States. 
-- U.S. citizens may not export goods or services to Iran or, 
in general, to a third country knowing it is intended for Iran. 
There are exceptions for "donations of articles intended to 
relieve human suffering," gifts valued at $100 or less, 
certain agricultural products, medicines, and informational 
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materials, the Treasury says. 
-- The U.S. government prohibits "servicing accounts of the 
government of Iran," including the country's central bank. 
-- In 2011, the United States added further sanctions, 
including tightening restrictions on companies that provide 
Iran with equipment and expertise to run its oil and chemical 
industry. It prohibited groups that do business with financial 
institutions in Iran from holding accounts in the United 
States. 
-- U.S. sanctions also targeted groups in Iran -- such as the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij Resistance 
Force, and Iran's Law Enforcement Forces -- as well as 
several individuals in Iran. 
U.N. Sanctions: 
-- Current U.N. sanctions against Iran are the result of a 
series of resolutions dating back to 2006. 
-- Material related to Iran's "proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
and ballistic missile programs" are embargoed, the United 
Nations says. 
-- One of the resolutions bans the export or procurement "of 
any arms and related material from Iran," the U.N. Security 
Council says. 
-- A long list of individuals and entities are subject to a travel 
ban and assets freeze. "The assets freeze also applies to 
any individuals or entities acting on behalf of, or at the 
direction of, the designated persons and entities, and to 
entities owned or controlled by them," the council says on 
its website. 
EU Sanctions: 
-- The European Union announced Monday it will ban the 
import of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products. 
-- Assets of Iran's central bank in the European Union will 
be frozen, and trade with Iran in gold, diamonds, and 
precious metals will be blocked, the union said. 
-- The export to Iran of "key" petrochemical equipment and 
technology from the European Union will be blocked, the it 
said. 
-- The European Union already had in place a series of 
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sanctions as well, targeting the oil and gas industry, nuclear 
industry, financial sector and more. 
-- Measures put in place in 2010 include restrictions on 
"equipment which might be used for internal repression," 
the official text said. 
Retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/meast/iran-
sanctions-facts/  
 126 
Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA)  
Preamble and General Provisions  
Preamble and General Provisions  
  
•    The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the 
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.  
  
•    Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran 
ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.  
  
•    This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all 
UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and 
national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.  
  
•    A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran 
will be established to monitor the implementation of this 
JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this 
JCPOA.   
  
•    The IAEA will be requested to monitor and verify the 
voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this 
JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular 
updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in 
this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council.   
  
•    The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN 
Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that 
conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its 
consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build 
a new relationship with Iran.  
  
Nuclear  
  
Enrichment, Enrichment R&D, Stockpiles  
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•    Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations 
on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related 
activities including certain limitations on specific research 
and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be 
followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the 
next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively 
peaceful purposes.   
  
•    Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 
years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment 
capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium 
enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess 
centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz 
will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring.   
(Note: Iran currently has about 19,000 IR-1 and advanced 
IR-2M centrifuges installed)  
  
-- Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will keep 
its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%.   
(Note: Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, Iran enriched 
uranium to near 20%)  
  
-- Iran will refrain from any uranium enrichment and 
uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear 
material at Fordow for 15 years.  
(Note: Iran currently has about 2,700 IR-1 centrifuges 
installed at Fordow of which about 700 are enriching 
uranium)  
  
•    Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, 
physics and technology center.  
  
•    1044 IR-I machines in six cascades will remain in one 
wing at Fordow. Two of those six cascades will spin without 
uranium and will be transitioned, including through 
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appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope 
production. The other four cascades with all associated 
infrastructure will remind idle.   
  
•    During the 15 year period, Iran will keep its uranium 
stockpile under 300 kg of up to  
3.67% enriched UF6 or the equivalent in other chemical 
forms.   
(Note: Iran currently maintains a stockpile of about 10,000 
kg of low-enriched UF6)  
  
-- All other centrifuges and enrichment-related 
infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA 
continuous monitoring.   
  
Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing   
  
•    Iran will design and rebuild a modernized heavy water 
research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual 
design, using fuel enrichment up to 3.67%, in the form of 
an international partnership which will certify the final 
design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research 
and radioisotope production for medical and instructional 
purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not 
produce weapons grade plutonium.   
  
•    Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international 
technological advancement in relying on light water for its 
future power and research with enhanced international 
cooperation including assurance of supply of necessary 
fuel.   
  
•    There will be no additional heavy water reactors or 
accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years.   
  
•    Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and 
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present power and research nuclear reactors.  
  
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures  
  
•    Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with 
Article 17 b) of the Additional Protocol.   
  
•    Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification 
of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” agreed with the 
IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present 
issues of concern relating to its nuclear program.   
  
•    Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation 
of the above voluntary measures for their respective 
durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, 
as set out by the JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures 
include: a long-term presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of 
uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium 
ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and 
surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; 
use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies 
including on-line enrichment measure and electronic seals; 
and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of 
IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.   
  
•    Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D 
level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear 
explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy 
activities.    
  
•    Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the 
procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex 
IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.    
       
Sanctions  
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•    The UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA 
will terminate all the provisions of the previous UN Security 
Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue 
simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of 
agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish 
specific restrictions.   
  
•    The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU 
Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all the 
nuclear related economic and financial sanctions, including 
related designations, simultaneously with IAEA-verified 
implementation of agreed nuclearrelated measures by Iran 
as specified in Annex V.  
  
•    The United States will cease the application, and will 
continue to do so, in accordance with the JCPOA, of the 
sanctions specified in Annex II, to take effect 
simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the 
agreed upon related measures by Iran as specified in 
Appendix V.   
(Note: U.S. statutory sanctions focused on Iran’s support 
for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities 
will remain in effect and continue to be enforced.)  
  
-- Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has 
reached the Broader Conclusion that all the nuclear material 
in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, 
the United States will seek such legislative action as may be 
appropriate to terminate or modify to effectuate the 
termination of sanctions specified in Annex II.  
  
Implementation Plan  
  
•    Finalization Day is the date on which negotiations of 
this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to 
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be followed promptly by submission of the resolution 
endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for 
adoption without delay.   
  
•    Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement 
of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier 
date as may be determined by mutual consent of the 
JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the 
commitments in this JCPOA come into effect.   
  
•    Implementation Day is the date on which, 
simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying 
implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures 
described in Sections 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and 
the United States takes the actions described in Sections 16 
and 17 of Annex V.  
  
•    Transition Day is day 8 years after Adoption Day or the 
date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a 
report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader 
Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in 
peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.   
  
•    UN Security Council resolution termination day is the 
date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing 
this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 
10 years from Adoption Day.   
  
Dispute Resolution Mechanism  
  
•    If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not 
meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could 
refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; 
similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not 
meeting its commitments under the JCPOA, any of the 
E3/EU+3 can do the same. The Joint Commission would 
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have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period 
was extended by consensus.  
  
•    After Joint Commission consideration, any participant 
could refer the issue to ministers of foreign affairs, if it 
believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. 
Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless 
the time period was extended by consensus.   
  
•    If the issue has still not been resolved to the 
satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the 
complaining participant deems the issue to constitute 
significant nonperformance, then that participant could 
treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing 
its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and / 
or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue 
constitutes significant non-performance. 
### 
Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/07/14/key-excerpts-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa 
